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Abstract 
 
This thesis is a study of radicalisation within the context of the UK. The research focuses 
on how people become radicalised, why some are rendered susceptible to radicalisation, 
and why some go on to commit acts of violence and terrorism. This thesis also critically 
assesses how radicalisation affects relevant counter-terrorism policy and how this policy 
affects radicalisation. 
 
The research has been informed through the analysis of empirical data in the form of 61 
qualitative semi-structured interviews. A number of these interviews were completed with 
respondents across government and academia. However, there was a specific focus on 
conducting interviews with the data set termed as the ‘informed informants’. This group 
consisted of grassroots workers conducting organic de-radicalisation strategies, religious 
leaders and imams, and former non-violent and violent extremists. The interviews were 
supported by fieldwork based observations.  
 
This account of radicalisation is presented within a framework borrowed from sociologist 
Erving Goffman’s (1961) theory of ‘moral career’, in order to bring together the factors of 
radicalisation and understand them in a more complex and fluid setting. This research 
found that although some of the more commonly stated components – at the micro and 
macro levels – hold much importance when studying the phenomenon, radicalisation is 
essentially about a change in people’s perceptions of ‘self’ and ‘social identity’. Within 
this thesis there is a particular focus on the role of social, cultural and subcultural factors; 
many of which are largely neglected in other accounts. 
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“I object to violence because when it appears to do good, the good is only temporary; 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
The terrorist attacks conducted in New York City on 11 September 2001 (9/11) marked a 
fateful day in the way terrorism was viewed in the West. Although the nature of the threat 
was already shifting many years before this incident, 9/11 remains in the minds of many 
as the day the landscape changed dramatically; an incident which still affects how many 
people go about their lives (de Londras, 2013). The UK had been familiar with the threat 
of terrorism for a number of years, predominantly arising from the ongoing conflicts with 
the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), and their 
various splinter groups. Despite entering a new era of reduced risk from terrorism – due 
mainly to the successes of ongoing peace talks in Northern Ireland – the UK was under 
increased and immediate threat once again1; this time from a seemingly new and global 
enemy. This threat, commonly referred to as ‘al-Qaeda inspired’ (AQI)2, was brought into 
sharp focus in the UK on 7 July 2005 (7/7) when four men detonated suicide bombs on 
London’s transport network. It is widely accepted that these individuals had been 
‘radicalised’3 before committing these acts. It is the intent of this research to further our 
academic knowledge of radicalisation within the UK, which can lead to the committing of 
an act of terrorism. 
 
One hard hitting point of the 7/7 attacks was that the perpetrators were all ‘home-grown’ 
British citizens. Not only did this increase the risk of terrorism in the UK, this time from a 
new and relatively unknown threat, it also raised questions of citizenship, integration and 
                                                 
1
 The threat raised from Northern Ireland-related terrorism has steadily been on the increase over 
the past few years, and has, as a result, been incorporated into the recently reviewed Prevent 
Strategy (HM Government, 2011). It has also been afforded its own threat level status from the 
UK government. It must be noted that the threat from Far-Right extremism is also an increasing 
concern within the UK. 
2
 The term ‘AQI’ does not assume that these groups do or do not have affiliations with al-Qaeda 
Central, or any of its global franchises. There are continuing debates to whether this type of 
terrorist threat is top-down or bottom-up. See for example the debate between Bruce Hoffman 
and Marc Sageman in ‘Foreign Affairs’ (Hoffman, 2008; Sageman, 2008b; Hoffman 2011), 
published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).  There are also those who argue that it is a 
combination of the two (Silber, 2011). Further, Silber importantly asserts that there are those 
groups who do not agree with the core ideals or strategies of al-Qaeda, or its hierarchy. Thus, the 
use of this term does not assume that the individuals and groups discussed within this thesis 
subscribe to these core ideals or strategies of al-Qaeda. It is merely used to make a distinction, in 
lay terms, of this particular type of threat. 
3
 See the Literature Review chapter for the definitions of certain key terms used in this thesis, 
including: ‘radicalisation’; ‘radicaliser’; ‘radicalisee’; ‘terrorism’; ‘extremism’; and ‘extremist’. 
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identity. Within this particular account of radicalisation, the term ‘home-grown’ refers to 
those individuals who are born or raised from a very young age within a specific country 
and become involved in supporting or participating in acts of terrorism against that 
country or her interests. This is a very critical issue, as it is estimated that home-grown 
terrorists have been responsible for 78% of AQ and AQI terrorist plots in the West from 
2003-2008 (Sageman, 2009). 
 
In recent years, the study of radicalisation has tended to focus upon AQI extremism, but 
it could pertain to any psychological process whereby people’s beliefs become extreme. 
It may then be plausible to refer to this as a broader process in which individuals’ social 
norms are reconfigured through forces of social change where the outcome may be a 
divergence from majority norms. It is important to briefly touch upon the use of the term 
‘individual’ as there is an ongoing debate about whether radicalisation is an individual or 
group process. A more balanced approach, which has been adopted by this research, is 
to consider it as individual behaviour in a collective environment (COT Institute, 2008). 
 
Although the most common understanding of radicalisation has a predetermined set of 
negative connotations attached to it, it can in essence be thought of as either ‘pro-social 
radicalisation’ or ‘anti-social radicalisation’4. Pro-social radicalisation is the acquisition of 
beliefs that are generally deemed as positive, conducted by movements which are, for 
example, attempting to instil environmental awareness, abolish slavery, or campaign for 
equal human or animal rights (Jackson, 2011). Anti-social radicalisation can be attached, 
as mentioned, to the process which leads to violence and terrorism, or even with issues 
that are not connected to violence. 
 
Many accounts have endeavoured to de-mystify and unravel the complex threads of 
radicalisation in an effort to understand the phenomenon further and illuminate how to 
counter this threat. There are, however, ongoing discussions regarding what this process 
entails, how it is conducted, and why individuals engage within it. This thesis endeavours 
to bring together the components of radicalisation in some sort of overarching framework 
– by employing sociologist Erving Goffman’s (1961) theory of ‘moral career’. Further, as 
well as focussing on how individuals acquire a set of extreme beliefs and attitudes, this 
research analyses the conversion towards being willing to support and conduct violence. 
                                                 
4
 The author would like to thank Professor Martin Innes at Cardiff University for this distinction. 
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1.1 The Evolving Nature of the Threat 
 
Some commentators argue that pre-9/11, recruitment into AQ and affiliated groups was 
occurring in full awareness of the British government (Briggs et al., 2006; Laqueur, 2004; 
Phillips, 2007). Much of this was the enrolment of fighters to travel abroad to join up with 
Muslim ‘armies’ in places like Afghanistan against the Soviets – where many countries in 
the West had some interest. Therefore, it has been argued that as long as the UK or her 
interests were not a target, this type of activity was able to flourish (ibid).  
 
However, after the attack on 9/11 the situation changed significantly. This prompted the 
then Labour government to respond, and they did so through the inception of an over-
arching counter-terrorism (CT) strategy named ‘CONTEST’5, which was made publically 
available in 2006 (HM Government, 2006). This strategy contained four pillars, including: 
Prevent; Pursue; Protect; and Prepare6. The British government realised that pursuing 
terrorists alone was not going to be sufficient to combat the threat of terrorism. Thus, 
rather than focussing upon international threats, the UK was forced into turning its 
attentions to those coming from inside its borders (House of Commons, 2012). It seemed 
as though the government fully understood that its previous focus on saving lives had to 
adapt to understand why people become involved in the first instance and the ‘factors 
driving radicalisation’ (ibid). Therefore, ‘Prevent’7 grew in stature relative to the other 
strands (Briggs, 2010). 
 
In recent times, it has been argued that radicalisation has been facilitated by the internet 
and the emergence and popularity of digital social networking (ISD, 2011; Stevens and 
Neumann, 2009). However, countering the threat of online radicalisation has proven to 
be a difficult task, with government agencies sometimes blurring the boundaries between 
ensuring security and personal privacy; as was understood with the details that recently 
emerged in regards to the US’s National Security Agency run programme, PRISM (The 
                                                 
5
 The official name strategy was ‘Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s 
Strategy’, which was changed in 2009 to, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering 
International Terrorism’ (HM Government, 2009). The Coalition Government changed the name in 
2011 to, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism’ (HM Government, 2011). 
6
 Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism; Pursue: to stop terrorist 
attacks; Protect: to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack; Prepare: to mitigate the 
impact of a terrorist attack (HM Government, 2011a). 
7
 It must be noted that Prevent has been part of CONTEST for the previous Labour government 
(HM Government, 2006, 2009) and the current Coalition Government (HM Government, 2011a). 
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Economist, 2013, 2013a). Although this thesis does not discuss the role of the internet 
within radicalisation, this should not be taken as the topic having little value when looking 
at the issue. This research focuses more on the social interactions of individuals and 
groups. These two issues need to be considered in conjunction with one another. As 
della Porta and Diani (2006: 133) argue, ‘virtual networks operate at their best when they 
are backed by real social linkages in specifically localized communities’. Similarly, in a 
leaked MI5 Behavioural Science Operational Briefing Note, it was argued that ‘Exposure 
to extremist ideology, whether in the form of online communities, books, or DVDs, 
although crucial, is never enough on its own. Personal interaction is essential, in most 
cases, to draw individuals into violent networks’ (Travis, 2008a). 
 
However, this of course does not apply to all cases of radicalisation. As well as acting as 
an enabler of group radicalisation and a readily available source of information which 
provides guidance to conducting various types of terrorist attacks, many feel the internet 
has helped to foster the emergence of the ‘lone wolf’ scenario. The case of the lone wolf 
encapsulates a range of different opinions. Whilst some believe the threat is moving in 
this direction, others argue that a recent global resurgence in AQ suggests the threat 
may in fact revert back to its original transnational position (The Economist, 2013b). It 
can also be argued that the knowledge and capabilities of these lone wolves may be 
limited. They may not pose the same level of threat as those who are part of more 
organised cells who have received tangible training. However, as Clarke (2012) points 
out, many of these lone wolves have travelled abroad recently to participate in ‘jihad’ in 
Muslim states and will start to return home. Thus, they may well have gained relevant 
knowledge, or more worryingly formed friendships with likeminded individuals abroad, 
and will start to foster relationships with likeminded individuals and groups in the UK. 
The lone wolf scenario is always a difficult one to judge, where people are quick to 
conclude that the perpetrator was working alone. However, there should not be the 
assumption that they have not had any influence from others. There only needs to be the 
consideration of David Copeland, Nicky Reilly, and Andrew ‘Isa’ Ibrahim, all of whom 
were thought to have been ‘lone wolves’ by some, though others argued that they were 
part of, or at least had links to, wider networks (see for example, BBC News, 2000; 
Gardham et al., 2008; Pantucci, 2009).  
 
 5 
As well as the internet having an influence on how the landscape has changed, there are 
various other dynamics that need to be considered. For one, religion acting as a driver of 
radicalisation has, according to some like Sageman (2008a), become less important, 
with social and structural issues becoming more prominent. Sageman argued, during a 
presentation for the New America Foundation, that many individuals involved in terrorism 
only appear to ‘discover’ religion merely weeks before becoming involved in an act (ibid). 
He explains that we are currently in the ‘third wave’ of AQI terrorism, with the first two 
waves being much more religious than the third. However, this will not be the same with 
all cases, with different people embracing religion at various different junctures of their 
radicalisation. Generally, this thesis agrees with Sageman’s sentiment that religion is not 
a causal factor of radicalisation.  
 
Many issues that affected people becoming radicalised over the last two decades, or so, 
are still pertinent today. As will be discussed at relevant points, these issues include, for 
example, foreign policy, discrimination, social bonds, group influences, and integration. A 
further theme that has been present over time concerns British Muslims, as briefly 
mentioned before, participating in fighting ‘jihad’ abroad. Over the years the destinations 
of choice for the foreign fighters have included Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Chechnya and 
Algeria, to name a few. Many of these individuals returned back to the UK looking for the 
‘next fight’. One of these ‘fights’ came, somewhat unexpectedly (at least in the opinion of 
Western societies), against the West. Similar concerns have been raised with those 
travelling, albeit in smaller numbers, to participate in more recent conflicts in regions 
such as North Africa and Syria, which, according to the Director General of MI5, is a 
great concern to British intelligence (Parker, 2013). There are arguments to suggest that 
part of the reasoning behind this shift is down to the difficulty of accessing training 
camps in previous popular locations due to an increase in surveillance (Soria, 2012). 
British, and Western, intelligence capabilities are limited in the new regions due to a lack 
of support from the relevant governments, or because these governments’ power is in 
serious threat due to civil uprisings. There also needs to be the consideration that the 
‘fight’ has moved on to different regions due to the shifting of priorities for these foreign 
fighters, such as a perceived more immediate threat to the wellbeing and security of 
Muslims elsewhere. 
 
 6 
In fact, some point out that the homecoming of these fighters is even more of a concern 
when considering the fact that their return coincides with the ‘steady release’ of those in 
British prisons serving sentences for terrorism related offences (Clarke, 2012). This 
problem not only exists with those individuals who were radicalised before going into 
prison, but also those who are radicalised whilst in prison (Neumann, 2010). As Clarke 
(2012: 3) argues, prison probation officers believe that ‘around a tenth of Muslim prison 
inmates are subject to effective radicalisation while serving their sentences’. 
 
The pressing question here relates to how widespread the threat is to the UK. Significant 
figures in the field such as Jonathan Evans, former Director General of MI5, stated in 
2007 that there were around 2000 people who posed a ‘direct threat to national security 
and public safety’ (Evans, 2007). This was a 25% rise from the figure provided by Evans’ 
predecessor, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller (2006), almost exactly a year earlier. In 
recent times, statistics have shown arrests of this type to be in decline (Soria, 2012). 
However, this should by no means lead to complacency with the matter, especially as 
some of this may relate to these groups’ increasing sophistication when trying to avoid 
detection. The current8 Director General, Andrew Parker, has been more cautious than 
his predecessors about giving exact figures of people who are a risk to national security. 
It was clear from his recent speech, however, that this threat is still very real and thriving, 
where ‘It remains the case that there are several thousand Islamist extremists here who 
see the British people as a legitimate target’. He added, ‘Since 2000, we have seen 
serious attempts at major acts of terrorism in this country typically once or twice a year. 
That feels to me, for the moment, unlikely to change.’ (Parker, 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Andrew Parker is the Director General of MI5 at the time of writing.  
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1.2 Research Aims and Methodology 
 
At its core, this thesis aims to understand how and why radicalisation occurs in the UK, 
and how this can, in certain cases, lead to some people committing acts of violence and 
terrorism. The research takes a multi-disciplinary approach to gain further insights into 
the phenomenon, including sociology, criminology and social psychology. The thesis has 
been guided by the following questions:  
 
1. How do people become radicalised? 
 
2. Why are some people rendered susceptible to radicalisation and why do some go on 
to commit forms of violence but others do not? 
 
3. What is the perception and reception ‘on the ground’ of counter-terrorism policies and 
strategies amongst those who are, in many ways, the focus of such attentions? 
 
4. What are the wider implications of the findings of this research for policymakers, 
practitioners and academics? 
 
In order to fully appreciate and understand the components of radicalisation which are 
relevant to a UK perspective, this research is informed by empirical data in the shape of 
61 semi-structured qualitative interviews. They were conducted with a range of different 
participants including central and local government staff, academics, counter-terrorism 
police and intelligence officers, and Muslim community members. There was, however, a 
particular focus upon interviewing grassroots workers, youth workers, religious leaders 
and former non-violent and violent extremists. This group has been labelled as the 
‘informed informants’. Many of them have first-hand experience of the situation and in 
many cases are involved within ‘de-radicalisation’ and ‘counter-radicalisation’9 work at 
the grassroots level. In addition, fieldwork based observations were also conducted and 
inform the thesis at relevant points. The method used to collect and analyse the data 
was grounded theory. However, this is not the traditional approach of grounded theory, 
                                                 
9
 For a distinction between the terms ‘de-radicalisation’, ‘counter-radicalisation’ and also 
‘disengagement’, see: ISD (2012). 
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as developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967), but more in line with newer developments, 
such as the version outlined by Charmaz (2006). 
 
1.3 Radicalisation as a Broader Social Phenomenon 
 
Within many studies of radicalisation, and terrorism work more generally10, there seems 
to be a tendency towards chronocentrism. Rock (2005) examined this concept within 
British criminological studies and concluded that there is a propensity to ignore writings 
over fifteen years old. This, he argues, results in ‘evident consequences for the public 
presentation and validation of expert knowledge’ (ibid: 473). Though the most commonly 
accepted understanding of radicalisation may be somewhat new and relatively unknown, 
this should not assume that the principles differ substantially from those within a wide 
range of historical contexts. The study of radicalisation should incorporate a number of 
different academic disciplines including, amongst others, sociology, criminology, social 
psychology, and political science. In this regard, Neumann (2008) asserts that humans 
do not exist in a vacuum, but are affected and shaped by the social, economic, cultural 
and political environment in which they exist and operate. The study of terrorism has 
also benefited greatly from adopting this multi-disciplinary approach (ibid). 
 
The academic literature on cults and sects11 includes a number of underlying principles 
which are similar, if not the same, to those found in processes of terrorist radicalisation. 
There are considered to be, according to Stark and Bainbridge (1980), two main theories 
of involvement. The first theory argues there to be a link between a person’s deprivation 
(i.e. social, economic or cultural) and the deviant group’s ideologies (Wilson, 1959; Stark 
and Bainbridge, 1980; Linton and Hallowell, 1943). However, this theory does not 
explain how there are potentially many in society that feel these deprivations though do 
not join a cult or sect. It is therefore considered that this idea of recruitment offers only 
‘very general contributory conditions in any satisfactory theory…’ (Stark and Bainbridge, 
1980: 1376). Though, saying that, this theory should not be completely dismissed as 
                                                 
10
 For a more detailed analysis, see: Duyvesteyn (2004). 
11
 It must be noted that there are sharp distinctions between the definitions of ‘cult’ and ‘sect’ 
(Stark and Bainbridge, 1979). However, there are those, such as Stark and Bainbridge (1980), 
who argue that although these differences need to be understood, ‘conversion’ to either type of 
group still largely remains the same.  
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those that did join usually had some deprivation in their lives. Those that did not were 
considered to be unlikely to become involved (Stark and Bainbridge, 1980; Bainbridge, 
1978; Lofland and Stark, 1965). This suggests that there needs to be the existence of 
additional factors for recruitment to occur.  
 
The second, and more recent, perspective emphasises the importance of ‘interpersonal 
bonds’ (Lofland and Stark 1965; Lofland, 1966; Bainbridge, 1978). For example, Stark 
and Bainbridge’s (1980) research on three ‘unusual’ religious groups found interpersonal 
bonds between the group’s members and potential members to be essential when trying 
to recruit them into the group. Similarly, Bainbridge (1978) found, during his research on 
satanic cults, that social bonds not only played a critical role in recruitment but also in the 
initial formation of the group. Interestingly, social bonds played such an integral role 
within recruitment that certain members of the group actually became affiliated, and even 
moved into the sect’s commune, before internalising the group’s ideologies (Lofland and 
Stark, 1965). In fact, there were instances where people disagreed with the overarching 
ideologies of the group but joined due to strong social ties with other members. There 
was even a distinct lack of recruitment where social bonds did not exist even though the 
individuals that did not join had similar predisposing conditions to others that did join. 
Stark and Bainbridge (1980) argue that humans will go to great lengths to protect the 
interpersonal bonds they so desire, even if this means accepting a new ‘religious faith’. 
 
Sageman (2004) maintains that rather than devotion to ideology, social networks played 
a crucial role in initial recruitment and commitment to the Unification Church; and draws 
similarities with modern day terrorism. As recruitment predominantly relied on members 
bringing others in, one reason the growth of the group was limited is due to cults and 
sects only encountering a small number of people (Stark and Bainbridge, 1980). Those 
who are socially isolated bring in very few, if any, new recruits. There is ‘overwhelming 
support for the crucial role played by social networks in the formation and growth of such 
groups’, and also in the development of social bonds with existing members (ibid: 1376). 
 
Lofland and Stark (1965) conducted a participant observation of the Unification Church 
and discovered that although the research was based on a single group, the model they 
developed may be applicable to many situations involving an individual’s conversion into 
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a deviant organisation12. They found seven necessary steps for conversion which can be 
considered as a ‘funnel’ in order to further identify increasingly susceptible individuals. 
For conversion to occur a person must: (1) experience enduring, acutely felt tensions; (2) 
within a religious problem-solving perspective; (3) which leads him to define himself as a 
religious seeker; (4) encountering the [Divine Precepts] at a turning point in his life; (5) 
wherein an affective bond is formed (or pre-exists) with one or more converts; (6) where 
extra-cult attachments are absent or neutralized; (7) and, where, if he is to become a 
deployable agent, he is exposed to intensive interaction’ (Lofland and Stark, 1965: 874). 
 
The seven steps are divided into two sections; ‘predisposing conditions’ and ‘situational 
factors’. The former comprises the attributes of individuals prior to affiliation with a group 
and forms a pool of potential converts. Lofland and Stark (1965: 864) explain that these 
predisposing conditions13, like demographic characteristics and structural or personal 
frustrations, have unfortunately, in sociological terms, become conventional in detailing 
why individuals become ‘dedicated to protest against the prevailing social order’. They 
importantly argue that ‘these factors are not unimportant, but a model composed entirely 
of them is woefully incomplete’ (ibid). They should be considered in conjunction with the 
‘situational factors’, which concern both social networks and social interactions, in order 
to achieve a more balanced theory. Thus, these two approaches, according to Stark and 
Bainbridge (1980), should be seen as complimentary rather than competing. 
 
Lofland and Stark (1965: 862) argue that ‘conversion’ entails an individual giving ‘up one 
such perspective or ordered view of the world for another’. It can be said that at the heart 
of this is an altered view of the ‘self’. This has strong links with wider bodies of work. One 
of these is Erving Goffman’s (1961) seminal ethnographic research on ‘total institutions’, 
more specifically asylums, where his concept of moral career has striking resemblance 
to the conversion process discussed above. There are also many similarities between 
the theoretical framework underpinning Goffman’s moral career and radicalisation. It is, 
thus, beneficial to employ Goffman’s moral career framework to inform the overarching 
narrative of this thesis. 
 
 
                                                 
12
 For a discussion on the term ‘deviance’, see: Becker (1963: 8-14). 
13
 These have also been described as ‘facilitating factors’, see: Bainbridge (1978). 
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1.4 Theoretical Framework for Studying Radicalisation 
 
Traditionally the term career has been reserved for those who expect to enjoy the 
rises laid out within a respectable profession. The term is coming to be used, 
however, in a broadened sense to refer to any social strand of any person’s 
course through life. The perspective of natural history is taken: unique outcomes 
are neglected in favour of such changes over time as are basic and common to 
the members of the social category, although occurring independently to each of 
them.’ (Goffman, 1961: 119) 
 
Goffman does not argue that the trajectories of moral careers occur in the same order for 
all people located in differing social situations. He essentially sets out the ‘ingredients’ for 
a ‘recipe’ where they can be applied in different ways and orders, but the outcome is 
generally the same. Goffman asserts that when discussing the case of ‘mental patients’ 
in asylums, it is not important to consider how ‘mentally ill’ the individual is. Rather, it is 
more beneficial to look at the processes and influences which confront all those who are 
hospitalised as they may respond to these in some similar ways. In this way, the power 
of social forces can overcome people, regardless of their backgrounds and upbringing.  
 
At the crux of moral career as a concept is the study of the ‘self’ and ‘social identity’. 
Goffman argues, at an institutional level, that if you put people into isolation, cut them off 
from previous influences, and instil a form of ‘wrap around social control’, the individual 
will come to a point of an altered perception of self and social identity. As a result, they 
may be willing to act differently. The particular significance of Goffman’s formulation of 
‘career’ is its ‘two-sidedness’. One side concerns internal matters such as ‘image of self 
and felt identity’. The other pertains to the publicly available positions. The concept of 
career allows the individual to move back and forth between personal (i.e. self) and 
public (i.e. society) positions, without having to rely solely upon what they understand or 
imagine themselves to be.  
 
Goffman’s position is strongly linked to the perspective of ‘symbolic interactionism’. In its 
most fundamental understanding, people’s interpretations of self and social identity are 
constructed on the basis of the assumptions made about how they are viewed by others. 
Therefore, perceptions of self can be dependent on the different interactions individuals 
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have with others and the world around them. Johnson (1995: 144) states symbolic 
interactionism addresses ‘how we use and interpret symbols not merely to communicate 
with one another but to create and maintain impressions of ourselves, to forge a sense 
of self, and to create and sustain what we experience as the reality of a particular social 
situation.’ 
 
In his account of ‘mental patients’, Goffman (1961) describes a number of interlinked and 
inter-dependent processes and influences individuals can be exposed to when admitted 
into a ‘total institution’ which act upon their conceptions of self and social identity. It is a 
central contention of this research that although radicalisation does not appear to occur 
in the highly controlled physical environment of a total institutional setting, there are a 
number of similar social and psychological processes at work. These can be useful when 
trying to make sense of why, how and when radicalisation happens. Although there are 
cases of radicalisation occurring in total institutions, such as prisons, this thesis focuses 
upon radicalisation in a more open environment. However, that is not to assume there is 
not an overlap between the two.  
 
Goffman’s moral career predominantly occurs via two stages; the ‘prepatient phase’ and 
the ‘inpatient phase’. The prepatient phase concerns an analysis of the individual’s past 
events and relationships. These take on a new meaning once admitted to ‘asylums’. 
Patients are told that their previous lives were false, and how they need to adapt and 
correct their issues. During the inpatient phase, the total institution – represented by the 
radicaliser in the context of this thesis – through the imposition of a process of ‘social 
death’ or ‘mortification of the self’ strips away the individual’s previous perceptions of 
self, social identity, and society. This can occur in many ways including cutting existing 
social ties, removing physical personal items which define the individual and as with total 
institutions, like the army, providing an ‘identity kit’, like a uniform or generic haircut. The 
exertion of various influences through this wrap around system of social control enables 
the reconstruction of a new perception of self and social identity for the individual. 
 
Goffman asserts that there are just as many, if not more, individuals considered to be 
‘mentally ill’ who have not been admitted to ‘mental hospitals’. Therefore, patients do not 
suffer distinctly from ‘mental illness’, but more from ‘contingencies’. These contingencies 
either facilitate in admitting an individual to a total institution, or assist in them bypassing 
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this fate. This is a critical concept to consider, as it acts as a link between the prepatient 
and inpatient phases. 
 
Applied to the process of radicalisation, the key analogy is that radicalisers provide the 
same function as the total institution; though importantly do not appear to represent the 
total institution from the perception of the radicalisee. The radicaliser is able to shift, or 
polarise, this representation through various influences and pressures during deeper 
radicalisation to those in direct conflict and competition to their particular extreme group.  
 
1.5 Radicalisation as a Moral Career 
 
Accounts of radicalisation normally adopt either a ‘dispositional’ or ‘situational’ approach. 
Within dispositional accounts there is a belief that those involved in terrorism have some 
sort of psychological deficiency as compared to those who are not involved. However, 
there is little evidence to suggest that the vast majority of terrorists hold any disturbed 
psychological symptoms, or that there exists an identifiable ‘terrorist personality’ (Silke, 
1998; Horgan, 2005; Crenshaw, 1990; Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 1997). A more fruitful 
approach, as argued by Innes et al. (2007), is to understand the experiences of these 
individuals’ ‘particular settings and circumstances’ by adopting the ‘situational model’ 
approach. Variations of which are favoured by many across the board when studying 
radicalisation processes (see Silber, 2011; Wiktorowicz, 2004, 2005; Silber and Bhatt, 
2007; Sageman, 2008; Borum, 2003, for example). 
 
A further problem with dispositional accounts is that they lack awareness of social forces 
and cultural considerations. Similarly, some situational accounts consider these factors 
though are unable to represent them within some overarching framework. This leads to 
not fully understanding or appreciating the value of these factors and their relevance to 
other components of radicalisation. Through the utilisation of Goffman’s (1961) moral 
career theory, this thesis endeavours to bring together these factors and understand 
them in a more complex and fluid framework which is yet to be explored in radicalisation 
studies. 
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Prior to discussing the context of this particular account of radicalisation, it is important to 
make a number of overarching statements. First, the term ‘process’ must be elucidated. 
Authors like Pisoiu (2012: 24-30), for example, outline in detail the pitfalls with using the 
term and the contradictions that exist within certain accounts of radicalisation as a result. 
Herein, the term ‘process’ does not imply a predefined set of procedures that occur in a 
sequential order to one another. The term ‘process’ in the context of this particular thesis 
will refer to, in line with Goffman’s (1961) view, a number of different factors, strains and 
influences that are common to a large number of individuals who become radicalised. 
They can occur – similar to the arguments made by Sageman (2008) within his account 
of radicalisation – at their own pace and often in parallel with one another.  
 
Further, one criticism toward studies of radicalisation is a propensity to provide a ‘one 
size fits all’ approach when researching the phenomenon. It must be understood that 
there will be a number of different types of process towards becoming radicalised which 
will differ with each individual and be dependent on specific social, cultural and political 
environments. This thesis merely represents one of these accounts; one that appeared 
to be most prominent from the empirical data gathered for this research.  
 
Second, radicalisation should not be considered as a ‘conveyor belt system’ where once 
an individual steps onto the ‘conveyor belt of radicalisation’ they will naturally become a 
terrorist. It will be argued that there are a number of outcomes of radicalisation; with 
violence being just one of these. It is also naïve to assume that all terrorists at one point 
passed through non-violent extremism (Gilligan, 2010). Though, as will be discussed, 
there may be a relatively large number that actually do. However, this should not be 
seen as a prerequisite for terrorism. 
 
Finally, it is important to consider the relevance of ‘youth’ at this point. There is a general 
consensus that individuals susceptible to extremist ideologies are likely to be young (HM 
Government, 2011), with the average age being in the region of early twenties (Travis, 
2008a; 2008b). Although many of the concepts discussed in this thesis are applicable in 
a wider context, there is a specific focus upon the radicalisation of Muslim youth within 
the UK. In this regard, although the research was not intended to be gender specific, it 
transpired that respondents interviewed as part of the empirical data did in fact primarily 
have experience with young male Muslims. 
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This particular account of radicalisation is grouped into three overarching sections. This 
holds similarities to Goffman’s (1961) ‘moral career of the mental patient’. Although 
Goffman only outlines two phases (i.e. the prepatient and inpatient phases) his theory of 
contingencies has been considered as an additional phase. As mentioned above, much 
of the content in these phases can occur at different times, in conjunction, and in parallel 
to one another. For the purposes of providing a framework for analysis, however, they 
have been represented as three empirical findings chapters in order to discuss them in a 
coherent fashion.  
 
The first chapter, ‘Susceptibility’, reflects Goffman’s prepatient phase where individuals’ 
past events and relationships, including those with the state and society, take on a new 
meaning once they are in contact with radicalisers. This concerns certain strains and 
grievances felt by radicalisees that have the potential of pushing them away from 
mainstream society and pulling them towards extreme ideologies. These strains and 
grievances can be experienced throughout the radicalisee’s life, potentially from a 
relatively young age, and are mainly acquired through personal experience. They occur 
at three different levels: ‘personal level’ (i.e. identity and belonging); ‘local level’ (i.e. 
within their local and national geographical area concerning relationships with the state 
and authorities – including the implementation of counter-terrorism strategies); and 
‘global level’ (concerning political decisions which directly affect Muslims in terms of 
their wellbeing and safety in the form of military conflicts or civil unrest, specifically as a 
result of foreign policy). 
 
However, simply because they are described as an important aspect does not indicate 
that the whole Muslim community is at risk of radicalisation. We merely have to look at 
the vast majority of Muslims who are in fact not radicalised, and importantly the other 
communities that face similar strains, to understand that this does not necessarily lead to 
any type of deviant behaviour. Lofland and Stark’s (1965) argument emphasising the 
importance of viewing these strains as ‘predisposing factors’ becomes especially 
pertinent. Thus, these strains and grievances cannot be considered as being causative. 
This indicates the requirement of additional factors occurring in conjunction with these if 
radicalisation is to take place. Though this should not, at the same time, underestimate 
the value of these strains and grievances increasing the susceptibility of radicalisees or 
those potential radicalisees. 
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The second chapter is in line with Goffman’s notion of contingencies. In a similar way, 
individuals who become radicalised are also exposed to a number of contingencies (or 
lack of) which helps to facilitate them towards extremism or bypass this fate. Within the 
context of this research, these contingencies refer to strong cultural and subcultural14 
influences and social bonds. This account takes a more subtle analysis of this 
phenomenon and considers it within a broader framework which is not just about being 
Muslim, but also about other social, cultural and human aspects. The Muslim and 
religious elements are indeed important, though they are not the only characteristics 
shaping these individual’s identity. The radicalisees may have started off as ordinary 
individuals who were simply looking for some sort of social and cultural identity, like 
many others living in the UK, and in fact globally. This is not to detract from the other 
elements of radicalisation, downplay them, or deny their importance. It simply highlights 
that there may be certain subtle underlying factors which also need to be considered 
within the bigger picture if the process of radicalisation is to be fully understood. 
Although this notion of culture, subculture and social identity by no means lead to 
terrorism or even the internalisation of extreme ideologies, these positions may provide 
important foundations for the radicalisation process when in contact with radicalisers. 
 
The third empirical chapter represents Goffman’s inpatient phase of the moral career. It 
outlines the ‘conversion’ element of radicalisation where it can be assumed that the 
radicalisee is in direct contact with a radicaliser. This occurs predominantly through their 
mutual ‘social networks’15 (Sageman, 2004; Rodriquez, 2005; Pedahzur and Perlinger, 
2006, 2009). They are described by Goffman (1961: 126) as the ‘circuit of agents’ and 
he outlines how they occur in conjunction with ‘career contingencies’. In the context of 
this thesis, the radicalisee can become ‘connected’ to the radicaliser or extreme group at 
any given point. This is not to assume that these social networks will specifically form in 
line with some extremist agenda, but may transpire through different social, economic, 
cultural or employment commonalities. 
 
                                                 
14
 For a more detailed discussion on ‘subculture’, see: Becker (1963); Hebdige (1979). 
15
 There is also the possibility of other forms of radicalisation such as self-radicalisation, which 
may not require the existence of social networks. There are also other ways people can become 
initially affiliated to extremism and extremists, such as ‘extremism outreach’, as outlined by 
Wiktorowicz (2005). This does not assume that the role of social networks does not become 
important thereafter. The role of social networks is of critical value within this particular account of 
radicalisation. 
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Once in contact, the radicaliser’s goal is to convert the radicalisee towards internalising 
their extreme ideologies. As with many organisations in traditional careers, ‘training’ is 
provided to ensure the new ‘employee’ adopts the ‘company’s’ norms. In the context of 
radicalisation, the radicaliser also aims to change the radicalisee’s beliefs, attitudes and 
actions. This is not ‘brainwashing’16, but more in a gradual and ‘positive’ manner – in the 
perception of both radicaliser and radicalisee. 
 
The radicaliser must first mortify the radicalisee’s self and social identity. In essence, the 
radicaliser tries to make the radicalisee feel distant from their existing lives, relationships 
and immediate social environments, i.e. exerting a ‘push’ from mainstream society and 
their previous social relationships, and goes towards instilling an environment of social 
isolation. In this regard, Goffman (1961: 23-24) explains that ‘a particular kind of tension 
between the home world and the institutional world’ is created and this is used as a 
‘persistent tension as a strategic leverage in the management of men’. 
 
Radicalisers must then reconstruct the radicalisee’s perception of self and social identity. 
This is achieved through first satisfying their needs, e.g. providing them with a dominant 
sense of identity and belonging which acts as a ‘pull’ towards both the radicaliser and 
extreme group. As with traditional careers, the ‘employee’ will consider, consciously or 
otherwise, the benefits available to them from the organisation they are a part of, or are 
considering joining.  
 
In addition to this, they must also change the radicalisee’s mentality. This is first about 
creating ‘frame-alignment’ between the issues discussed in the ‘Susceptibility’ chapter. 
In essence, these felt strains and grievances act as ‘qualifications’ for the radicalisee’s 
extremist career. As with most careers, without these ‘qualifications’ the career would not 
progress. This creates an ‘us vs. them’ paradigm, where the ‘us’ is the extreme group, 
and the ‘them’ are all who do not subscribe to their ideologies. The radicaliser must also 
create and maintain an emotional reaction to the grievances discussed at the global 
level, which has been termed in wider accounts as ‘moral outrage’ (Sageman, 2008), or 
‘moral shock’ (Wiktorowicz, 2005). 
 
                                                 
16
 For a discussion on the term ‘brainwashing’ within this particular context, see: Sageman (2008: 
50). 
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In such an environment of heightened awareness, it can be hypothesised that the role of 
the radicaliser might have become increasingly more difficult due to the general societal 
rejection and stigma of extremism. Further, possibly more efficacious CT strategies may 
go towards increasing these group’s operational difficulties. Also, airing this topic may 
remove the oxygen from the arguments posed by these radicalisers. On the other hand, 
this indicates that the role of the radicaliser may have become somewhat easier. These 
strains and grievances are being discussed more broadly within society. Thus, rather 
than having to introduce and explain the context of these strains and grievances to the 
potential radicalisee(s), there is a strong possibility that they may be more au fait with 
them, and the radicalisers may be able to concentrate their efforts on increasing their 
impact. 
 
The process of radicalisation is, until this point, relatively generic for most AQI extreme 
groups in the UK. This is due to the similarities in their strains, grievances and goals. It is 
also due to parallels with the process of mortification and reconstruction of the self 
implemented by radicalisers (Goffman, 1961). What is different is the type of extremist 
ideology they could potentially internalise; which is, at least initially, largely dependent on 
the type of ideology the radicaliser has adopted. With this in mind, there are a number of 
outcomes for the radicalisation process. These outcomes, and the radicalisation process 
discussed within this section, have been represented in the diagram below: 
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Diagram 1: Radicalisation Flowchart 
 
At the top of the flowchart, the radicalisee moves through and is affected by susceptibility 
and contingency factors. From this, they can either continue with their normal lives, or 
through their social networks become connected with a radicaliser. If the latter occurs, it 
is at this point that the conversion process starts to take place. Depending on whether 
the arguments presented by the radicaliser are ‘frame-aligned’ within the mind of the 
radicalisee, there are three general outcomes. They can exit the process and go back to 
their former lives, they can engage in various other types of non-extreme activism, such 
as charity work, or, finally, they can be radicalised towards the internalisation of a set of 
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extremist ideologies. The arrows between these boxes depict the potential to move 
between the different stances. 
 
Those that do become radicalised may adopt a non-violent or violent stance. This can 
include them being part of a non-violent extreme group and remaining so. Within these 
situations, they may undertake a number of positions within the organisation, such as, 
for example, becoming a radicaliser or active enabler for group activity. There can also 
be those who go through the radicalisation process and remain ‘soft’ supporters of 
violence, though do not engage in it themselves. The last group, and the primary focus 
of this thesis, are those who will personally participate in acts of violence and terrorism. 
There is always the possibility that the radicalisee can move between these positions as 
time goes on. Finally, it is critical to mention that having either a non-violent or violent 
stance depicts this as being an extremely simple scenario. In reality, as will be discussed 
in the thesis, there are many complexities with either standpoint, such as, for example, 
condoning the use of violence in Muslim countries, but not in the UK. The radicalisee 
may well adopt elements of a combination of stances, with there being many shades of 
grey in between. 
 
1.6 Thesis Overview 
 
The next chapter of the thesis, ‘Literature Review’, presents a review of the key literature 
for this research. In order to provide a foundation for the chapter, and also the thesis, it 
begins by critically analysing important definitions for this research, such as ‘terrorism’, 
‘radicalisation’, and ‘extremism’. Within this, the section outlines a definition for each of 
these terms which have been constructed on what they mean to, and how they should 
be depicted within, this thesis. The chapter moves on to discuss how different accounts 
attempt to answer the ‘why’, ‘who’ and ‘what’ questions of radicalisation. Many authors 
have represented radicalisation in some sort of model, and the next section, through 
focussing on the ‘how’ element, critically analyses some of the more prominent ones. 
The final parts of the chapter outline the value of using a progressive social movement 
theory approach which has considerations for elements of rational choice theory 
components.  
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The following chapter, ‘Methodology’, outlines the strategy used to conduct the research. 
As mentioned earlier, this thesis is informed by empirical data in the form of in-depth 
qualitative semi-structured interviews. These are supplemented with fieldwork based 
observations. The chapter discusses how the data were collected and which sampling 
techniques and strategies were used. This includes a discussion of the ethics and risk 
management considerations. A conversation about how the data were analysed then 
follows. The approach taken by this thesis is one of the newer adaptations of grounded 
theory (GT). The chapter then concludes with a reflection of the research. This section 
outlines the insider/outsider considerations which were important with gaining access to 
the samples, and finally a conversation about the challenges faced with collecting the 
data. 
 
The first empirical chapter, ‘Susceptibility’, outlines the strains and grievances felt by an 
individual usually prior to the point of affiliation with a radicaliser. The first set of strains is 
located at the personal level. Post defining events such as 9/11 and 7/7, it can be 
argued that Muslims within the UK are questioning their sense of identity and belonging. 
Consequently, they may perceive themselves to be outsiders or the ‘other’, due to media 
representation and discrimination from elements of wider society. At the local level, there 
are grievances held towards elements of general policing and the implementation of 
certain counter-terrorism tactics and strategies; which have been introduced and on 
occasion re-introduced17 in an attempt to counter this threat. In terms of the global level, 
there are grievances held towards the political decisions which directly and negatively 
affect Muslims and Muslim states; usually based around Western foreign policy 
decisions. Finally, the chapter aims to understand why Muslims identify and have strong 
‘imagined’ bonds with other Muslims across the world that they have never met and will 
most probably never meet. 
 
The second empirical chapter, ‘Contingencies’, addresses the value of social bonds, 
culture, and subcultural trends amongst certain sections of Muslim youth, not only within 
their immediate peer groups but also more widely across their generation. It explores the 
subculture of extremism being viewed as ‘cool’. This notion is heightened when part of a 
likeminded friendship group. Within these friendship circles come a number of 
associated social psychological pressures which are found in almost all groups, extreme 
                                                 
17
 This is particularly in reference to the UK’s Irish communities (see Hillyard, 1993, for example). 
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or otherwise. In addition to this, culture is also analysed in terms of differences, i.e. the 
cultural gap, or ‘generational gap’, between Muslim youth and their ‘elders’18. This brings 
with it a number of potential consequences, such as Muslim youth subsequently 
neglecting their religion. This can lead to what was described in the data as a ‘lack of 
Islamic knowledge’; a concept that becomes especially pertinent if the individual comes 
to a point of considering violence as a tactic to achieve some set of goals. 
 
The third empirical chapter, ‘Conversion’, outlines how radicalisees come to internalise 
extreme ideologies when in contact with a radicaliser. This concerns the ‘wrap around’ 
social control or influence as discussed previously in connection with Goffman’s (1961) 
framework of moral career. The radicaliser aims to bring about a mortification of the self 
or social death, through a number of techniques. From this, the self and social identity of 
the radicalisee can be reconstructed. One possible outcome of the radicalisation process 
is, as outlined, where individuals are prepared to commit an act of violence or terrorism. 
In order for this to occur they need to be affiliated with a group that espouses these 
types of violent ideologies. If they are part of a non-violent extreme group, there is then 
the possibility that they will become frustrated with their non-violent ideologies, form their 
own group or move to another, and gravitate towards the acceptance of violence as a 
legitimate tactic. In this regard, there is the possibility that violent groups may look to 
‘headhunt’ new ‘employees’. Once radicalisees become affiliated to this type of ideology 
they have to be promised eternal rewards for their actions, and be religiously and morally 
satisfied with the concept of committing an act of violence. With this violence, or the 
potential of it, comes a level of excitement and enhanced masculinity, further influencing 
them to engage in deviant acts. 
 
The fourth and final empirical chapter of the thesis, ‘Theory, Practice and Policy’, brings 
together the arguments outlined in the previous empirical chapters into an overarching 
theory and considers it in the context of CT policy. The chapter asserts that there are 
three different careers the radicalisee can engage in. The first is the group referred to as 
the ‘seekers’, who actively search for an extreme group and/or some type of extreme 
ideologies. The second career relates to the ‘pretenders’. These individuals can be 
                                                 
18
 The term ‘elders’, refers to ‘first-generation’ migrants to the UK. There are various 
interpretations of the term ‘first-generation’. Within this context it refers to those who were born 
outside of the UK and moved there as adults. Thus, their children, if born in the UK, will be 
‘second-generation’. 
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considered as being ‘extremist by association’, where they are affiliated to extremism to 
satisfy certain social and subcultural desires. The final career concerns the ‘drifters’, who 
are lulled and pulled into extremism. The section ends by analysing the role of violence, 
how the threat of violence and terrorism in the UK has evolved, and where risks in the 
future may lie. Through the use of empirical data19, the chapter then considers these 
career paths in the context of counter-terrorism policy; namely the two versions of the 
Prevent Strategy (HM Government, 2007, 2011). This discussion focuses on how 
radicalisation affects policy, and how policy affects radicalisation. 
 
A conclusion chapter then follows. 
 
1.7 Personal Reflections 
 
When I am asked where my interest in counter-terrorism started, it is an easy question to 
answer. At the age of seven, my father’s friend, who worked with my father for our local 
government office, came to our home to visit the family. At this time, there was a large 
recruitment drive by MI5, the United Kingdom’s domestic intelligence service. Part of this 
recruitment initiative was targeted at finding suitable candidates in other central and local 
government capacities. My father’s friend brought with him the blank application form for 
MI5, as he thought I may be interested in seeing it. I still remember the one thing that 
caught my attention in the form which asked something along the lines of, ‘have you 
ever tried to overthrow a government?’ 
 
I found this fascinating. It made me widen my thought process further than before. The 
world was no longer simply black and white, or good and evil, as had been depicted in 
the many films I had watched in my youth. There was now some depth to my thinking. 
From that point, I have always had an interest in terrorism and counter-terrorism. This 
may have diminished at times, and I may have taken alternative pathways in my life and 
opted for different career moves. However, the attacks on New York City in 2001 
changed that. I still vividly remember watching on television the planes hitting the towers. 
Much has changed in the way I see the world since that day, though what has remained 
                                                 
19
 The results from this analysis were also published as an academic journal article, see: Lakhani 
(2012). 
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the same is the way I feel when I hear about terrorist attacks killing innocent civilians, 
and the fascination I have with understanding the perpetrators motives. It is these factors 
that have led to the completion of this thesis. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
The literature concerning radicalisation in the West is ever increasing in size and depth. 
However, many of these works are beset by limitations due to them not being empirically 
informed or having strong methodological underpinnings (Schmid, 2013; Borum, 2011a; 
Silke, 2008). This has distinct continuities with the literature on terrorism studies 
analysed almost 25 years ago by Schmid and Jongman (1988). Consequently, much of 
the research on radicalisation is dominated by ‘conventional wisdom’ (Githens-Mazer 
and Lambert, 2010). 
 
Innes et al. (2007) contend that there are two main approaches to understanding 
radicalisation: ‘situational’ and ‘dispositional’ accounts. Dispositional accounts, although 
prominent a number of years ago, are mostly now discounted20. Further, it is generally 
accepted that rather than being an event, radicalisation is a process (Taylor and Horgan, 
2006; Borum, 2011). It can therefore be argued that ‘no one is born a terrorist’, rather, an 
individual grows and develops in that direction (Akerboom, 2012). Wiktorowicz (2005: 
85) confirms, during his ethnographic study of al-Muhajiroun (AM21) in the UK, that 
people ‘rarely awake with a sudden taste for radicalism or an epiphany that drives them 
to support violence’. Situational accounts are therefore considered to offer much more 
substance and validity (Innes et al., 2007). This will be the focus of the chapter.  
 
                                                 
20
 Much of this is due to there being a distinct lack of evidence linking terrorism with psychological 
dispositions or psychopathologies (Horgan, 2008; Taylor and Horgan, 2006; Crenshaw, 1992; 
Kruglanski and Fishman, 2006; Silke 1998; Gupta, 2005; ECEGVR, 2008; Atran, 2003). There is 
also a lack of proof suggesting the existence of a ‘terrorist personality’ (Horgan, 2005, 2008; 
Sageman, 2004, 2008; Laqueur, 1997; Al-Lami, 2009; Hudson, 1999; Crenshaw, 1992, 2000; 
ECEGVR, 2008). One of the most commonly agreed factors within radicalisation studies is that 
the individual appears to be ‘normal’ when compared to the rest of general society (Crenshaw, 
2012; Al-Lami, 2009; Brighton, 2007; Innes et al., 2007; Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010; 
Victoroff, 2005; COT Institute, 2008; Helmus, 2009). This is also confirmed in wider studies of 
deviance (Erikson, 1966). 
21
 Al-Muhajiroun disbanded in 2004 under the ‘spiritual leadership’ of Omar Bakri Muhammad. His 
second in command, Anjem Choudary, has since led a number of similar groups widely 
considered to hold the same core membership of AM, such as the now proscribed Islam4UK and 
Muslims Against Crusades. Choudary was also thought to be heavily linked with now banned 
group al Ghurabaa. For the purposes of this thesis, the name al-Muhajiroun, or its acronym AM, 
will be used. For a more detailed discussion, see: Raymond (2010); Home Office (2012: 6). For 
further information, see Footnote 102. 
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Assessing the wide-ranging literature on radicalisation is a complex task which highlights 
the often contradicting approaches and theories taken by those researching the issue. In 
order to make sense of this, it is best to loosely address the most commonly asked 
questions. Those working in the field generally attempt to answer: why people become 
radicalised; what enables this process; and how do people become radicalised? 
 
This chapter contains four sections. The first outlines a number of key definitions, such 
as ‘terrorism’, ‘radicalisation’, ‘extremism’ and ‘extremist’. These not only provide the 
foundations for the rest of this chapter, but for the thesis as a whole. The second section 
moves on to assess the literature on radicalisation and begins by looking at the reasons 
provided behind ‘why’ people become radicalised. Much of this is through an analysis of 
the ‘root cause approach’, which aims to determine how certain strains and grievances 
affect peoples’ actions and behaviour. This approach has also been present in wider 
disciplines, such as sociology and criminology, for many years. The third section 
understands ‘who’ and ‘what’ enable radicalisation. In order to become radicalised, 
people need to have internalised extreme ideologies. This is predominantly achieved 
through the process of (re-)socialisation. However, it can be argued that the concepts 
discussed in the previous two sections hold little value on their own. The fourth section, 
therefore, puts them into context through understanding ‘how’ people become 
radicalised. This will be done through a critical analysis of the various ‘process models’ 
developed by academics, researchers, and policymakers. This includes wider theories 
pertaining to rational choice theory (RCT) and social movement theory (SMT). The 
section and chapter will conclude by outlining the benefits of using a progressive SMT 
approach within radicalisation studies. These theories are of course not standalone 
entities. They are encapsulated within the wider overarching moral career framework 
used within this thesis (Goffman, 1961). As will be discussed within this chapter, and 
throughout the thesis, a critical benefit of using the moral career framework is its 
flexibility to be able to consider the findings presented within the empirical data collected 
for this study, whilst still being able to incorporate and utilise wider theories, such as 
elements of RCT and SMT. This enables this thesis to be able provide a higher level of 
abstraction for understanding radicalisation than many of the current accounts.  
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2.1 Definitions 
 
It is important to outline a number of definitions for the most commonly used terms in this 
thesis and to clarify those which are most open to debate and differing interpretations. It 
may be better to do this in terms relevant to this particular study, rather than to engage in 
a deep semantic discussion, as this has already been done by various authors in the 
field (see Pisoiu, 2012, for example). Engaging in a brief historical analysis of the terms 
will be provided when it is deemed necessary. 
 
2.1.1 Terrorism 
 
The definition of ‘terrorism’, and who is deemed to be a ‘terrorist’, continues to be subject 
to much debate and controversy. Many have put forward their own understandings, only 
to be refuted by others. Thus, ‘there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism. It 
remains the subject of continuing debate in international bodies’ (Lord Carlile of Berriew 
Q.C., 2007: 6). In fact, research has found the existence of over 100 definitions of the 
term ‘terrorism’ (see Schmid and Jongman, 1988; Laqueur, 1999). 
 
Many argue that it is virtually impossible to reach a mutually accepted definition of the 
term (Kruglanski and Fishman, 2009; Taylor, 2010; Weinberg et al., 2004; Schmid, 
1984), especially across disciplines and in different situations (i.e. within policy use or in 
an academic context). This has led Laqueur (1999: 6) to conclude that the ‘only general 
characteristic generally agreed upon is that terrorism involves violence and the threat of 
violence’. In a similar way, Richardson (2000) explains that the most commonly accepted 
characteristic of the term is the negative connotation it incorporates. 
 
Referring to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s aphorism, Horgan (2005) explains that one way of 
addressing the issue is to ‘let the use of a word teach you its meaning’. In essence, the 
act or threat of terrorism intends to cause fear and terror to its target audience; as its 
Latin translation suggests (Lewis and Short, 1879). Though what distinguishes terrorism 
from other forms of violence such as hooliganism, murder and war? Horgan (2005) 
states that much of this relates to the political dimension of a ‘terrorist’s behaviour’. This 
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is of course open to debate and in fact raises further questions regarding the definition of 
‘political’ as a standalone concept, and specifically in relation to the term ‘terrorism’. 
 
A contentious topic within this debate is about who can be categorised as a terrorist. The 
most commonly held consensus, especially in the West, is that terrorism appears to be 
primarily attached to individuals or clandestine groups. These groups may have 
affiliations with larger organisations globally, but generally terrorism is seen as bottom-
up. However, a number of commentators, such as Chomsky and Herman (1979), claim 
this restricts the scope of the term. It should be, and in many cases is, argued that 
terrorism should not only be seen as a bottom-up process, but also one that can be top-
down and conducted by certain states (Horgan, 2005), including those in the West (see 
Chomsky, 2002, 2003, for example). This is by no means a new concern and has been 
raised by many prominent authors throughout history such as George Orwell (1945), for 
example. 
 
There needs to be a real appreciation of the ambiguity and complexity involved with the 
term ‘terrorism’, and a transparent examination of what constitutes ‘terrorism’ on the one 
hand and ‘defence’ on the other. This ambiguity and complexity stems back to the well-
known saying ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’. Whittaker (2007) 
argues that terrorism has different meanings for all of those involved, from those in 
authority, those countering it, those victim to it, to those witnessing it.  
 
However, for the purposes of this thesis there needs to be some sort of definition used. 
Thus, the following definition, which is by no means conclusive, constructed by the 
author, best describes what the term means in relation to this research22: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 It must be noted that this definition of ‘terrorism’ does not reflect the author’s overarching 
perception of the term, but provides a meaning which is in line with this particular research. It is 
felt, for example, that acts conducted by state actors and governments should also be considered 
in wider definitions of ‘terrorism’. 
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‘Terrorism is the act or threat of violence employed to instil fear into a state, 
society, or sections of the population to bring about some sort of change. These 
targets include people, iconic figures, landmarks and parts of the critical national 
infrastructure, in order to cause death, destruction and destabilisation. The 
perceived targets are not necessarily the immediate ones as terrorism can also 
be used as a communication tool in order to relay messages. The motivation 
behind using terrorism as a strategy is to achieve some sort of end goal which 
may relate to a combination of political, religious and social dimensions.’ 
 
2.1.2 Radicalisation 
 
The term ‘radicalisation’ also has no universally accepted definition (Veldhuis and Staun, 
2009; Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, 2009). It can even be seen as more undefined and 
unexplored than the term ‘terrorism’ (Githens-Mazer et al., 2010). Due to the distinct lack 
of definition, ‘some critics have voiced their concern that the idea of radicalisation could 
be used to criminalise protest, discredit any form of “radical thinking” and label political 
dissent as potentially dangerous’ (Neumann, 2008: 3). 
 
In this regard, Veldhuis and Staun (2009) point out that, more broadly, the definitions of 
radicalisation generally focus around two different approaches. One concerns the violent 
pursuit of certain goals, and the other is about attaining far-reaching changes in society 
which does not necessarily have to include any type of violence. Thus, various authors 
make the distinction between the terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘radical’, and argue that the 
latter does not necessarily invoke any negative connotations. 
 
In recent times the term ‘radicalisation’ has acquired this negative implication, especially 
given ‘how it is employed within the current context’ (Innes et al., 2007: 38). In terms of 
general societal understandings, radicalisation is considered to be a relatively new 
phenomenon and appears to be distinctly attached to Muslims and Islam. In fact, the 
term ‘violent radicalisation’ is also, as argued by Githens-Mazer et al. (2010), regularly 
used in the same manner, with it only coming into existence from European Union policy 
circles directly after the Madrid bombings in 2004 (ECEGVR, 2008). Thus, Woodhead 
(2012) explains how some people are positive towards this term as it defines a specific 
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and new problem. However, there are those who feel it to be unhelpful as it obscures 
continuity with other phenomenon (see Borum, 2011), and contributes towards lessons 
from other examples of terrorism and religious movements being missed. 
 
The close association between violence, terrorism and radicalisation is frequently used, 
such as in the definitions outlined by the UK government (HM Government, 2011) and 
the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET, 2009). Generally they describe 
radicalisation as ‘a move from a peaceful perspective to one which encourages and 
thrives on the use of violence’ (Githens-Mazer 2010: 10). Silber and Bhatt (2007:16), for 
example, assert ‘terrorism’ to be the ‘ultimate consequence of the radicalization process’. 
Though, they also importantly argue an individual who has been radicalised does not 
necessarily have to become involved in an act of terrorism. In fact, Githens-Mazer et al. 
(2010: 17) argue that ‘“radicalisation” has no inherent relationship to terrorism’, which is 
agreed upon by others in the field (see Mandel, 2009 for example).  
 
In terms of the working definitions of radicalisation, one particular approach is to define it 
as some form of change with an individual’s behaviour, ideology and action (The COT 
Institute, 2008; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). Other authors, like Kaloianov (2007), 
are more specific in regards to its attachment to social identity. Thus, defining 
‘radicalisation’ within the context of the term ‘conversion’, as discussed by authors such 
as Lofland and Stark (1965), may be more beneficial. Lofland and Stark argue, ‘All men 
and human groups have ultimate values, a world view, or a perspective furnishing them 
a more or less orderly and comprehensible picture of the world…When a person gives 
up one such perspective or ordered view of the world for another we refer to this process 
as conversion’ (ibid: 862, italics in original). Also, in line with Goffman’s (1961) theory of 
moral career, the term should incorporate a change in people’s perception of self and 
social identity.  
 
Taking all of the arguments on defining and conceptualising ‘radicalisation’ into account, 
it is important to outline a working definition which is consistent with this particular thesis. 
There also needs to be the consideration that radicalisation differs from radicalism and 
other terms afforded to more positive methods of conversion, both within a political 
sphere and otherwise. In this regard, attaching radicalisation to just a process that 
occurs with Muslims or ‘Islamic extremism’ is also not correct, as it is, as mentioned in 
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the Introductory chapter, a process which can convey a number of different, both positive 
and negative, situations in society. However, as the term within this account does refer 
to a process by which people come to adopt some extreme (violent or otherwise) 
viewpoint, there should be some reference to the negative connotations it has within this 
particular context. On this basis, the term within this account refers to: 
 
‘Radicalisation is a process by which individuals change their values, beliefs, 
attitudes and actions; and give up one worldview for another. This involves them 
going through some sort of change in their perceptions of self and social identity. 
Some people within this process will be converted to internalise an extremist 
viewpoint, whilst others may come to internalise a violent extremist viewpoint.’ 
 
In order to understand how people are guided through this process there are two key 
elements that need to be defined. For the purposes of this particular research the term 
‘radicaliser’ will refer to those individuals and groups who seek to persuade others to 
adopt their beliefs. The persuasions exerted by groups and individuals may of course 
differ and distinctions between these will be made when and where necessary. The term 
‘radicalisee’ will be used to describe those who are exposed to the persuasion and 
influence exerted by radicalisers and may or may not come to adopt the beliefs.  
 
2.1.3 Extremism 
 
The definition of radicalisation outlined above has little value on its own without defining 
key terms within it, mainly ‘extremist’, and also ‘extremism’. Defining ‘extremism’ is, as 
with ‘terrorism’, a complex procedure and one which is open to debate. In this regard, 
Coleman and Bartoli ([n.d.]: 2) assert that its complexity is hard to see, and that in its 
most simplest understanding, ‘it can be defined as activities (beliefs, attitudes, feelings, 
actions, strategies) of a character far removed from the ordinary’. Pisoiu (2012: 14) 
states it is common for authors to discuss the ‘etymological meaning of “extreme” as 
opposed to “moderate”’. Though this is not without complexity as it implies a common 
agreement of the term ‘moderate’, and can be dependent on who is defining it. There are 
those, such as Borum (2011), who argue that it is not sufficient to define a security threat 
from the meaning of extreme which is said to be a deviation from the norm. Though 
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Pisoiu (2012) counters this by claiming that this ‘is beside the point, since the intrinsic 
meaning of the term “extremism” implies a relation to something, while the variation of 
the political, cultural and social context needs to be assumed as such’ (ibid: 15). 
 
Many definitions of extremism focus upon a specific type of movement with an 
appreciation of the differing factors applicable in each context (Pisoiu, 2012). It would of 
course be best to be able to provide a generic definition of extremism which is applicable 
to all groups within a particular state, and even globally. However, whilst radicalisation 
can be defined as a cognitive and behavioural change in state, extremism is considered 
to be something which is farthest away from the middle or moderate. In this regard, the 
‘moderate’ in the context of British society may well be considered in line with the UK 
Government’s analysis of extremism (HM Government, 2011). Though, what is deemed 
to be considered as ‘extreme’ in one state may not be in another. In fact, the term 
‘extreme’ may even vary across different governments in the same state. One example 
is of how the current Coalition Government in the UK has controversially defined the 
term ‘extremist’ (see HM Government, 2011), as compared to the previous Labour 
government. This has, as will be discussed later on in the thesis, changed the way CT 
policy is delivered within the UK. 
 
It may then be better to outline a definition of extremism which is in line with the 
definition of terrorism. This is the approach taken by Innes et al. (2007: 38) who explain, 
‘Through processes of radicalisation some people will come to assume an extreme 
viewpoint, wherein they are willing to countenance or enact violence in pursuit of their 
goals’. Most importantly they explain that ‘whilst the concept of radicalisation captures 
the process of conversion, extremism is the position that some people come to assume 
through exposure to this process’ (ibid). With this in mind, the term can be defined, for 
the purposes of this thesis, as:  
 
‘Extremism is the position some people and groups come to assume after going 
through the process of radicalisation. Those who support violence and terrorism 
tacitly, do not condemn other’s use of it, or have links to local or global violent or 
terrorist organisations are defined as “extremists”. Whilst those who explicitly 
support, incite and/or engage in the use of violence and terrorism as a tactic to 
achieve some sort of end goal are defined as “violent extremists”.’  
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2.2 Assessing the ‘Why’: A Root Cause Approach 
 
A relatively large proportion of radicalisation research analyses whether the existence of 
‘root causes’23 can illuminate ‘why’ people become radicalised. This approach has 
gained much traction over the last decade (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009; COT Institute, 
2008). The theory stresses that those who are susceptible to radicalisation, are in the 
process, or have become radicalised, believe they are socially, politically or economically 
deprived of something they are entitled to, as compared to those around them (Muller, 
1985; Walker and Smith, 2002; Gurr, 1970). This disadvantage (perceived or otherwise) 
is turned into frustration – a development of the ‘frustration-aggression’ theory – and this 
subsequent anger can potentially be channelled into terrorism (Sageman, 2008).  
 
Crenshaw (1981) argues the need for a distinction, although one with blurred boundaries 
(Noricks, 2009), between root causes considered as ‘permissive’ and ‘precipitant’; where 
‘precipitant’ factors are also referred to as ‘triggers’ (see, COT Institute, 2008; ECEGVR, 
2008; Noricks, 2009, for example). The former ‘set the stage, whereas the latter are the 
miscellaneous sparks that trigger such developments as…the use of terrorism’ (Davis 
and Cragin, 2009: xviii). There should, however, be caution with using the term ‘trigger’ 
as it implies some sort of causation and can be misinterpreted to refer to a ‘mechanical’ 
event which is deterministic. This would assume that everyone affected by these strains 
and grievances become radicalised, when in reality only a very small percentage actually 
do.  
 
The permissive root causes cited within various accounts of radicalisation are numerous 
and wide-ranging and concern the socio-economic, social, and historical spheres, whilst 
precipitant factors generally allude to macro-level political grievances24. One commonly 
cited permissive factor suggests that socio-economic disadvantage and a lack of social 
mobility have prominent effects on radicalisation25 (see, Smith, 2008; HM Government, 
                                                 
23
 The manner in which ‘root causes’ of radicalisation are grouped can vary greatly. See: COT 
Institute (2008); Francis (2012); Veldhuis and Staun (2009); McCauley and Moskalenko (2008). 
24
 For detailed examples of ‘permissive’ and ‘precipitant’ root causes, see: COT Institute (2008); 
Noricks (2009); Kirby (2007).  
25
 In the UK, much of this is fuelled by studies showing certain Muslim communities to have the 
highest rates of unemployment, fewest educational qualifications and the poorest health (see 
Modood et al., 1997; Carvel, 2004; Ansari, 2002; Peach, 2005; Abbas, 2009; Anwar, 2005; 
Graham, 2004, for example). 
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2011; Gurr, 1970, for example). On the other hand, alternative research has shown there 
to be no apparent link between socio-economic deprivations and radicalisation (Krueger 
and Maleckova, 2003; Roy, 2008; Laqueur, 2004; Lieven, 2008). Therefore, those such 
as Ballin (2007) and Nasser-Eddine et al. (2011) argue that it should not be considered 
as a ‘causal relationship’. Thus, Sageman’s (2008) argument that social, economic and 
structural strains shift over long periods of time, whereas terrorism occurs in a much 
shorter time span is useful to consider.  
 
Another permissive factor regularly cited concerns the lack of integration (perceived and 
actual) of immigrant settlers into their host country (Rotella, 2002; Kaloianov, 2007; Pew 
Research Center, 2007). However, once again, not all subscribe to this theory (Pisoiu, 
2007; Ali, 2008; Schindler, 2007). In fact, some refer to the various surveys that show 
the vast majority of Muslims to personally feel well integrated into the UK and proud to 
be British (Wind-Cowie and Gregory, 2011).  
 
This then may not be about integration per se, but more about identity. Many argue that 
Muslim youth in the West are frequently torn between the often conflicting identities of 
their parents’ homelands and the secular West (Neumann, 2008; Franz, 2007; STREET, 
[n.d.]). As a result, they cannot attach an identity to either one, or may rebel against both 
(Choudhury, 2007; Malik, 2004; Mirza et al., 2007; Roy, 2004). They may also have to 
balance the identity of religion, which is often a complex task (Ismail, 2004). Identities 
are not singular or fixed, and can be subject to ever increasing change (Kahani-Hopkins 
and Hopkins, 2002; Castells, 1997). However, some even argue that the identities young 
Muslims are trying to balance are starting to become obsolete (Kepel, 2004).  
 
Further, after events like the Bradford and Oldham riots in 2001, some studies have 
suggested that Muslim men are seen as the new ‘folk devils’ and ‘enemy within’ (Bowling 
et al., 2008; Hudson, 2007). Giddens (1991) argues, under these strains and in an era of 
flux, people are more likely to retreat to traditional ideas and identities as a way of coping 
with this change. This challenges their own perceptions of identity, where belonging in 
their own communities deepens as hostility (perceived or otherwise) from wider society 
increases (Roy, 2004; Choudhury, 2007).  
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Moving on to precipitant factors, although there are many outlined in various accounts of 
radicalisation, one is most commonly mentioned in a Western context. This concerns the 
social, economic, and political wellbeing of Muslims globally; normally in Muslim states. 
Much of this is to do with the deaths of Muslim civilians through the direct and indirect 
consequences of Western foreign policy. This is not exclusive to conflicts involving the 
West, as it also relates to issues concerning states and regions such as Kashmir, Bosnia 
and Palestine (Bloom, 2007; STREET, [n.d.]).  
 
There are those that discount the importance of foreign policy within radicalisation. One 
of their arguments relates to the existence of AQI extremism in the UK before the attacks 
on 9/11 (and subsequent invasion of Afghanistan), albeit in considerably smaller size. 
However, it may be plausible to argue that considering foreign policy in a direct context, 
i.e. in terms of the UK’s military operations, is far too simplistic. There must be some 
reflection of Britain’s foreign policy decisions (or lack of) pre-9/11, like the genocide of 
Bosnian Muslim civilians in the 1990s (Brighton, 2007). This issue was pre-warned by 
prominent figures like former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who predicted the 
rise of ‘Islamic extremism’ if the West did not intervene in the crisis (Thatcher, 1992). 
This is not a standalone issue, with some arguing that conflicts in Algeria, Chechnya, 
Albania, and Kosovo, for example, led to the awakening of Muslims who felt that this was 
not in fact a ‘coincidence’, but due to the West perceiving Islam to be a threat after the 
demise of Soviet communism (Taseer, 2005). 
 
It is only when foreign policy is discussed in relation to an imagined community that it 
has any relevance to Muslims in the West who normally have no direct affiliation, except 
religion, to the people in question. This hurt and humiliation is not ‘personally’ felt by 
radicalisees in the West but in the context of the ‘Ummah’; a concept which relates to the 
global kinship of Muslims (Baker, 2011; AIVD, 2006). As a consequence, witnessing the 
humiliation of others who are perceived to be closely affiliated to them can ‘evoke strong 
anger’ (Sageman, 2008: 73). However, the concept of the Ummah is adopted by a vast 
number of Muslims which indicates the existence of additional factors for radicalisation to 
occur. 
 
Taking a broad perspective on the root cause analysis, similarities can be drawn 
between this approach and wider studies in sociology and criminology. Although a large 
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number of accounts of radicalisation and terrorism may not mention the term, they are 
essentially ‘anomie’ based accounts where parallels can be seen with studies in crime 
and deviance (Downes and Rock, 2003). Erikson (1966), for example, found that 
exerting some type of macro-level pressure or stress onto a community meant that the 
tension filtered down to the individual potentially causes them to engage in deviancy. 
This concept has been labelled as ‘strain theory’, with much of its inception being 
attributed to sociologist Robert Merton (1938)26. 
 
There is also some relation between ‘root cause’ based accounts of radicalisation and 
concepts such as ‘social disorganization theory’. Emanating from research conducted by 
Shaw and McKay (1942) of the Chicago School, the theory is generally applied to 
understanding deviancy and crime. Faris (1955) evolved this theory in an attempt to 
make connections between social pathologies and social issues. Thus, under conditions 
of social disorganisation there is the possibility of an increase of social issues such as 
crime, rates of alcoholism, mental health, and suicide, for example. 
 
However, there is no evidence to suggest that these large-scale structural forces are 
causal factors within radicalisation, especially when considering that there are many who 
experience similar, if not the same, strains and are not radicalised (Horgan, 2005, 2008; 
Innes et al., 2007). Therefore, although this approach has been embraced by certain 
academics like Gurr27 (1970) and organisations like the United Nations (Bovenkerk and 
Chakra, 2004), assuming that root causes alone directly leads to terrorism is vehemently 
discounted by many authors (see Horgan, 2005, 2008; Noricks, 2009, for example). 
 
The current trend is to argue that they are not causative factors per se, but facilitate an 
enabling environment where terrorism is more likely to occur (Noricks, 2009; ECEGVR, 
2008). They should thus be considered as ‘background contributing factors’ (Korteweg et 
al., 2010: 29). Innes et al. (2007: 49) add that these types of factors ‘are suggestive of 
why some individuals are “radicalisable”, but not how they are radicalised.’ Thus, a better 
method is to ‘identify predisposing risk factors for involvement in terrorism…as a prelude 
                                                 
26
 However, it must be noted that there is much ambiguity between Merton’s strain theory and his 
adaptation of anomie, and it has been subject to much praise and criticism alike (Featherstone 
and Deflam, 2003). 
27
 It must be noted that Gurr and other advocates have since abandoned or developed their 
approach. However, some still remain dedicated to this stance (Brush, 1996). 
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to some form of risk assessment for prediction of involvement.’ (Horgan, 2008: 84). With 
this there needs to be the existence of additional factors for radicalisation to occur (Innes 
et al., 2007). 
 
2.3 Who and What Enables the Process of Radicalisation 
 
As mentioned in the Introductory chapter, there is a fierce and public debate concerning 
whether AQ terrorism is established as a top-down or bottom up process28. Within his 
book, Silber (2011) analysed important secondary data sources of sixteen terrorism plots 
against the West. As well as determining that all plots started off in the West, i.e. where 
initial radicalisation occurred, he argued there to be three different types of situation. The 
first is labelled as ‘command and control’ where recruitment, objectives, resources and 
knowledge are all filtered top-down from AQ. Second are the ‘suggested plots’, where 
radicalisees travel to certain Muslim areas of the world, such as the Af-Pak region, for 
example, in order to provide supplies to or join and fight with the Mujahedeen. Once they 
arrive, they may potentially be informed that there are enough supplies or fighters and 
the best way to help the ‘cause’ is to return back to their home country in the West and 
carry out some sort of attack. He asserts that the details of this plot are, more often than 
not, left to the perpetrator. Third, relates to those plots that are AQI which do not assume 
that there is any type of contact, let alone direction, from AQ hierarchy. These individuals 
and groups will conduct acts of terrorism, such as the atrocities on Madrid’s underground 
system in 2004, as they simply agree with the core ideals of AQ and unofficially attach its 
name to the attack. Silber importantly points out that most of the plots he analysed were 
‘bottom-up’ initiatives. What is common across Silber’s analysis is the interaction that 
people have with one another.  
 
In many cases of radicalisation it can be argued that there is the need for contact with an 
extreme ideologue and/or group. There are many who assert that this mostly occurs29 
through the existence of social networks. This can be seen in wide-ranging contexts like, 
for example, cults (Stark and Bainbridge, 1980), total institutions (Goffman, 1961), and 
terrorism (Sageman, 2004; Rodriquez, 2005; Pedahzur and Perlinger, 2006, 2009). 
                                                 
28
 For further information, see Footnote 2. 
29
 For further information, see Footnote 15. 
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The need for contact with an extreme ideologue or group is essential for the radicalisee 
to internalise extreme ideologies. Even those considered to be lone wolves have some 
sort of interaction – even if this is one directional and digitally, with a radicaliser. Gupta 
(2005: 7) argues that certain theory, especially ‘root cause’, ‘shed important lights on the 
motivations of rebellious behavior’, however ‘none of them make any effort at modelling 
the mind; they do not make any fundamental assumption about what motivates a human 
being.’ He argues the need for ‘political entrepreneurs’ to be able to ‘frame’ the problem 
(ibid: 14-15). Although Gupta’s reference to ‘political’ has some relevance, the situation 
is more complex than this. The important point to consider from Gupta’s analysis is the 
human element needed to drive radicalisation; something reflected in wider studies (see 
Choudhury, 2007, for example). For example, the European Commission’s Expert Group 
on Violent Radicalisation (ECEGVR) argue that ‘Concrete personal experiences, kinship 
and friendship, group dynamics…are needed to trigger the actual process.’ (ECEGVR, 
2008: 9)  
 
The study of ‘social influence’ endeavours to identify how this occurs, and aims to better 
understand how factors such as societal norms, group influence, and social behaviours 
become integral in facilitating this shift in behaviour. Within both disciplines of sociology 
and social psychology there exists a great deal of literature that addresses this. Although 
these theories do not feature regularly in accounts of radicalisation, certain studies have 
identified the importance of some of these concepts30. This has led some academics like 
Innes et al. (2007: 40) to argue that radicalisation seems ‘to involve several phases that 
are based upon fairly well understood techniques of influence’. 
 
Social influence impacts radicalisation in two ways. First is from the influence exerted at 
the individual level, i.e. on a one-to-one basis. This occurs, more often than not, between 
the radicalisee and the radicaliser. In literature, much of the conversation focuses on the 
personality of the radicaliser. This is imperative when using techniques of ‘persuasion’ to 
influence others to participate in acts they normally would not, or with beginning to start 
accepting ideologies they previously potentially had little or no interest in (Cialdini, 2001; 
Cialdini and Goldstein 2004).  
 
                                                 
30
 For examples of this, see: Horgan (2005); Atran (2010); Helmus (2009); Sageman (2008); 
McCauley and Moskalenko (2008); Wiktorowicz (2005). 
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There are many personality traits outlined by different authors in reference to coercing a 
change of attitude in the radicalisee, with one of the most cited being ‘charisma’31. There 
are various theories, often conflicting, that define what constitutes a charismatic person. 
These range from believing it to be a God given trait (Weber, 1947), to those who feel it 
to be more of a ‘theatrical’ stance (Howell and Frost, 1989). What is clear, though, is that 
charisma can lead, amongst other traits, to creating perceptions of authority (Robbins, 
2003; Hovland et al., 1953; Kelman, 1958). Authority is seen as critical by some authors 
when understanding why people internalise extreme ideologies (Wiktorowicz, 2004, 
2005).  
 
The second approach relates to the pressure exerted within group situations. Here, the 
importance of concepts like peer pressure, conformity, cohesiveness, and unanimity are 
pushed to the fore (Horgan, 2005; Bartlett et al., 2010). For example, if the majority of an 
extreme group (especially influential members within it), or a group of friends for that 
matter, have extremist agendas then the rest of the group, or outlying individuals, could 
feel under pressure to conform to this stance.  
 
Crenshaw (2011) argues that cohesion and uniformity are ‘likely to be intensified under 
the circumstances of underground life’. In terms of radicalisation, ‘underground life’ does 
not have to necessarily relate to committing or supporting a terrorist act per se, or even 
affiliation to an extreme group. It may simply concern the acknowledgement of what is 
considered to be against social norms and constituted as being deviant behaviour. It can 
also be argued that being affiliated to a group whose opinions start to converge means 
that the shift in opinion can also become more extreme (Sunstein, 2002; McCauley and 
Moskalenko, 2008).  
 
The various accounts of radicalisation highlight further influences exerted by the extreme 
group. One of these relates to the pressure for individual group members to loosen, or in 
many cases completely cut off, their existing relationships with family and friends who do 
not subscribe to the extremist group’s ideologies (Husain, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2005; 
                                                 
31
 The importance of charisma has been shown in a wide range of both recent and more historical 
examples pertaining to radicalisation and terrorism (Ibrahim, 1980; Rotella, 2002; Bloom, 2007; 
Precht, 2007; Clutterbuck, 2007; AIVD, 2006; Crenshaw, 2000, 2011; HM Government, 2009, 
2011; COT Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management, 2008), and in wider sociological, 
criminological, anthropological, and social psychological studies (Weber, 1947; Howell and Frost, 
1989; Robbins, 2003; Cialdini; 2001; Lindholm, 1990; Stewart et al., 2007). 
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Hudson, 1999). This ensures there is a reduced chance of affiliates being influenced by 
people outside of the group. During their study of cults, Lofland and Stark (1965) 
described this as a ‘countervailing force’. They argue that if recruits did maintain any 
previous social ties then they were ‘pulled about by competing emotional loyalties and 
discordant versions of reality’, with these ‘persons [being] subject to intense emotional 
strain’ (ibid: 873). This ensures that the extreme group is the individual’s only source of 
information (Post, 1987; Crenshaw, 1987; Singer and Lalich, 1995).  
 
There is also importance given to the group minimising dissent (Crenshaw, 1987, 2011; 
Coleman, 1990). Crisp and Turner (2007: 139), for example, attribute individual’s lack of 
rebellion in groups as a bid to avoid punishment, exclusion and ‘social sanctions’ from 
others. Wider research corroborates this, such as the studies relating to certain Catholic 
communities of Northern Ireland during the IRA and INLA conflict (Sluka, 1989; Darby 
and Morris, 1974). This works to ensure group members discard personal opinions and 
viewpoints, and in turn strengthens ‘deindividuation’ (Zimbardo, 2007; Horgan, 2005). 
 
Much of this may be attributed to the individual experiencing a sense of belonging in the 
group and doing all they can to maintain this (Crenshaw 1987; della Porta, 1995; Post et 
al., 2003). This may also relate to a desire to be liked by others (Aronson et al., 2005). In 
addition, being part of a group also provides the individual with a strong sense of identity 
(Taseer, 2005; Shaw, 1986; Pickering et al., 2007). As Wiktorowicz (2004: 14) explains 
within his research on AM, ‘most of those who eventually became members experienced 
a severe identity crisis prior to their initial stages of participation’. The extreme group, 
thus, ‘offers a new sense of self’ (ibid: 16). 
 
However, certain accounts of radicalisation assert that when social bonds are strong, 
this social identification is with the group rather than in terms of ‘self’ (see COT Institute, 
2008). Another argument is that when people are in a deeper form of radicalisation and 
identify strongly with the group, perceptions of self are in line with the group rather than 
at the individual level. This has similarities with wider work such as self-categorisation 
theory (Smith, 1993). The simple nature of many extremist groups and their ideologies 
attracts people who feel overwhelmed by having to define themselves in a ‘complex 
world’; thus they may choose to define themselves through that group (Borum, 2011b; 
Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner, 1982). As cohesion in the group starts to strengthen, so 
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does the collective group identity (Sprinzak, 1990; Post, 1987; Crenshaw, 2011). This in 
turn increases the level of conformity of other members (McCauley and Moskalenko, 
2008; Forsyth, 1999).  
 
There needs to be one final consideration regarding groups. Although many studies of 
radicalisation agree on the importance of group pressure and influence, there is a 
difference in opinion with how these groups are actually formed. For example, authors 
like Sageman (2004) stress the importance of long-term friends becoming radicalised 
together, whilst others argue that this is not necessarily the case in all accounts. A report 
by the ECEGVR (2008: 12) explained, ‘The search for community and group solidarity 
plays an important role in attracting them to these groups.’ This implies that due to a 
current lack of community and group solidarity in their lives, they search elsewhere.  
 
These arguments may well overlap, though the subtle difference is whether groups of 
friends radicalise together, or those affected by strains and grievances go searching for 
an answer to their issues. Therefore, some believe that individuals almost become self-
primed, sometimes in the context of justifying terrorism (Moghaddam, 2005), which leads 
to anger and frustration. They then become deeply radicalised through the influence of 
radicalisers. Others stress the importance of social bonds and believe that radicalisation 
occurs after the individual or group of friends are affiliated with an extreme radicaliser 
and/or group. 
 
2.3.1 Re-Socialising Identity 
 
This section has thus far discussed the importance of ‘who’ enables the process of 
radicalisation, and there must now be a consideration of the ‘what’. At the heart of 
radicalisation an individual changes their attitude, beliefs, opinions and actions. This may 
be accomplished through a change in perception of self and social identity (Goffman, 
1961). For someone to have become ‘radicalised’ they will have internalised certain 
ideologies that are deemed to be extreme. It is therefore imperative for this ideology to 
resonate with its target audience (Robson, 2004). There are many accounts attempting 
to outline how ideology is used to change the opinions and world-view of the radicalisee. 
The explanation provided by the ECEGVR (2008: 14) succinctly captures its role:  
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‘Central to the development of any movement or group is the construction of an 
ideological framework which provides a logically coherent belief system… 
Ideologies link the beliefs, narratives and cognitive and evaluative perceptions of 
one’s social condition – particularly prospects for the future – to a programme of 
collective action for the maintenance, alteration or transformation of society, 
whilst also providing the justification for a particular action. Ideologies in particular 
are a means of understanding the world and events, whilst mediating them to 
align with the aims and methods of a particular group.’ 
 
As stated at the fore of this chapter, radicalisation is a process and not an event; and the 
same applies to the internalisation of ideology. Wiktorowicz (2004, 2005) explains that 
people do not typically have a sudden compelling desire to join extreme groups. At the 
heart of this is the process of persuasion which can be ‘characterized by debate and 
discussion, an exchange of ideas in which movement activists try to convince seekers 
that movement ideology represents the “truth” and provides logical solutions to pressing 
concerns.’ (Wiktorowicz, 2005: 24-25) 
 
In order for individuals to internalise an extreme ideology, many argue that the process 
of socialisation needs to take place (Crenshaw, 2000). According to White (1977), there 
are two separate categories to consider within socialisation, i.e. ‘primary’ (childhood) and 
‘secondary’ (adulthood). The principal tenet of secondary socialisation assumes the 
individual learns experiences through interactions with others and will result in new 
‘assessments and definitions of self’ (ibid: 81). It can be argued, however, that the focus 
should lie with the concept of ‘resocialisation’ as it occurs when an individual is subject to 
radical change where there is a substitution of ‘one set of value orientations for another’ 
(McHugh, 1966: 356). In addition, socialisation simply builds upon the existing whilst 
resocialisation requires the old values to first be removed, i.e. desocialisation (McHugh, 
1966). Desocialisation effectively relies upon the discontinuation of prior relationships, as 
discussed previously, which have the potential to continue influencing, or re-influencing 
the individual back to their former values. There are distinct similarities between this and 
Goffman’s (1961) theory of moral career where perceptions of self and social identity are 
‘mortified’ and reconstructed.  
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It is also important to consider theories pertaining to ‘organisational socialisation’. This is 
where the individual learns the culture and norms of a particular organisation and the 
maintaining of a specific role within it. Here, they acquire the social knowledge and skills 
to assume this position (Van Maanen and Schein, 1979; Shibutani, 1962). Van Maanen 
and Schein (1979) explain that this process occurs with the individual mobilising upward 
(promotion), downward (demotion) or maintaining lateral movement (i.e. the changing of 
roles). They have influence within the organisation when furthest from these boundaries 
and the organisation having the most influence upon the individual when closest to these 
boundaries. This can result in the individual opening themselves up to accept different 
methods of practice. In the case of extremist organisations, they may accept alternative 
viewpoints, ideologies and norms.  
 
Organisational socialisation may generally be associated with the commonly understood 
definition of employment. However, it can also have strong resonance in the analysis of 
extreme or deviant groups. For example, some accounts of radicalisation and terrorism 
argue that individuals leave their jobs on certain occasions in order to concentrate their 
full efforts on the advancement of the group and its ideologies, or at least a considerable 
amount of time (Husain, 2007). Sageman (2008, 2008a) similarly argues that Britain’s 
state benefits system allows these individuals to dedicate all of their time to the ‘cause’ 
without having to work in other employment. As well as being affected by root causes 
and ideology, those within extreme groups may also be driven by a sense of advancing 
their extremist ‘career’ (Pisoiu, 2012), which is substituted for the traditional application 
of the term.  
 
2.4 How Do People Become Radicalised?: A Critical Assessment of Literature 
 
This chapter has so far outlined some of the most commonly cited macro-level theories 
which attempt to explain ‘why’ some people become radicalised. There has also been a 
discussion about ‘who’ and ‘what’ enables this process. Sageman (2008: 23) argues that 
there are ‘severe limitations’ with either of the approaches as standalone entities. One 
method of overcoming these limitations is to bring together all of these theories so there 
is a specific set of circumstances within which the individuals are located. The validity of 
these factors increases when they are part of frameworks which attempt to elucidate the 
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process by combining two or more of them. Academics, policy makers and researchers 
within this particular field have taken these building blocks and arranged them in the 
various ways they feel most suitably depict the radicalisation process. However, 
relatively few of them have gained much traction as plausible explanations for furthering 
our knowledge on the topic32.  
 
There are generally four types of process frameworks within literature on radicalisation: 
stage process models; non-stage process models; RCT models; and SMT models (these 
may also include stage/non-stage models). Essentially, these models argue there to be 
either a cognitive and/or motivational change in the individual or group which can lead 
them to conducting acts of terrorism (Mandel, 2009). Rather than outlining all of these 
models in detail, as has been conducted in numerous studies33, it is better to critically 
analyse their key factors, discussing the gaps and beginning to understand how this 
particular thesis will attempt to address them.  
 
2.4.1 General Stage Process Models 
 
Although general stage process models may have subtle differences, they tell a similar 
story which can be represented in a relatively small number of stages (see for example 
Borum, 2003; Lousberg et al., [n.d.]). One of the better-known examples in this category 
was developed by Silber and Bhatt (2007) for the New York Police Department. Their 
approach holds similarities with other accounts, such as Precht’s (2007), and is depicted 
in four stages. They fundamentally argue that those becoming radicalised are affected 
by a number of macro-level strains and are ‘frustrated with their lives or with the politics 
of their home governments’ (Silber and Bhatt, 2007: 16). This results in a ‘crisis of 
identity’ and eventually leads them to search for a new one which is, more often than 
not, based upon a religious context; a notion which can be witnessed in wider studies 
such as Wiktorowicz’s (2005). They disassociate themselves from their previous lives 
                                                 
32
 It must be mentioned that the models and frameworks discussed within this section are by no 
means exhaustive, but are those they are regularly outlined. Some of these models have wide-
ranging global implications, whilst others might be representative of the ‘challenges faced by 
many Western countries.’ (King and Taylor, 2011: 604) 
33
 There are numerous studies that outline these models and their stages in extensive detail (see 
Lousberg et al., [n.d.]; King and Taylor, 2011; Helmus, 2009; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008, 2008a; 
Borum, 2011a; Berrebi, 2009; Nasser-Eddine, 2011; Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, 2009; 
Knott et al., 2006, for example). 
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and socialise with those whom they feel are likeminded. The radicalisee then begins to 
internalise the extreme group’s ideologies and becomes, as Silber and Bhatt (2007) term 
it, ‘indoctrinated’. This has the potential to lead to violence or terrorism, i.e. ‘jihadisation’.  
 
Although Silber and Bhatt’s model was considered to be groundbreaking at the time of 
release, research since then has shown this approach to contain some limitations. Most 
importantly – even though the authors argue that not everyone follows a perfectly linear 
progression – it represents a general frustration-aggression model which can be deemed 
as somewhat sequential in nature and as a result seen as too rigid. There is no proof to 
suggest this approach has any substance (Lygre et al., 2011). This can be determined 
by looking at wider studies on deviance. During Lofland’s (1966) ethnographic study of 
proselytization and indoctrination, he uses the term ‘involvement sequences’ rather than 
‘involvement sequence’. Innes et al. (2007) argue this to be significant as it represents 
the differing reasons and methods for joining. Thus, ‘different individuals will have been 
radicalised as a result of exposure to different combinations of factors’ (ibid: 29), and 
whilst there are commonly found elements to the ‘individual involvement sequences’, 
they were arranged differently for different recruits (ibid: 40). Further, in a similar way to 
Moghaddam’s (2005) ‘Staircase to Terrorism’ framework, although the different stages of 
Silber and Bhatt’s (2007) model may be supported by wider empirical data, the transition 
between the different steps is not. This means the validity cannot be fully assessed and 
‘render them [the steps] fairly meaningless analytically’ (Innes et al., 2007: 41). 
 
What these types of models do correctly show is that radicalisation is based upon certain 
social and psychological considerations (King and Taylor, 2011), rather than ideological 
alone (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011). Similarly, Borum’s (2003) model of radicalisation also 
goes some way to address this issue by incorporating the consideration of behaviour. 
However, as with Silber and Bhatt (2007) and Precht’s (2007) analysis, Borum (2003) 
provides an overview of radicalisation without outlining out how people move from one 
cognitive state to the next.  
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2.4.2 Non-Stage Process Models 
 
One approach taken by non-stage process models is to consider the cognitive element 
of radicalisation through employing various social psychology and psychology theories 
and frameworks. For example, McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2008) account stresses the 
importance of considering factors at the individual, group and global levels. One glaring 
assumption within their research – through their analysis of radicalisation as a pyramid – 
is that the base consists of ‘all who sympathize with the goals the terrorists say they are 
fighting for’ (ibid: 417). As mentioned, this assumes that the radicalisee is first aggrieved 
and then searches for relevant groups, rather than being part of a group and then feeling 
certain strains. Thus, this approach fails to understand the value of social bonds. They 
merely make a brief reference to this in the conclusion of the paper. Further, as will be 
discussed, this leaves no room for incorporating those who are affiliated to extreme 
groups to simply satisfy their social and subcultural desires, and start to become 
radicalised thereafter.  
 
Of most concern within this account is the increasing perception that radicalisation is a 
deterministic process where individual agency has little or no merit. Although this may 
not have been the authors’ intent, the analysis could overcome this notion by discussing 
not only why some people radicalised, but also why others do not. Their use of terms like 
‘path[way] to radicalization’ only goes to underline this.  
 
Many of the confusions attached to this paper stem from the attempt to provide a ‘one 
size fits all’ approach. For example, whereas some of their arguments may hold true for 
certain female suicide bombers in Palestine, the same cannot be said for ‘home-grown’ 
youth in the UK or US, and vice-versa. Although the paper draws upon a rich variety of 
historical examples and relevant Social Psychology theories, none of their conclusions 
are based upon any hard empirical data.  
 
What is of importance with this approach is the attempt to understand how people’s 
behaviours and attitudes change rather than, as with the models discussed in the last 
section, letting the reader make their own assumptions. The authors importantly highlight 
the need for radicalisation to refocus upon individual actors as well as the dynamics of 
groups; rather than just the former which so many accounts of radicalisation are guilty of. 
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They also highlight the importance of cognitive factors, but unfortunately do not take the 
analysis to a deeper level whereby they outline how these theories actually take effect. 
Further, they do not provide any type of framework to conceptualise how these factors fit 
together or drive each other through. Rather, they argue that their outlined ‘mechanisms’ 
can be found in combinations for different people’s radicalisation. Critically, they explain 
that their list is not exhaustive and there will be other considerations that they have not 
included. However, taking this approach has the potential to be misguided in a number 
of ways, such as listing all possible factors of radicalisation without any real thought or 
evidence of their importance.  
 
This type of ‘exhaustive’ approach has been adopted by certain authors and institutions 
(see Kirby, 2007; COT Institute, 2008; Veldhuis and Staun, 2009, for example). As 
Pisoiu (2012: 46) correctly observes, they merely resort to ‘“piling” various factors in 
various constellations…[which] is based on the reasoning that since no unique or unitary 
set of factors or causes have been found applicable to all radicalisation cases.’ However, 
one positive element in these models is their consideration of factors at the individual, 
group and global levels. This approach is difficult to contend and is reflected in other 
accounts of radicalisation (see Sageman, 2008; Innes et al., 2007, for example).  
 
There are other types of non-stage process models to consider which take a more direct 
approach. These accounts, although not classed as SMT, draw relevant theories and 
incorporate them into their own framework. Sageman’s (2008) account of radicalisation 
is one of these, and combines both cognitive and situational factors and adopts a non-
linear and emergent framework (King and Taylor, 2011). Rather than outlining a number 
of predetermined stages, Sageman (2008) asserts that there are four ‘dimensions’ which 
can occur at their own pace and often in parallel with one another. As with SMT theories, 
he explains how radicalisation should be determined by the radicalisee’s strains being 
‘framed’ and aligned with the extremist’s ideologies. For example, the strains of foreign 
policy resonate with young Western Muslims through their own personal experiences of 
discrimination. This leads to a belief that there is a Western ‘war against Islam’. This 
approach can be seen in wider accounts of radicalisation, such as Innes et al.’s (2007).  
 
Milgram (1974, 162) argues that if you ‘control the manner in which a man interprets his 
world, [then] you have gone a long way toward controlling his behavior’. Through the 
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mobilisation of networks and the validation and confirmation of ideas and ideologies 
there can be a move away, according to Sageman (2008), from angry young men to 
those who can potentially carry out acts of terrorism. Revisiting the theories of Goffman 
(1975: 21) enables a sociological understanding of this argument where frames such as 
this offer individuals with a schemata of interpretation to ‘locate, identify and label’ events 
within their immediate and global levels (Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2011).  
 
Although it is difficult to argue with Sageman’s (2008) overarching tenor, his framework 
for understanding radicalisation is let down by certain shortcomings. First, is the bottom-
up recruitment paradigm he so fervently sticks by, which has been shown by authors 
such as Silber (2011) to be more complex. Further, and more importantly, Sageman 
(2008) fails to provide an in-depth understanding of how people actually move towards 
committing an act of violence. He attributes it to a mix between choices made rationally, 
cognitive factors such as emotional ties to the ‘in-group’, hatred towards the ‘out-group’, 
and a replacement of short-term goals with longer-term ones which include saving the 
world. Sageman’s analysis would benefit from the consideration of a number of wider 
theories across different disciplines. 
 
In this regard, the account provided by Innes et al. (2007) borrows ideas from the field of 
criminology and sociology and applies them to radicalisation studies. For example, by 
employing established theories such as Matza’s ‘drift’, Innes et al. are able to confidently 
explain how those becoming radicalised are in fact no different to the rest of society. The 
framework for radicalisation by Innes et al. is, like Sageman’s (2008), one that is not 
sequential in nature, and also draws elements from SMT. They outline various push/pull 
factors and ‘background factors’ which effectively ‘prime’ individuals for radicalisation. 
There are also ‘foreground factors’, described by others as ‘triggers’, which are the most 
immediate occurrences and those most visible which ‘directly stimulate the process of 
conversion’ (Innes et al., 2007: 57). Through the construction of their ‘radicalisation 
diamond’, they explain that when these factors are aligned, similar to ‘framing’, it creates 
an opportunity to radicalise, which they term as ‘the radicalisation window’. An important 
element of their framework, as with McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) and Sageman’s 
(2008), is acknowledging the importance of social interaction and group bonds. Further, 
and most critically, Innes et al. (2007) realise the value of considering the individual 
within a group setting.  
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There do, however, appear to be certain limitations with Innes et al.’s (2007) model of 
radicalisation. For example, they argue that if one or more of the outlined factors in their 
research is missing, it may go some way to explain why some people may acquire more 
political radical beliefs but do not support the use of violence. Although they refer to 
Louise Richardson’s (2006) theory of a ‘conducive surround’ for terrorism, there is an 
important underestimation for the role of differing ideologies within radicalisation34. Innes 
et al. (2007) correctly observe that ideology is not a causal factor of radicalisation up to 
the point of accepting violence as a legitimate tactic. However, it may be considered 
more as a causal factor for violence once an individual moves towards becoming more 
deeply radicalised. Therefore, the role of ideology in their account may fare better, when 
it comes to understanding motivations behind the use of violence, as a ‘foreground’ 
factor rather than a ‘background’ one as it is currently depicted. Ideology entwined with 
misconstrued and religious doctrine may have the potential to provide the individual with 
the moral and religious requirement to conduct acts of terrorism. In this way, once again, 
Innes et al.’s use of wider theories compliments their analysis. For example, they are 
able to confidently explain and identify, through the inclusion of Sykes and Matza’s 
(1957) ‘techniques of neutralization’, how ‘These techniques equate to a repertoire of 
moral positions via which engagement in criminal activity can be sympathetically 
explained and justified.’ (Innes et al., 2007: 42). 
 
Sykes and Matza (1957) outline five techniques of neutralization; four of these have 
significance in understanding how moral concerns can be neutralised in violent extremist 
behaviour. First, through ‘denial of responsibility’ the individual believes they are coerced 
into the action; something they feel is beyond their control. Second, ‘denial of victim’ 
states that the victims deserve the consequences of their actions (Lerner and Simmons, 
1966). Milgram (1974) describes this as psychologically shifting the responsibility; in the 
case of terrorism this responsibility is moved to the target. This is evident in various 
martyrdom videos such as Mohammed Sidique Khan’s where he outlined that, ‘Your 
democratically elected government continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people 
all over the world. And your support for them makes you directly responsible…’ (BBC 
News, 2005). Third, and somewhat related to the second technique, ‘condemnation of 
                                                 
34
 This is not just reserved for Innes et al.’s (2007) analysis, but is applicable to many other 
accounts of radicalisation (see Silber and Bhatt, 2007; Kirby, 2007; Precht, 2007; COT Institute, 
2008; Borum, 2003; Moghaddam, 2005, for example). 
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the condemners’ allows the individual to believe they are retaliating against the actions 
of the British government in respect to certain foreign policy actions such as the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Fourth, ‘appeal to higher loyalties’ argues that the individuals are 
following the decree of God, and the violent action is in effort for a greater good rather 
than focussing on the micro-level action and consequence of the crime35. 
 
Finally, within radicalisation studies generally, participation in terrorism is either depicted 
as emotionally driven or to do with rational choice. Committing an act of violence which 
is not impulsive and is well thought out and planned may still be emotionally driven. It is 
more of a complex problem which will consider issues around persuasion (Wiktorowicz, 
2005), or the changing of self and social identity (Innes et al., 2007). When it comes to 
choosing terrorism as a tactic, it may then be beneficial to consider elements of RCT.  
 
2.4.3 Radicalisation: A Rational Choice? 
 
A number of prominent authors in the field have used RCT as a vehicle to explain violent 
extremism; the most notable and widely cited being Martha Crenshaw. The use of RCT 
in radicalisation studies varies somewhat, though one common factor is the disregard of 
the grievance based approach (Pisoiu, 2012). These authors argue that the use of RCT 
helps to explain why many people may be affected by the same strains though only a 
very few mobilise into some sort of action (McAdam et al., 2011).  
 
However, RCT is not embraced by all and there are those who seriously question its use 
and relevance. For example, Victoroff (2005), using a similar argument, outlines that 
RCT does not explain why such a small number of people become terrorists when the 
potential pool is far larger. Schbley (2000) takes this further by stating that only very few 
individuals that rationally believe in terrorism actually become terrorists.  
 
RCT is used to describe involvement and commitment with an extreme group as one 
entire process (Pisoiu, 2012), and also to understand why terrorism is chosen as a tactic 
from a range of other options (see for example, Crenshaw, 1981, 1992, 1987; Victoroff, 
2005; Wilson, 2000; Berman, 2009; Lake, 2002). Influential experts in the field such as 
                                                 
35
 Similarities can be drawn with the writings of Niccolo Machiavelli (2003). 
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Robert Pape (2006: 7) argue that ‘terrorists are simply the members of their societies 
who are the most optimistic about the usefulness of violence for achieving goals that 
many, and often most, support’. Suicide terrorism is considered to fall within this, and is 
one of the most, if not the most, commonly referred to modes of attack when discussing 
AQ and AQI terrorism by general society36. As Atran (2003: 1534) rightly quips, 'Suicide 
attack is an ancient practice with a modern history’.  
 
Atran (2003) questions the value of RCT for suicide bombers due to a lack of perceived 
tangible rewards, though explains there is benefit for those orchestrating the attacks in 
terms of increased social support and economic funds. In this regard, academics like 
Post (2005: 8) state that, ‘as with terrorism in general, suicide terrorism is very much a 
function of group and collective psychology’. This can be witnessed through research 
conducted on the Japanese Kamikaze pilots during the Second World War, where 
‘communities of practice’ were considered to be of great importance (Taylor, 2010; 
Taylor and Horgan, 2006; Hundeide, 2003; Sasaki, 1999). The argument here is that the 
ability of human beings to conduct violent acts against one another depends on the 
‘social pressure and support in the background that pushes them into this situation’, with 
those with strong social support being the most likely to conduct acts of violence (Collins, 
2008: 77). Atran (2003: 1535) similarly explains that regardless of the type of suicide 
attack, i.e. ‘subnational’ or ‘state-sponsored’, ‘Choice is often voluntary, but typically 
under conditions of group pressure and charismatic leadership’. 
 
Similarly, McCauley and Moskalenko (2008: 417) explain that the ‘classic answer’ to 
mobilise people towards social action is through the group instilling a sense of personal 
morality through a consciousness of letting the group down or by introducing some types 
of sanctions. In smaller groups, as well as ‘social punishments’, ‘social rewards’ may well 
be used to ensure participation (ibid). However, a balanced approach would argue that 
the group and individual analysis are not mutually exclusive, with authors like Gupta 
(2005: 5) stressing that RCT should evolve and expand to ‘include the primordial human 
urge of belonging to a group’ where individual and collective action cannot be separated. 
 
                                                 
36
 In reality, suicide terrorism is a considered to be a tactic that may account for the least amount 
of attacks, though ensures the most amount of accumulative casualties (Merari, 2005; Sheehy-
Skeffington, 2009; Atran, 2006). 
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When considering RCT in the context of Olson’s (1971) ‘free-rider’, where the benefits 
are simply defined by some political achievement and they are subject to little or no cost 
as compared to those who are participants (Gupta, 2005), then there may be a case 
against this. However, when spiritual rewards are introduced, then RCT seems like it has 
more value. Wiktorowicz (2004a, 2005) argues that a terrorist sacrificing their life for the 
allure of spiritual rewards is a rational choice.  
 
There are numerous examples of terrorism and suicide attacks that are based upon 
spiritual rewards, such as the Kamikaze pilots of the Japanese Imperial Navy (Sasaki, 
1999; Bloom, 2007), and Palestinian ‘martyrdom operations’ (Hegghammer, 2006). As a 
result, some authors, like Wiktorowicz (2005), argue that RCT should be considered for 
individual choices rather than the group unit of analysis; though this is something which 
is rarely done. However, there are instances of these arguments not necessarily being 
mutually exclusive. This can be seen with the examples stated above which relate to the 
Japanese Kamikaze pilots, where authors like Sasaki (1999) found the importance of 
both personal rewards and communities of practice in her research. 
 
Literature on radicalisation and terrorism studies is laden with research discussing both 
the pros and cons of RCT (see Berrebi, 2009, as an example). However, it may be more 
useful to consider the arguments from a different angle. It is plausible, according to the 
COT Institute (2008), to break radicalisation down into two different phases. First is the 
process that leads up to the point of terrorism and the second is selecting and 
participating in terrorism as a tactic.  
 
If the first part of radicalisation is considered, i.e. up to the point of terrorism, then it may 
be possible to argue that it is based upon the actions of someone who is not completely 
rational, yet at the same time does not assume they are acting irrationally either. Recent 
developments with economic models go some way to further explain this. Traditional 
economic models generally assume that individual actors navigate their way through the 
world and social situations on the basis of a series of rational choices, or rational 
calculations (Gupta, 2005). However, assumptions like this have been questioned by the 
emergent paradigm of behavioural economics. As Ariely (2009) argues, when attempting 
to answer the questions society cares about, the broader picture should be considered, 
including what is understood about human nature. The point here is that radicalisees are 
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relatively normal members of society who act in both rational and irrational manners 
depending upon the specific influences they are exposed to.  
 
This may then relate to how people make decisions. One theory presented argues that 
people essentially have two types of decision making systems (Kahneman, 2011). The 
first is used for deliberation, consideration and assessing ‘cost vs. benefit’. This system 
takes a much longer time for the brain to process and is therefore not used as much as 
the other. The second system is the more ‘intuitive’ element and occurs at a much faster 
pace with, according to Kahneman, many decisions being made using this process. This 
is not to say people do not occasionally make rational and thought out choices based on 
rigorous cost vs. benefit, but most of the time these decisions are primed by emotions 
and are not as well thought out.  
 
This leads onto a broader argument where choice architectures can be used for attaining 
positive social outcomes. This holds similarities with the notion of ‘nudge’, developed by 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008), where people can be ‘nudged’ into making better decisions 
regarding a multitude of issues, ranging from eating healthier food and paying their taxes 
(Parker, 2010), to reducing gang crime (Dolan et al., 2010). The question is, however, do 
radicalisers adopt similar methods by utilising an ominous element of nudge through 
social interactions? 
 
Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010) explain that ideology or specific attachments to 
political ideology is not enough to explain why people commit acts of terrorism. This has 
led certain academics and policy makers to fall back on grievance based theories in an 
attempt to explain the ‘initial determinant of the radicalisation process or as some type of 
“lacks” to be compensated by positive incentives’ (Pisoiu, 2012: 38). Thus, some argue 
that RCT has limited value in understanding radicalisation up until the point of violence, 
or the ‘motivation’ of terrorists (Gupta, 2005: 8). However, in terms of selecting violence 
as a tool, especially suicide terrorism when considering spiritual rewards, there may be a 
caveat. This leads those like Lake (2002: 26), for example, to advocate the use of RCT 
when looking at terrorists’ strategies, but something that ‘fails to explain why terrorists 
have such extreme ambitions in the first place’.  
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2.4.4 Ensuring Flexibility: A Progressive SMT Approach 
 
Traditionally, SMT has been used to understand the motivations of larger movements 
where growth is one of the core traits of the theory (Klandermans and Oegema, 1987). 
There are, however, certain benefits from drawing upon components within it when trying 
to understand radicalisation further. The flexibility offered by SMT, as opposed to stage 
models, can enable a deeper analysis of the issue at hand. 
 
Within his psychological assessment of terrorism, Horgan (2005) argues that it is better 
to focus upon the ‘how’ rather than the ‘why’ when developing process models. It can, 
however, be argued that a balance of both will provide a better approach. Here the ‘why’ 
can inform the ‘how’, something SMT allows to incorporate. Further, rather than simply 
focussing upon the macro or micro level analysis, it is possible, similar to the work of 
Giddens (1985), to bridge the gap between the two levels; which SMT’s flexibility also 
accommodates.  
 
The use of SMT in terrorism studies has become increasingly popular since prominent 
academics like Donatella della Porta (1995) connected some of its components within 
her studies of Italian and German violent extremists. However, using SMT to understand 
AQ and AQI terrorism, or the ‘Islamist movement’ as defined by Meleagrou-Hitchens 
(2011), remains an underdeveloped field (Wiktorowicz, 2004a). One account considered 
to have successfully utilised SMT is Wiktorowicz’s (2004, 2005) ethnographic study of 
AM. There are some who refer to his work as a phase model simply because it outlines a 
number of phases, or arguably stages (see Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). This may well be 
a flaw in Wiktorowicz’s (2004, 2005) account, compared to the approach taken by others 
like Innes et al. (2007) and Sageman (2008), for example. On the surface, Wiktorowicz’s 
(2005) account seems no different than that offered by other general stage process 
models. However, there are various important differences, both subtle and otherwise.  
 
SMT emphasises the critical importance of social ties in joining, social interactions in 
maintaining commitment, and the value of persuasion through the influence of those 
deemed to hold authority (Stewart et al., 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2005). Further, as Bartlett et 
al. (2010: 20) explain, SMT ‘…attempts to integrate social and historical conditions, 
dynamics of groups and organisations, and their relation to society and personal 
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leadership, membership, ideology into one framework.’ Thus, rather than simply offering 
explanations of radicalisation where readers are left to second-guess how people move 
from one stage to another and how they internalise extreme ideologies, wider theories 
can be employed. For example, as discussed, this may concern (re)socialisation where 
radicalisers and extreme groups are able to change people’s attitudes, actions, beliefs 
(Crenshaw, 1994), and as Wiktorowicz (2005: 27) explains, ‘perceptions of self-interest’. 
In addition, SMT offers an explanation of how extreme ideologies are aligned in the mind 
of the individual, i.e. how they resonate with their own beliefs or replace their existing 
beliefs. As with research on cults and sects, as outlined in the Introductory chapter, SMT 
discusses the ‘conversion process’ where individuals change their perceptions of society 
and reassess their place within it, and in fact change their world view (Lousberg et al., 
[n.d.]).  
 
As mentioned earlier, this can be explained through the concept of ‘frame analysis’, as 
outlined by Goffman (1975). This is referred to as ‘framing processes’ in the context of 
SMT (Benford and Snow, 2000) and ‘framing theory’ with radicalisation. Through the use 
of a ‘master-frame’ (Benford and Snow, 2000), ‘Islamist movements’ portray that Islam 
and the secular West are ‘fundamentally conflicting’ (Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2011: 14). 
The radicaliser aims to achieve ‘frame alignment’ between the individual and the group’s 
ideologies (Wiktorowicz, 2005). Here, framing relies upon notions of values and beliefs, 
and helps the radicalisee to make sense of, and organise, their experiences and guide 
their actions (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008). This forms one of the schools of thought in this 
arena and is seen as the ‘most promising’ when looking at the issue of radicalisation 
(Borum, 2011: 16).  
 
However, the current form of SMT attracts certain criticisms. One of these argues that it 
places too much emphasis on RCT, as the focus is more in favour of self-interest as 
opposed to persuasion (Meijer, 2005). However, as mentioned, there are some authors 
that have successfully provided a more nuanced account of SMT, with the inclusion of 
RCT, when considering radicalisation (Pisoiu, 2012). A further criticism regards those 
SMT accounts that, although outlining how extreme ideologies are internalised through 
socialisation and frame-alignment, do not discuss why and more importantly how these 
concepts are able to occur. That is, how do the motivations, attitudes, actions and beliefs 
of people change? This goes to highlight the benefit of using an overarching framework 
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such as Goffman’s (1961) moral career, though still viewing radicalisation through a SMT 
lens.  
 
This use of Goffman’s theory also allows the flexibility to be able to move away from the 
more commonly stated ‘norms’ of radicalisation research. One particular criticism in this 
respect is certain authors’ propensity to give religion too much value at an early stage 
(see Silber and Bhatt, 2007; Precht, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2005, for example). A more 
accurate analysis would argue that religion is the factor that brings individuals together 
and gives them with a new identity (Taseer, 2005; Kraft et al., 2007; Choudhury, 2007), 
or provides some sort of misconstrued justification for committing violence and terrorism 
(Githens-Mazer, 2010; Toft, 2007; Juergensmeyer, 2003; Sageman, 2008a). Similar 
arguments can be made about the perception that ideology alone drives radicalisation. 
There is no evidence to suggest that either religion or ideology are drivers, catalysts or 
‘triggers’ of radicalisation and, although certain authors do not explicitly claim it to be so, 
this rigid approach does not allow for the consideration of alternative factors.  
 
The general perception in society is that radicalisation is something which is ‘induced’ by 
the radicaliser when there is contact with the radicalisee. Most accounts of radicalisation 
discussed in this chapter may well argue that the strains felt at the macro-level will cause 
some form of susceptibility and lead people to search for a new identity, a new meaning 
in life and a different view of society and the world around them. However, should there 
not be an exploration of the hypothesis that people may actually want to be affiliated with 
extremist groups and extremism in general, in their own ‘positive’ perception of the term? 
Radicalisation may not always be due to just macro-level pressures and strains, but also 
to do with generational and popular trends amongst peer groups. 
 
This holds particular importance when considering the radicalisation of young Muslim 
males in the West. Thus, issues around excitement and masculinity should be at least 
considered which authors such as Choudhury (2007) have started to investigate. The 
implications of these aspects, and generally how extremism is perceived as a subcultural 
trend amongst young Muslims in the West, especially the UK, are very rarely discussed, 
and if so is only mentioned in passing (see Slootman and Tillie, 2006; Innes et al., 2007; 
Husain, 2007; Sageman, 2008; Pisoiu, 2012; Bartlett et al., 2010, for example).  
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The value of its inclusion can be discovered in wider research on topics such as cultural 
criminology (Ferrell, 1999). Katz (1988), for example, explores the notion of ‘foreground’ 
within criminology, and assesses this in various situations. One of these includes street 
gangs and, as Katz terms it, the ‘ways of the badass’. This is particularly strengthened 
when these groups are part of subcultures which are deemed to be, as Howard Becker 
(1973) describes, ‘outsiders’.  
 
Radicalisation is unfortunately not a simple concept and is laden with many complexities. 
It should be understood, as Schmid (2013) correctly points out, from a combination of 
looking at the micro, meso, and macro levels. In order to gain a deeper understanding of 
the phenomenon, there of course needs to be consideration of the current theories and 
core foundations in the field. However, the employment of certain SMT attributes set 
within a wider conceptual framework like Goffman’s (1961) moral career also allows for 
the construction of an analysis that can consider emerging (or neglected) aspects, such 
as subculture, masculinity and social identity. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
 
The conduct of the research is based upon a qualitative methodology on the premise 
that it affords an in-depth understanding of human behaviour and more importantly the 
reasons that govern that behaviour. A qualitative approach has also been selected on 
the basis that radicalisation is not, as far as is known, a widely distributed social issue, 
but occurs only in relation to a relatively small proportion of the population. Whilst 
quantitative methods have obvious and critical uses within research, it was felt that an in-
depth account based upon data from the individuals who have the most relevant insight 
can potentially provide a more valid and reliable examination. As summarised by Gillham 
(2000: 11), one benefit of qualitative analysis is that it enables the researcher to ‘explore 
complexities that are beyond the scope of more “controlled” approaches.’ Accordingly, in 
the context of the present research, this strategy will facilitate an in-depth study of the 
complexities involved in a select number of cases where radicalisation has occurred. In 
particular, the meanings that are assigned to different factors by people in terms of 
accounting for how and why it occurs under particular conditions. This emphasis upon 
detail and depth is offset by the fact that the adopted approach is less suitable for 
assessing how widespread the distribution of these factors might be. 
 
It can be said that the framework for planning, implementing and evaluating qualitative 
research should include three important considerations: epistemology; methodology; and 
method (Carter and Little, 2007). However, there can be an argument for considering the 
ontological element within this also. Rather than adopting a positivist approach based on 
external objectivism, usually reserved for quantitative approaches, the use of qualitative 
research can be considered more of an interpretivist stance. Thus, there is not simply a 
single reality, but multiples realities which have been constructed in each individual and 
group’s particular context.  
 
This is not only a consideration for the research participants, but also for the researcher 
themselves. The reality is normally socially constructed within each context by the most 
commonly accepted interpretations by those involved. It is therefore acknowledged that 
my own perceptions of reality will have affected the way I constructed an opinion of the 
topic prior to engaging in the research. An element of this will have been based on the 
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factors that could not be changed, such as being male, having a South Asian heritage 
and being born into a certain class and living in a certain society. There will also be the 
existence of those influences that could have been changed. This is about the decisions 
I could have taken throughout my life which has affected the way in which I interpret the 
world, which in turn influences the way in which I constructed this problem. This includes 
the friendships I have entered and maintained to the newspapers I have decided to read. 
There will be countless influences in my life which have affected both my perception and 
understanding of this problem, and how I see it connect to and interact with wider issues. 
Some of these decisions will naturally provide a bias to the research. Though, as will be 
discussed, this is something I have been conscious of throughout the research and have 
attempted to mitigate, as much as possible, by consulting relevant academic works on 
being a researcher, maintaining a neutral perspective, and reducing bias when analysing 
and reporting data. Though, some of these factors have acted as positives throughout 
the research, such as insider/outsider statuses, and will be outlined in relevant places. 
 
These are considerations that all qualitative researchers in the field need to be aware of. 
The ontological and epistemological influences will naturally shape people, and we will 
all have our own particular perceptions of reality which have been socially constructed. 
The researcher must ensure that the way they have constructed their reality does not act 
as a barrier to remaining open to new ideas and beliefs. That said, qualitative research 
has the strong potential to provide the insights which can help us to understand and 
solve many of the social issues facing society; with radicalisation being just one of these. 
This includes the causes and consequences that convey the complex nature of the 
process with greater depth and texture than might result from employing the kinds of 
structured survey questions often utilised in quantitative methods. 
 
This chapter begins by setting out the research questions central to the theme of this 
thesis. The following section highlights the selection of methods. In order to effectively 
answer the research questions one principal method of data collection was implemented, 
i.e. qualitative semi-structured interviews. This was supplemented with fieldwork based 
observations. The third section outlines the ethics and risk management considerations, 
prior to the collection of data. The fourth and fifth sections will discuss the data sources 
used in the research in more detail, including how respondents were sampled and 
recruited, and the challenges faced. The sixth section outlines how the data were 
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analysed. The final section of the chapter provides a reflection of the research, including 
the challenges faced when collecting data of this nature.  
 
3.1 Research Questions 
 
There were various aspects of radicalisation that needed to be examined by this study. 
These not only considered how and why radicalisation occurs, but also what implications 
these findings would have for policy, practice, and wider academic theories. There are 
four research questions central to this thesis and are represented below:  
 
1. How do people become radicalised? 
 
2. Why are some people rendered susceptible to radicalisation and why do some go on 
to commit forms of violence but others do not? 
 
3. What is the perception and reception ‘on the ground’ of counter-terrorism policies and 
strategies amongst those who are, in many ways, the focus of such attentions? 
 
4. What are the wider implications of the findings of this research for policymakers, 
practitioners and academics? 
 
3.2 Selection of Methods 
 
In addressing the research questions above, two research methods were used. The first 
was the completion of in-depth semi-structured interviews with a range of different 
participants. Second, was to conduct discreet fieldwork based observations when it was 
deemed to be necessary and appropriate to do so. The semi-structured interviews were 
used to answer all of the research questions outlined above, and the fieldwork based 
observations were specifically targeted at answering the first three research questions.  
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3.2.1 Qualitative Interviews 
 
Through the employment of the semi-structured qualitative interviewing method, I have 
collected accounts of radicalisation. Many academics, including seminal figures such as 
Malinowski, stress the importance of attaining points of views through conversation 
(Burgess, 1982), especially when attempting to reach a deeper understanding of an 
under-researched phenomenon. In addition, the use of semi-structured interviewing 
allowed for an effective two-way conversation, enabling the respondent to ask questions 
of the researcher. The interviewee also had the flexibility to discuss other relevant topics 
which may or may not have been previously considered. Finally, and critically, semi-
structured interviewing facilitated the potential of not only providing the answers to 
questions but also illuminating the reasoning behind them. 
 
Within such a strategy, consideration must be given to the validity of the responses 
provided by the individuals being questioned. Wright Mills (1940: 904) outlines this very 
point and states that ‘human actors do vocalize and impute motives to themselves and 
others’, attributing this to their perceptions based on past experience. Similar to these 
‘vocabularies of motives’ are what Lyman and Scott (1970) describe as ‘accounts’. They 
state that an account has a resemblance to the verbal component of a ‘motive’, and is ‘a 
linguistic device employed whenever an action is subjected to valuative inquiry’ (ibid: 
112). An account is a ‘statement’ made by an actor to explain ‘untoward’ behaviour, 
whether it be for themselves or for others. Lyman and Scott further argue that there are 
different forms of accounts an individual may relay depending on different motivations. 
Of particular consequence to this study were those accounts based upon the invocation 
of excuses and justifications, where both are ‘socially approved vocabularies that 
neutralize an act or its consequences when one or both are called into question’ (ibid: 
120). There needed to be a specific focus on the internal consistency, credibility and 
reliability of the data collected from the semi-structured interviews. It was important to 
consider these respondents were offering their perspective which may not have been a 
value neutral objective, and was mostly always, if not always, a motivated account. 
 
Another major concern with semi-structured interviewing was to ensure the interview 
stayed on course and the conversation did not divert to unnecessary issues. Overlooking 
this had the potential to not only waste time, but also miss the more pertinent topics for 
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discussion. Thus, the outlining questions were carefully formulated so as not to be 
prescriptive or leading. Gray (2004: 224-5) reiterates this point, stating that maintaining 
control is essential and can be achieved by ‘minimizing long-winded responses and 
digressions’. He goes onto argue that the researcher should not feel concerned to 
interrupt the respondent if this enables the interview to stay focussed. Arksey and Knight 
(1999) add to this by writing that improvisation throughout the interview is fundamental to 
maintaining control. 
 
Given the specific considerations associated with this study, the interviews were aimed 
to be conducted on a one-to-one basis, as opposed to a focus group setting, as it was 
felt this approach would provide a deeper understanding of the subject matter. Within 
this situation, respondents may also feel more comfortable and be able to express their 
thoughts rather than agreeing with others in line with group conformity theories (see 
Asch, 1955; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Aronson et al., 2005, for example). Within a group 
setting there is the possibility for some individuals to feel overshadowed by others which 
may cause certain respondents to keep potentially key thoughts undisclosed (see Crisp 
& Turner, 2007). Also, within communities that have a high level of social capital, such 
as those located within certain areas of the UK (see for example Innes et al., 2007), it 
may prove difficult for some respondents to disclose sensitive information for fear of 
reprisals from the rest of the community. However, due to unforeseen difficulties in 
accessing potential samples, focus-group interviewing was implemented if and when 
required. Nevertheless, these considerations were taken into account when conducting 
these focus-groups and every effort was made to avoid the outlined pitfalls. In fact, on 
many occasions within the focus-group setting the participants were able to ‘prompt’, 
both consciously and otherwise, one another’s memory on the topics at hand.  
 
3.2.2 Fieldwork Based Observations 
 
The in-depth interviews are supplemented and augmented through limited observational 
fieldwork. The fieldwork based observations’ main purpose was to provide a better 
understanding of the processes of rhetoric, group dynamics and emotions that could 
arise in certain settings that may be pertinent in terms of understanding how and why 
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radicalisation occurs. This is critical as, to date, the affective component regarding how 
individuals’ ideas, beliefs and ideologies are radicalised remains neglected. 
 
This observational method acts as a support mechanism to provide the reader with a 
more detailed understanding of the research and the process involved behind it. Ritchie 
(2003: 35) makes this very point when stating the importance of transferring this 
information to the reader as it allows them to see the events, actions and experiences 
‘through the eyes of the researcher’. Though, as argued by Bailey (1996), this analysis 
will not just focus on visuals but will make use of all available senses. This data aimed to 
comprise of what Lofland (1971) describes as ‘raw’ (i.e. without initial analysis) material, 
such as seating arrangements, surroundings, behaviours (of respondent and all other 
present during the interviews) and sounds. The data collected through this method aims 
to provide an insight which is not available from any other. 
 
3.3 Ethics and Risk Management 
 
There were a multitude of risks and ethical issues that needed to be vigorously analysed, 
especially as the research lay within an extremely sensitive area. This task needed much 
planning as although I aimed to adhere fully to ethical standards and maintain the utmost 
safety considerations for all concerned, I did not, at the same time, want to destroy my 
rapport and access with the respondents. I was aware that there were a number of 
requirements and stipulations that applied to conducting this research. These were given 
due and careful consideration.  
 
The respondents were all provided with an information sheet37 explaining what the 
content of the research was, confidentiality issues and data protection considerations. 
They were all required to sign a consent form38 prior to participating in the interviews. 
The information sheet also explained to respondents that the police could seek an order 
requiring production of the interview recordings and/or transcripts. This is if the police 
had reason to believe that they would be of assistance in an investigation into terrorism 
matters, including whether – under SS 19, 38b and 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000 – a 
                                                 
37
 See, ‘Appendix 1: Research Information for Respondents’. 
38
 See, ‘Appendix 2: Consent Form for Respondents’. 
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journalist has in their possession or has not disclosed to police information relating to a 
terrorism offence.  
 
It was highly unlikely such information would have been provided to me in the interviews, 
and even more unlikely that a police request would have been made. Nevertheless, the 
legislation has not yet been thoroughly tested before the courts. To date, no request has 
been made by any authorities.  
 
There were also linguistic complexities to factor in. Prior to the interview the respondents 
were all given a chance to indicate whether they would be more comfortable undertaking 
the interview in English or in another language. If another language was preferred, 
arrangements for a suitable translation service would have been provided. However, this 
was not requested. 
 
3.3.1 Risks to Researcher 
 
Given that the research was conducted in a sensitive area, there was the possibility that 
there could have been risks to my personal physical and psychological wellbeing. In 
order to counter this and ensure personal wellbeing, the following considerations were 
implemented:  
 
 If I felt any psychological distress throughout the interviews or at any time during 
the research, all activities would have been immediately terminated and this 
would have been discussed in full honesty with my supervisors, both of whom 
have extensive experience of conducting research on sensitive issues and in 
‘closed’ social settings. I was also aware of the assistance and support available 
from a variety of relevant external associations. 
 
 To minimise the risks involved, all interviews were conducted during the daytime 
and in a safe environment. If for any of the interviews the risk of physical harm 
was deemed to be higher, they were conducted within a public arena which was 
suitable and safe to both me and the respondent. I also ensured that either one 
of my supervisors knew where, when and who I was meeting for each interview. 
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If this was not possible, then a close and trusted family member, i.e. my spouse, 
was given all of the information, except the personal details of the respondent. 
 
 I did not discuss any personal details with any of the respondents except what 
was absolutely necessary. The respondents knew my first name and where I was 
conducting the PhD, though any other identifying factors like telephone numbers 
or home address were not disclosed.  
 
3.3.2 Risks to Respondents 
 
The potential risks to the respondents needed to be considered in a wider context than 
just the potential of physical or psychological harm and discomfort or stress that this 
research may have generated. These included risks to an individual’s personal standing 
within the communities they are a part of, privacy, personal values and beliefs, their 
relationships with their family, and their position within their occupational settings. There 
was also the consideration of adverse effects generated from discussing information that 
relates to illegal or deviant behaviour. Therefore, the following considerations were 
integrated into the design of the research in order that the study could be conducted in 
an ethical manner.  
 
The respondents were initially informed about what the research entails. Alongside this, 
they were provided, as mentioned, with an information sheet and given the chance to 
raise any concerns they may have. They were also given an appropriate amount of time 
to decide whether they wanted to participate or not; which was usually seven days. The 
potential risks and issues were discussed with the respondents prior to their acceptance. 
They were informed that participation would be on a voluntary basis and they were fully 
able to refuse answering any questions throughout the interview. Further, that they were 
free to withdraw from the research at any point for whatever reason they saw necessary. 
The information recorded to this point would not have been used unless full authorisation 
had been given by the respondent. All data provided by the respondents, whether this 
was prior to or during the interviews, and their anonymity have been and will continue to 
be kept strictly confidential in line with the Data Protection Act.  
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The risk of physical harm to individuals was substantially reduced by adopting certain 
considerations when setting up and conducting interviews. The knowledge of the 
interviews taking place was kept to an absolute minimum and discussed only where 
necessary. The interviews were conducted, when requested by the respondent or when 
it was felt necessary, outside of that geographic community and away from areas they 
could potentially be identified. With some of the respondents, especially those who were 
once part of extreme movements or espoused extreme ideologies, there was the risk of 
some psychological distress and this was constantly reviewed throughout the interview. 
If it was felt that the respondent was in any anguish the interview would have been 
immediately terminated. If the respondent was caused distress after the interview had 
been completed, they would have been directed to the relevant local health services that 
could provide them with further support and assistance. The physical and psychological 
safety of the respondents was reviewed both before and throughout the interviews, and 
the interviews would have immediately been terminated if the respondent’s safety was in 
jeopardy. There was also a concerted effort to avoid harm not only to the immediate 
interviewees, but also to their family, friends and the communities and organisations they 
were affiliated to (both religious and otherwise). This was once again completed through 
strict confidentiality of participation and full anonymity of respondents when discussing 
this information within the thesis. Locations, meeting details and any other identifying 
factors also remain anonymous. Fortunately no issues occurred before, during or after 
the research39.  
 
The recordings from the interviews are stored on an external hard drive and this, with the 
hard copies of the transcriptions, is locked in a safe and secure place in accordance with 
the Data Protection Act. This is solely accessible to just myself and my two supervisors 
(on request). As well as being provided the documentation, this information was also 
discussed with respondents prior to the commencement of each interview. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39
 This is correct at the time of writing. 
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3.4 Accessing the Data: Qualitative Interviews 
 
In total, 61 interviews were conducted across various locations within the UK40, where 
certain respondents were interviewed on multiple occasions. They were collected by the 
author over a nine-month period between October 2009 and June 201041. There were a 
small number of preliminary interviews conducted in mid-2008. Of these 61 interviews, 
14 were conducted with ‘officials’, 31 were with ‘informed informants’ and the remaining 
12 with ‘community members’. These three sets of interviews alongside the sampling 
and data collection techniques are outlined below. 
 
3.4.1 Interviews with Officials 
 
The respondents within this data set comprised of: one government minister; two high-
level civil servants; three local government employees; one former high-ranking police 
officer; one former high-ranking American intelligence official; two academics; and four 
researchers. These individuals were selected on the basis that they could all provide an 
alternative understanding of the issues at hand. This was imperative when gaining a 
balanced approach to the research which not only considered the arguments bottom-up, 
but also from a top-down perspective.  
 
The majority of these individuals were contacts I had gained from my previous role as 
‘Researcher’ for the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, a 
think-tank based in Whitehall, London. The other respondents were directly approached 
due to their prominent work within this arena. It was expected, and somewhat accounted 
for, that those working in official capacities, i.e. for the government, would be restricted in 
what they were able to discuss. Access to this group was relatively simple and almost all 
of the respondents approached for participation agreed to take part in the study.  
 
                                                 
40
 It must be noted that of these 61 interviews, 60 were conducted in person in the UK. The 
remaining one was conducted over the telephone with a former high-ranking intelligence official in 
the US. 
41
 Though, as will be discussed within the section outlining the challenges of the research, the 
groundwork for securing these interviews started long before the initial interview was undertaken. 
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3.4.2 Interviews with Informed Informants 
 
The informed informants comprised individuals and groups working at the ‘grassroots’ 
level within particular local Muslim communities, and were all Muslim themselves. These 
respondents were purposively sampled on the basis of having first-hand experience and 
regular contact with those who are susceptible to extremist ideologies, those who hold 
extreme viewpoints/subscribe to extremist ideologies, or have been implicated as part of 
one of the various Terrorism Acts (TACT). Many of the informed informants conduct ‘de-
radicalisation’ and ‘counter-radicalisation’ work at the grassroots level. This group also 
included those who were once part of violent and/or non-violent extreme groups. It 
should be mentioned that there was also a concerted effort to interview a small number 
of youth workers who primarily deal with Muslim youth. Although it was envisaged that 
these individuals may have some sort of vested interest in counter-extremism, it was not 
set out as a pre-determined requirement for them. 
 
The recruitment of suitable respondents within any research project is vital in ensuring 
the results are considered to be both credible and useful. Rubin and Rubin (2005) 
recommend that during selection, the interviewer should ensure that the interviewee is 
experienced, knowledgeable and has a variety of perspectives. This is in contrast to 
random sampling, which in turn relates to the desirability of generalisability; a concept 
introduced by Campbell (1957). Although there may be much relevance in ensuring the 
‘external validity’ within certain experimental designs (Campbell, 1957: 297), there also 
needs to be a recognition that research projects do not necessarily have to conform to 
generalisability norms. Gray (2004) argues that ‘just because a study does not find 
results that are capable of generalization does not mean they have no relevance’. The 
findings from the interviews within this research will not be applicable across the wider 
Muslim population, but will target a small specific group of individuals. Accordingly, the 
intent underpinning this study was not to conduct a large scale survey across the 
population, but to ‘drill down’ and gain a deeper understanding of what radicalisation is 
and how it occurs by analysing the information provided by those with the most relevant 
experience, expertise and exposure. This point is emphasised by Wiktorowicz (2004: 2) 
who, during his ethnographic study of AM, argued that research with small groups of 
respondents may limit generalisability, though ‘provides unique insights…that are 
virtually impossible to generate through other methods’. 
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Rubin and Rubin (2005: 65) state that ‘finding interviewees with the relevant first-hand 
experience is critical’, and further maintain that enlisting individuals who are, or have 
been, directly involved is better than interviewing those who are not. For example, 
interviewing an individual who was kidnapped is better than talking to their parents or 
close friends. Although this point has much validity, Rubin and Rubin fail to point out that 
this is not necessarily the case within every research project as it can also be beneficial 
to interview those who have had close contact and interaction with the research subject. 
This is especially relevant when considering that within a research project such as this, it 
is difficult to locate individuals who openly claim to have ‘extreme’ viewpoints and 
ideologies. Radicalisation is not a phenomenon that is evenly distributed across the 
population. Becker (1970: 31) makes a similar argument, when studying deviants, that 
there is no ‘such officially complete list of participants’. This research was fortunate to be 
able to gain perspectives from those who were once personally involved in extremist 
activity and were willing to participate due to their denouncement of extremism, and 
those working in close proximity to people who currently espouse extreme ideologies. 
 
Thus, the particular individuals participating in this aspect of the research were selected 
on the basis of being ‘informed informants’, rather than ‘uninformed informants’. During 
his study of morale on ten naval ships, Campbell (1955) found that the responses from a 
small well informed group were more accurate than the responses given by a larger less 
informed group. Although Campbell’s research was based upon a quantitative nature, he 
argues that this is representative across much of social science. Rubin and Rubin (2005: 
68) similarly argue that an interviewer does not need a large amount of respondents to 
increase the reliability or credibility of their findings. This is described by Burgess (1984) 
and Honigmann (1982) as ‘judgement sampling’ and also by Ritchie et al. (2003) as 
‘purposive sampling’. Here, respondents have been selected as ‘they have particular 
features or characteristics which will enable detailed exploration and understanding of 
the central themes and puzzles.’ (ibid: 78) 
 
As a final point, it must be mentioned that some of these respondents were Salafi; which 
is part of the Sunni sect. There have been differing opinions to whether Salafis are really 
at the core of the issues discussed within this thesis. Briggs et al. (2006: 62), for 
example, assert that the UK ‘government must greatly enhance its partnership with the 
Salafi community’ in order to work towards resolving these issues. This includes a move 
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away from those they term as the ‘usual suspects’, who they argue have little or no real 
influence or core understanding in this arena. Partnerships with Salafis is also promoted 
by Dr Robert Lambert, former head of the Muslim Contact Unit within the Metropolitan 
Police, who explains that, from his experience, these groups are at the ‘forefront of 
groundbreaking community work that successfully counters the adverse influence of al-
Qaeda propaganda among susceptible youth’ (Lambert, 2008: 33). Lambert goes on to 
state that these groups, through various misconceptions, face alienation from both the 
government and their own communities who consider them as working with the ‘enemy’ 
(ibid). 
 
There are also those who distance themselves from these groups due to the alleged 
links between Salafism and Wahhabism. Wiktorowicz (2006) argues that the term 
Wahhabi is affiliated to Salafis by their enemies and that it is difficult to find anyone who 
refers to themselves as Wahhabis. He goes onto explain that the Salafi faith has been 
broken down into three major factions: purists; politicos; and jihadis. This is due to their 
differences over the ‘assessment of contemporary problems and thus how this creed 
should be applied’, including ‘issues related to politics and violence’ (ibid: 207)42.  
 
This apprehension can be seen through the UK Government’s stance on the issue of 
non-violent extremism (HM Government, 2011). Salafi groups in the UK have not been 
officially labelled as ‘non-violent extremists’ or simply as ‘extremists’, though many have 
had their funding – provided by the government to tackle radicalisation – unexpectedly 
cut. Considering this and other factors it is believed this is due to them falling under this 
definition (House of Commons, 2011). The informed informants within this study 
comprised of a number of different Islamic sects in the UK, and the responses collected 
from Salafis were deemed to hold just as much importance as the others. In fact, on 
certain occasions, the data provided by Salafis gave alternative insights on the issues 
which were not previously considered. At the same time there is an appreciation of the 
complexity within the non-violent extremism arguments. This is discussed in further 
detail within both the ‘Theory, Practice and Policy’ and ‘Conclusions’ chapters of the 
thesis. 
 
                                                 
42
 There are also other papers which provide further insight on the topic (see Change Institute, 
2008, for example), and others that discuss the topic more widely (see Lynch, 2012, for example). 
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Snowball and Opportunistic Sampling: Informed Informants 
 
Snowball sampling methods are usually applied when respondents are difficult to access 
for researchers. For example, this includes the homeless (Salganik and Heckathorn, 
2004), drug users, and small and dispersed populations (Ritchie et al., 2003). This was 
also the case within this particular research as the number of potential respondents 
available was significantly limited with many being dispersed across much of the UK. 
Thus, there was difficulty in identifying, locating and accessing those who met the 
specified criteria. The snowball sampling strategy proved to be successful in overcoming 
this issue. 
 
Also, given the sensitive nature of the research, and with the obvious associations with 
government, security services and police forces, it was somewhat difficult to build up 
enough trust with individuals to ensure they agreed to participate. As trust was built up 
gradually within respondents’ networks, it proved to be of huge importance as trusted 
recommendations from current contacts to potential contacts held much more weight. 
Finally, the use of recommended individuals helped to ensure the new respondents were 
of a certain standard as their personal reputations were considered. 
 
There were also the negative implications of the strategy to consider. First, although this 
strategy went some way to ensure respondents were of a certain standard, the collected 
data may not represent a balanced perspective as current respondents could have put 
me in contact with individuals who hold similar viewpoints (Ritchie et al., 2003). Also, 
interviewing within the same extended network of respondents could have subjected the 
research to bias or erroneous data with little way of identification. Finally, there was also 
the risk that if one respondent within the network became unsure towards the validity of 
the research or towards me personally, then this could have disrupted access to the rest 
of the network. As far as I am aware, these issues did not cause a great concern when 
collecting the data; though, as will be discussed, this was not without its own complexity. 
The concerns regarding the validity of the data were overcome when data collected from 
one network was analysed against that collected from other networks.  
 
In addition to employing the snowballing sampling strategy, I frequented relevant talks, 
conferences and events around the subject of this thesis. I also accepted the invitations I 
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had received from contacts to attend various ‘local community’ mosque social events. 
These were usually on the topic of extremism, all of which had the potential to expose 
me to further respondents; described by Burgess (1984: 55) as ‘opportunistic sampling’. 
Becker (1970: 35) also identifies this as one of six strategies set out for aiding 
researchers to identify their sample group and ‘gather information in a more direct and 
purposive way.’ 
 
There was one final method used to recruit respondents. This involved becoming part of 
internet forums which discussed certain issues pertaining to Muslims. Some of the 
threads on the forums concerned extremism. They were not promoting extremism, but 
discussed and debated the links (or lack of) with Islam and extremism, and the meaning 
of ‘jihad’, for example. This method provided access to a number of contacts and from 
this one particular person proved to be an important respondent for the thesis. This was 
not only because he had once been involved in an extremist network personally, but also 
as he acted as a ‘gatekeeper’ for some of the interviews conducted with community 
members (as will be discussed later). 
 
Data Collection: Informed Informants 
 
As mentioned, there were 31 semi-structured interviews conducted within the data set 
labelled as ‘informed informants’. Although these were primarily on a one-to-one basis, 
there was one occasion where two respondents from the same organisation personally 
requested to be interviewed together. Before the recruitment for interviews took place it 
was thought that the respondents would fall into one or more of four distinct categories.  
 
Grassroots Workers: The first group consisted of individuals engaged in de-radicalisation 
and counter-radicalisation work at the grassroots level. They hold an informal (as viewed 
by central and local government) yet powerful role within their local communities and 
usually integral positions within their local mosques. They are at the centre of organising 
certain youth activities and providing social support in a range of topics, not just specific 
to extremism. This is extremely important as it ensures transparency and builds up trust 
with youth across a range of different topics.  
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The interviews also facilitated a wider appreciation of some of the issues facing youth, 
which may not have previously been considered, and determine why they become more 
susceptible to extremism (Rayment, 2008). As many of these respondents were of 
second and third generation immigrants they appeared to be in touch with certain youth 
issues; as many of them had faced the very same problems themselves. The Home 
Affairs Select Committee hearings on understanding the ‘Roots of violent radicalisation’, 
similarly argued, ‘there is a wealth of knowledge held by people working with individuals 
judged to be vulnerable to violent radicalisation at the local level that could better inform 
our understanding…’ (House of Commons, 2012: 43). The roles they hold within their 
communities appear to have many similarities to the ‘moral entrepreneurs’ outlined by 
Howard Becker (1973: 148).  
 
Almost all of these individuals and organisations were not, at the time of interviewing, 
government funded. This is due to them wanting to maintain a distance as a direct result 
of negative Muslim youth perceptions of the UK Government in regards to its CT policies 
(as will be discussed later in the thesis). There were three main aims for interviewing 
these individuals. The first was to understand from a ‘bottom-up’ approach why and how 
radicalisation occurs from those who have real experience within this area. The second 
was to understand the de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation techniques some of 
these individuals were applying within their own local communities. Finally, interviewing 
these respondents helped to gain a deeper understanding of the links between 
radicalisation and terrorism. 
 
When interviewing this particular set of respondents it was imagined that there may have 
been the possibility of certain limitations; with four in particular. First, the responses 
could have contained a certain element of bias as the individuals may have attempted to 
protect the reputations of both the organisation they represent and the youth that attend. 
Second, some of the respondents may have been unwilling to talk about sensitive issues 
or disclose sensitive data. Third, the respondents could have provided bias responses 
so not to incur social exclusion from their friends, family, or the wider community (Crisp & 
Turner, 2007). Finally, the respondents may have refused to participate due to the 
potential issues this could have caused between themselves and the youth they work 
with. After the interviews were conducted and the data were analysed it appeared that 
these limitations fortunately did not seem to occur. 
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Youth Workers: The second group contained those working with Muslim youth as ‘youth 
workers’. They were considered to be ‘unofficial’ in the sense that they had not been 
employed by the state. They had, however, in certain instances received some form of 
government funding or grant. It was envisaged that this group would be predominantly 
involved with general youth work, rather than focussing upon, as with the grassroots 
workers, ‘de-radicalisation’ and ‘counter-radicalisation’ strategies. However, it was also 
understood that some of the respondents would have fluidity in their work. Interviewing 
this group fundamentally aimed to gain a deeper understanding of the wider strains and 
grievances affecting Muslim youth, which do not necessarily have to relate to extremism. 
The limitations envisaged with this group mirrored that of the grassroots workers’ stated 
above. 
 
Religious Leaders: The third group comprised of various imams and religious leaders 
across the UK. This included those who were affiliated with one specific mosque and 
those who were not part of any in particular (at least not in an official capacity). The aim 
of interviewing these respondents was to understand the mosques’ viewpoint of what 
constitutes extremism, and also to further ascertain the role of theology, ideology and 
religion within radicalisation.  
 
Much of the devout Muslim communities’ activities have some sort of direct or indirect 
connection with the mosque. Religious leaders are not only seen as spiritual guides but 
also as those who can be approached for a multitude of reasons, including economical, 
social and cultural. They are also approached to resolve certain issues within and across 
communities and specific families. 
 
There were three main limitations, in addition to those discussed within the context of 
grassroots workers, envisaged when interviewing this group. First, was the possibility of 
obtaining data that was either distorted or uninformed. As will be discussed within the 
relevant empirical chapters, although these religious leaders may be able to provide 
Muslim elders with the support they need, a relatively large number of them fail to 
culturally, socially and politically meet the needs of Muslim youth (see HM Government, 
2007; Wiktorowicz, 2005; Naqshbandi, 2006; Malik, 2007). Though this was initially seen 
as a limitation, it was also clear that if the responses from this group was analysed 
correctly then it may allow a deeper exploration of the relationship (or lack of) between 
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Muslim youth and religious leaders, and in turn how this can affect certain Muslim 
youths’ susceptibility towards becoming radicalised. Second, they could have claimed to 
have known extremist individuals and groups when in fact they did not. Once again, it 
was felt that if this was the case then it would prove to yield interesting research data. 
The final limitation was that the religious leaders could have fabricated their answers in 
order to maintain, in their own opinion, creditability for themselves and their mosque. 
 
Ex-Extremists: The final group of informed informants comprised individuals who were 
once part of either non-violent and/or violent extreme groups in the UK or abroad, or 
espoused extreme ideologies. These individuals have now reverted away from this 
stance. Although it was originally thought that this group would be hard to reach, there 
were opportunities during the research, predominantly through ‘snowballing’, to speak to 
a small number of them. There was initially a concern with interviewing those who had 
been radicalised as they may not be the best to judge how their opinions, beliefs and 
actions had changed over a period of time. Though, it became clear after the interviews 
took place that this set of respondents have had the time to reflect on the causes of their 
radicalisation. Although the limitations to this group mirror what has previously been 
discussed, the richness and depth of data gained from their responses were extremely 
important to shaping this research. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the interviews with informed informants were conducted 
exclusively with male respondents. This was due to a number of reasons. Most notably, 
this tends to reflect the apparent limited numbers of female informed informants working 
within this particular area. 
 
3.4.3 Interviews with Community Members 
 
The community members were initially selected to answer the third research question 
outlined above. The data collection for this particular phase planned to be conducted 
across two different locations as part of a multiple, or comparative case-study approach. 
Yin (1984) argues that the multiple case-study design has distinct advantages over 
single case design. The evidence from a multiple approach ‘is often considered more 
compelling…[and] regarded as being more robust’ (ibid: 48). Yin goes on to point out 
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that the results of case studies are not generalisable to populations and that the main 
purpose is to ‘expand and generalize theories’ (ibid: 10). Although this holds some 
resonance within this research, it was felt that the core issues that could surface have 
the potential to act not only as strong foundations for future research within other Muslim 
communities in the UK, but also have wider implications within topics which do not 
necessarily have to be linked to the subject of radicalisation. 
 
The semi-structured interviews within this phase aimed to be conducted with individuals 
who, unlike the informed informants, were not, to my knowledge, directly exposed to 
those with extreme viewpoints or ideologies. However, their knowledge was far wider 
than initially expected. It is important to mention at this point that a critical issue arose 
during the data collection. This severely affected the research methodology and the 
approach taken within this phase. As a result, the strategy for data collection had to be 
rethought. Before this is discussed, the original sampling and data collection strategy will 
be outlined as a reference.  
 
Sampling: Community Members 
 
The term ‘community’ can incorporate a variety of meanings. These include geographic, 
employment related, social, religious, and political, amongst others. The research sought 
to recruit respondents which would be part of three distinct communities: religious (i.e. all 
of the respondents would be Muslim); geographic (i.e. all respondents would live within 
the same specified geographic boundaries); and institution (i.e. all would attend the 
same mosque).  
 
Ideally, all of the respondents’ demographic attributes would have been in line with a 
representation taken for the general attendance at the particular mosque chosen for the 
research. However, as most religious institutions have an ‘open door’ policy it was 
almost impossible to gauge this. Therefore, the next best alternative was adhering to the 
demographic breakdown of the local geographic area. Thus, respondents’ sampling 
criteria was to be in accordance to gender, age and socio-economic distributions in 
relation to the 2001 census; specifically focussing on the Muslim population’s statistics 
within these areas. 
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The proposed sampling strategy for this phase was intended to be a ‘single-stage 
probability’ technique with the specific implementation of a ‘stratified random sampling’ 
approach. Blaikie (2000) states there are two main purposes of this technique. The first 
is when the researcher aims to make sure particular categories within a sample are 
represented. The second is to ensure there are sufficient numbers within all the outlined 
categories that are to be selected. The attempted recruitment took place after Jum’ah – 
Friday prayer – as this is deemed to be one of the more emphasised requirements for 
Muslims to attend. In addition, recruitment was also attempted during another day of the 
week to ensure a wide selection of potential respondents, rather than the risk of simply 
attaining interviews with those who attend mosque only for Friday prayers. The selection 
of potential respondents aimed to be conducted over a minimum of four weeks per 
location to ensure a fair representation of worshippers. 
 
Data Collection: Community Members 
 
Originally, it was planned that data would be collected from two different geographic 
areas, with a target of ten interviews per site. The locations were the London Borough of 
Lambeth and the London Borough of Tower Hamlets. However, a number of unforeseen 
problems arose; one of which was critical to the research. After attempting to recruit 
respondents outside of the selected mosque within the London Borough of Tower 
Hamlets, it became evidently clear the worshippers had little, if not any, interest in 
participating in the research. When approaching potential respondents I was initially 
welcomed warmly with people willing to talk to me. However, when the nature of the 
research was outlined and certain key phrases were used, such as ‘radicalisation’, 
‘extremism’, and ‘terrorism’, for example, the potential respondents immediately declined 
participation and effectively terminated the conversation. This indicated a lack of trust 
towards the research. Further to this, after lengthy applications, numerous emails and 
telephone calls, the proposed mosque in the London Borough of Lambeth refused direct 
involvement in the research also43.  
 
                                                 
43
 It must be noted that a number of prominent figures at the mosque, and within its affiliated 
community groups, were extremely helpful throughout other elements of the empirical data 
collection.  
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Consequently, two further locations were selected. One was in the London Borough of 
Hounslow and the other was a location in the West of England. These were chosen as I 
had existing networks which could act as ‘gatekeepers’ to potential respondents at these 
sites, with the possibility of ‘snowballing’ further contacts. The respondents in the London 
Borough of Hounslow were snowballed through a mutual friend, and participation was 
agreed by two respondents. After interviews were conducted with these individuals, I 
asked if they could put me in contact with further respondents; though this was bluntly 
refused. The participants explained that due to the sensitive nature of the topic, and from 
the ‘horror-stories’ they had heard through the media of issues such as the misuse of 
‘detention without charge’ legislation (Yezza, 2008; Curtis and Hodgson, 2008), they 
would not risk their credibility or their families’ safety and wellbeing by recommending 
others to participate.  
 
I also contacted the mosque directly to request assistance with recruitment, though was 
advised that they wanted nothing to do with the research and emphasised that I would 
not be welcome recruiting for the research anywhere on the mosque’s grounds. They 
also strongly requested that I maintain the wishes of the mosque, representative of its 
congregation, and did not attempt to recruit respondents whatsoever, including standing 
on public ground outside of the mosque. I of course had to abide by these requests. 
Thus, it became virtually impossible to recruit further respondents within this particular 
location. 
 
However, the selected mosque in the West of England was more receptive to the 
research. This was mainly due to two people. First was the individual, mentioned above, 
who contacted me through the Islamic forum. The second was a religious leader at the 
mosque I had maintained contact, and built up trust, with over many months. Though, it 
must be mentioned that gaining access to this mosque was not without its own issues. 
When these ‘gatekeepers’ proposed the research to the mosque’s congregation and 
management it was immediately met with hostility. However, after lengthy negotiations 
on my behalf, the ‘gatekeepers’ were able to grant access. These two individuals risked 
much to facilitate these interviews44. 
                                                 
44
 I would like to extend much gratitude to the two individuals from the West of England for their 
tireless work in facilitating these interviews; especially as they risked their own credibility. Their 
faith in me and my research is duly appreciated. Without them, this element of the research would 
not have been possible. They cannot be named due to confidentiality reasons.  
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The limitations envisaged when collecting data from this group comprised four main 
points. First, the respondents may not have wished to discuss certain sensitive subjects 
and issues. It was thought this reluctance may occur during the interview, rather than, as 
discussed, during the recruitment period. This was not an issue during the interviews for 
those who did participate within the study. Second, certain respondents may have 
withheld information or have provided elements of false data as I may have been 
considered as an outsider. Third, the respondents could have provided bias responses 
in order to protect the (perceived) reputation of their particular mosque, community, and 
Islam as a faith more generally. The fourth limitation is the respondents may have given 
biased responses so not to encounter any social exclusion within their communities, 
even though they were fully assured of confidentiality.  
 
It must also be noted that the interviews conducted with the community members from 
the West of England were in a focus group setting. This was due to restrictions on time 
and resources; as much of this had been spent attempting to recruit the community 
members from the first three failed locations. As the location in the West of England is a 
long journey from my home in London, there were only a limited number of trips I could 
make on the budget I had for the interviews.  
 
As a final point, the interviews with the community members were exclusively conducted 
with men. This was expected from the outset and was mainly due to the respect of 
cultural and religious beliefs I had to maintain, i.e. as a male not approaching Muslim 
woman outside of mosques. Also, there was a consideration of the difficulties involved in 
certain Muslim women talking in private to an unfamiliar male. However, it was hoped 
that through employing a snowball strategy some women may have been recruited 
during the interviews. Though, as discussed, as there were enormous difficulties in 
recruiting men themselves, recruiting women was not an option at any point during the 
interviews.  
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3.5 Accessing the Data: Fieldwork Based Observations 
 
The fieldwork based observations for this research are different from the contemporary 
ethnographic data collection method frequently implemented by social scientists. Thus, 
rather than immersing myself within the sample I aimed to research I assumed the role 
of both a non-participant observer and participant observer when necessary. It was 
hoped that this would not only prove useful when conveying findings to the reader, but to 
also help understand how social interactions take place within certain settings.  
 
The recording of the observational data was through personal field notes. Bailey (1996: 
80) describes field notes as being the ‘backbone of collecting and analyzing field data’, 
and that they form part of the analytic process. Lofland et al. (1984: 72) take this further 
by writing that if the researcher does not take field notes, they ‘might as well not be in the 
setting’. Gray (2004: 244, italics in original) recommends that the researcher should 
make ‘mental notes’ of the settings, people and experiences, which can later be recalled 
to help ‘the production of jotted notes’. These ‘jotted notes’ were captured within a blank 
fieldwork book which was carried around at all times. The initial notes, especially during 
interviews, were quick comments as an elaboration can be ‘disconcerting’ to the 
respondents (Bailey, 1996: 81). Lofland et al. (1984) recommend the researcher waits 
for an opportunity, such as the journey home from an interview, to elaborate on these 
initial notes. This advice was strongly considered and much of the elaborated notes were 
written on the usually long journeys home, which included an analysis of my personal 
interpretation of the settings and actions noted.  
 
It was decided to not inform the respondents that fieldwork based observations were to 
take place. Douglas (1976) considers this to be an ethical approach in collecting data as 
there is a possibility individuals may attempt to portray an artificial representation of 
themselves; thus defying the purpose. As well as acting in a manner not natural to them, 
informing the respondents of this may have affected their interview responses.  
 
There were two limitations envisaged with using fieldwork based observations. The first 
concerns the researcher. As there is potentially copious amounts of data available with 
this method it is difficult to ‘prove conclusively that the data gathered are sufficiently 
objective to represent a true reflection of events’ (Gray, 2004: 256). The second 
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limitation lies with the respondent. As some of the fieldwork based observations were 
conducted through interviews, there was the potential to gather erroneous data as the 
interviewees may have acted in a manner not normally natural to them. Further, although 
some of this data were collected in social settings, those being observed may have 
acted differently as they were conscious of the presence of an outsider. 
 
3.6 Data Analysis 
 
The method of data analysis one chooses is not only important with the analysis of data, 
but also determines, to some extent, how that data is collected in the first place. One of 
the more popular approaches currently is ‘grounded theory’ (GT). If GT is considered in 
its most original understanding, as derived by Glaser and Strauss (1967), the researcher 
does not start with some hypothesis, but remains open minded and allows the data to 
fully guide the categories, concepts and themes. From this, there will be the construction 
of some theory which goes to understand and explain the particular phenomenon they 
are researching.  
 
However, expecting the researcher to enter the field with no preconceived thoughts on 
the topic is extremely difficult and arguably impossible, especially in the modern era of 
easily accessible information. These opinions are not always necessarily formed in the 
conscious mind of the researcher, but can also be influenced throughout their lives from 
various factors, including those, as mentioned at the fore of this chapter, epistemological 
and ontological considerations. Those conducting qualitative interviews will, at least, be 
influenced with the types of questions they ask. Even when the data has been collected 
by the researcher, it will be difficult to code it with complete objectivity. 
 
This version of GT was considered to be too rigid and implausible for this thesis. This is 
not a standalone verdict, with others such as Charmaz (2012: 3) arguing:  
 
‘Glaser…differentiates his version of grounded theory from qualitative inquiry and 
rejects common practices within it, such as beginning research with a literature review, 
making accuracy a central concern, transcribing interviews, and sample size. Glaser and 
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his followers do not explicitly attend to epistemological questions about data collection 
and quality, research relationships, and researchers’ roles and standpoints…’ 
 
This did not mean that alternative approaches to GT were not suitable. Developments in 
the field over the last decade or so, such as the adaptation presented by Charmaz 
(2006), considers it valid for the researcher to have some predetermined notion of the 
topic they are studying and, importantly, that GT and qualitative inquiry can actually 
complement each other. Charmaz (2012) states that, at its core, a researcher using GT 
should remain open to all possible theoretical understandings, develop tentative 
interpretations about these data through codes and nascent changes, and return to the 
field to gather more data to check and refine major categories. Thus, a neo-GT approach 
was selected.  
 
My awareness and understanding of the concept of radicalisation began, as with most of 
society, through the media post-9/11. After becoming employed for a think-tank based in 
London I started to further understand not just the media’s interpretation but also the 
views held by policy makers and academics. However, a secondary analysis of material 
is not always a necessary indication of the issue; at least one that may not be entirely 
accurate. This was especially apparent when I started my doctorate and I was able to 
read more materials in depth, which often contradicted one another. It was clear that the 
only way to enable a better understanding of the phenomenon was to personally conduct 
preliminary empirical interviews with those who had some form of expertise in the area. I 
wanted to gather a range of perspectives on the issue, so I interviewed people working 
for central and local government, the police and academics.  
 
I also interviewed an informed informant from London. At this point, I wasn’t aware that 
he was a grassroots worker, and in fact did not even fully understand the role that these 
individuals played within de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation work. I interviewed 
him as I had known the mosque he worked with had some serious problems in the past 
with violent extremists45 and because he had been recommended by one of my contacts. 
The questions I had asked him reflected this, for example: 
 
‘What is, in your opinion, the current state of extremism within your area?’ 
                                                 
45
 This was determined from reading various newspaper articles.   
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It became quickly evident, however, that the respondent wanted to discuss their opinions 
of how and why radicalisation occurs, from the outset. It was from this point that I started 
to give this layer of individuals and groups (i.e. the informed informants) much more 
prominence within the research, and they started to form an integral role within the data 
collection. This was one of the aims of the preliminary interviews, i.e. to not only gain a 
better understanding of what the current issues were in order to shape the research, but 
also to determine who could provide valuable insights. As with the principles of modern 
GT, I transcribed and coded this respondent’s interview instantly. I altered the semi-
structured questions to reflect these developments for future interviews. These new 
questions focussed on how and why radicalisation occurs and what could be done to 
counter it.  
 
Around a year later, the main data collection for the research started. After a great deal 
of difficulty – as will be discussed later – I started to conduct interviews with the informed 
informants. My preliminary hypothesis, that there would be slight nuances in their roles 
and knowledge, proved to be true; even though there were overlaps and many of the 
interviewees held knowledge of topics beyond their primary function. Thus, the imams 
and religious leaders were not only asked about what they thought radicalisation 
entailed, but there was also a focus on the role religion plays within the phenomenon. 
The ex-extremists were asked about their own personal experiences; where there was 
an effort to get them to outline their account from start to finish in some coherent and 
chronological way. The grassroots workers were questioned about their involvement and 
experience with those who are susceptible to radicalisation or have been radicalised. 
 
Once an interview was conducted it was transcribed verbatim. These were all personally 
done as it enabled a further familiarisation and understanding of the responses (Fielding, 
1996). Personally transcribing the interviews allowed me to make additional connections 
between the responses and relevant theories, and also helped to refresh anything that 
was overlooked when conducting the fieldwork based observations.  
 
The data were coded line by line as this enabled a much deeper understanding of the 
issue and provided the ability to focus the questions for future interviews (Charmaz, 
2012). From this, there was the recognition of emerging topics that I had not previously 
been aware of. For example, certain micro and macro level factors, such as identity and 
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discrimination, for example, went from being considered as causal factors to those that 
make the individual more susceptible to radicalisation. This was a key development as it 
resonates with the paradigm that many people in society may be affected by these 
strains and grievances, though only a very few become extreme.  
 
Another important issue that was not originally considered within the research was the 
subcultural element of radicalisation and terrorism. After this consideration was raised by 
the initial respondents interviewed it started to increasingly feature more prominently in 
most of the interviews with the informed informants. It became clear that this concept 
needed to become one of the central themes of the thesis, not only because it formed a 
core part of radicalisation, but also as it was a topic that was under-researched and not 
generally considered within other accounts.  
 
The community members, as mentioned previously, were initially recruited to answer the 
third research question of the thesis. It was, at first, intended to question this data set 
about whether they, or others they knew of, had experienced any of the effects of CT 
policy and strategy in general. However, many Muslim respondents within this study 
(both informed informants and community members) knew about the Prevent Strategy 
(HM Government, 2007), and were able to comment about it in depth. Much of this was 
due to exchange of information within communities, the upsurge of media coverage at 
the time from both ‘Western’ and ‘Muslim’ news outlets, and a number of the informed 
informants having some affiliations with the strategy due to the nature of their work. The 
questions were, therefore, altered to also ask about the strategy specifically. 
 
In addition, due to the extensive knowledge of some of the community members, their 
responses were useful when answering research questions across the board. Further, 
as the average age of the community members was relatively young, i.e. between the 
ages of 20-25 years old, this also afforded insights into some of the problems that face 
Muslim young people, and youth in general, in the UK. Some of this focussed upon their 
opinions on the role culture and subculture plays within radicalisation.  
 
The interviews conducted with the officials also evolved as the research went on. Much 
of this was influenced by what was being understood from the responses given by the 
informed informants. For example, those respondents that worked in central and local 
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government were questioned on their opinions of the Prevent Strategy from the outset. 
They were initially asked about their own particular issues with its implementation and 
this evolved to also trying to gauge their opinions on the grievances felt by the informed 
informants and community members in regards to the strategy; such as the blurring of 
boundaries between CT work and community cohesion, for example.  
 
It is also important to discuss how this data were analysed. In terms of the fieldwork 
based observations, these were coded into general categories, such as, for example, 
‘group influences’, ‘peer pressure’, ‘personality’, ‘the Ummah’, and used when and where 
necessary when writing up the thesis. With the qualitative interviews, as discussed, the 
data were coded line by line, which then made up certain concepts and categories and 
sub-categories. An example of this is with the topic of ‘foreign policy’. 
 
Most of the informed informants mentioned ‘foreign policy’ as one of the main reasons 
they felt radicalisation occurs in the UK. Thus, every time the phrase was used it was 
coded under the heading of ‘foreign policy’. If there were other concepts within this, then 
the data were also cross-coded as appropriate. The use of qualitative software NVivo 8 
allowed this to be undertaken in a simple and logical manner. From this, the concept was 
considered within the wider category of ‘macro-level strains’. Once all of the data for this 
category was coded, I went back to it and organised the all of the concepts into finer 
sub-categories, where ‘foreign policy’ was placed under the title of ‘global grievances’ 
(which was later renamed to be the ‘global level’). As with most other research, it is 
difficult to be able to perfectly code everything in the first instance. I therefore had to re-
visit the concepts and finer-code within them. So with ‘foreign policy’, there became sub-
concepts like ‘direct foreign policy’, ‘indirect foreign policy’, for example. Again, the use 
of qualitative software allowed me to do this with relative ease.  
 
Finally, it must be considered that although the coding was completed on a case by case 
basis as the interviews went on, I decided to re-code all of the interviews again once all 
the data had been collected. My understanding of radicalisation had considerably 
changed by the end of the data collection and it was felt this was the simplest way to 
reflect this. Further, as I had collected many interviews, I wanted a chance to look at all 
of my data again to see if there were any important aspects that had been overlooked 
and any further connections that could be made between the data.  
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This was an important decision for the thesis as it led to the data evolving from being 
organised in the original categories, i.e. ‘personal and local-level strains’, ‘macro-level 
strains’, ‘transition’, ‘facilitations’, and ‘radicalisation’, to become connected, under the 
guidance of my supervisor Professor Martin Innes, with Goffman’s (1961) moral career 
framework. Thus, the data was now grouped under three main categories to compliment 
Goffman’s three pronged approach. They were renamed ‘Susceptibility’, ‘Contingencies’ 
and ‘Conversion’. This was a critical step as it allowed this account of radicalisation to be 
presented in a coherent and clear way, and for it to form part of a theoretical framework.  
 
3.7 Respondent References 
 
The method used to assign each respondent with their own specific reference needs to 
be briefly outlined. Each conducted interview was considered as standalone and within 
that interview each participant was allocated their own reference. This considered two 
elements.  
 
The first part of the reference consisted of three letters which were determined by the 
category the respondent was attached to. This referred – as close as possible – to their 
specific role and experience. It was felt that this method was most suitable, rather than 
only assigning the interviewee with a generic number or code, as it gives the reader a 
little more information of the origin of that particular respondent quote. The categories 
used, with their three letter associated code (as shown in brackets), were:  
 
 High-ranking government minister (hrm);  
 High-ranking police officer (hrp);  
 High-ranking intelligence official (hri);  
 High-ranking central government civil servant (hrc);  
 Local government civil-servant (lgc);  
 Academic (acd);  
 Researcher (res);  
 Grassroots worker (grw);  
 Grassroots worker and ex-extremist (gee);  
 Ex-extremist (exe);  
 Imam and/or religious leader (irl);  
 87 
 Prominent representative of a Muslim community (rmc); 
 Community member (cms) 
 
In terms of the second part of the reference, each respondent was assigned their own 
specific three digit numerical identification code. This was essential to keep consistency 
across the entire thesis when using different quotes from the same interviewee. These 
numerical codes were generated at random using the “=RANDBETWEEN” function in 
Microsoft Excel 2007. When these two elements were combined, a specific reference 
was produced for each respondent, such as ‘grw 768’ or ‘res 492’, for example.  
 
3.8 Reflections 
 
Collecting empirical data for this thesis was a difficult task. There were many challenges 
I faced when attempting to recruit respondents for the study and during the interviews 
themselves. However, before discussing this in further depth it is important to outline the 
benefits of considering wider theories that can have an impact when in the field.  
 
3.8.1 Insider/Outsider Status 
 
Studies in anthropology and sociology traditionally assumed that researchers were either 
fundamentally ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’ in regards to accessing their research sample; with 
each status having its own advantages and disadvantages (Merriam, et al., 2001). More 
recent discussions have highlighted the complexities inherent in either status and have 
acknowledged that the ‘boundaries between the two positions are not all that clearly 
delineated’ (ibid: 405). Further, Kleinman (1980) argues the importance of using our 
identities to build a rapport with respondents, whatever the common ground may be. 
There were three main points of consideration in regards to my personal circumstances 
which were of importance when recruiting for and conducting interviews. 
 
The first consideration pertained to gender. As many of the interviews were conducted 
with male Muslim respondents, it is possible that they opened up to me more speedily 
and I was able to gain their trust with less difficulty. Through centuries of ‘historical 
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circumstances’, certain Muslims, of course not all, view females as being subordinate to 
men even though Islam, through the interpretation of the Quran, ‘provides women a 
position of honour and respect’ (Smith, 1979: 517). In addition, researchers such as 
Klatch (1988: 79), who conducted interviews with women of the American New Right, 
declares that her gender enabled her to build a stronger rapport with her female 
respondents as the ‘fact remained that [they] were two women talking together’. 
 
Second, issues of ethnicity and heritage were considered. The majority of respondents 
within the study were, as am I, of South Asian descent which had the possibility of being 
favourable. A Caucasian counterpart unfortunately may have found it more difficult with 
gaining access and trust. During her study of West Yorkshire Pakistanis, Bolognani 
(2005) attributed much of this to the ‘climate of Islamophobia’ experienced by a number 
of her respondents. This ‘clearly created a general sense of mistrust towards people 
investigating issues concerning Muslims in Britain’, especially white researchers due to 
the loss of trust in ‘white officialdom’ and ‘white authority’ (ibid: 282). Interestingly, this is 
something that may be reserved for white British individuals, as once her ethnicity of 
white Italian was discovered it appeared to reaffirm her increasing new status as an 
‘insider’ within the community she was researching.  
 
Although the South Asian connection had the potential to work in my favour, coming 
from an Indian and Hindu heritage certainly did not and had the possibility to destabilise 
access into these communities. For many years, predominantly since the partition of 
India in 1947, there have been long running conflicts between Hindus and Muslims 
within the region, with tensions finding their way into many Diasporas. Over the years 
this has been accentuated through issues such as Kashmir. Although tensions have 
somewhat subsided of late with India and Pakistan having ever increasing collaboration 
on a number of different fronts, the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008 and subsequent 
attacks, for example, highlight how potentially unstable the region can be. Fortunately, 
this tension was not apparent during recruitment or conducting the interviews. In fact, on 
certain occasions I felt I had been viewed as an ‘outsider’ who had made the personal 
choice to research Muslim issues. This, I believe, was viewed as somewhat admirable. 
Further, during the interviews it became apparent that certain interviewees preferred 
non-Muslim academics to research Muslim issues. There are two reasons behind this. 
First, many felt that Muslim academics are sometimes unrelenting towards the cause of 
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fellow Muslims. Secondly, some respondents felt, although this is of course not accurate, 
that there is an enhanced level of credibility when arguments concerning Muslims are 
delivered by a non-Muslim. 
 
Third, personal experiences and demographics were also invaluable. As a brief personal 
background, I have grown up in a fairly affluent area of London, but attended an all boys 
comprehensive secondary school which was very rough and intimidating at times. Whilst 
conducting my undergraduate degree, I lived in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets 
located in East London which was ranked the third most deprived borough out of 354 
local authorities in England (Government Office for London, 2007), and the London 
Borough of Waltham Forest which has an ‘above average’ crime rate in relation to the 
rest of London (Metropolitan Police, 2008). In addition, I have family and friends living in 
many areas across the UK. I strongly feel that this contrast has enabled me to develop 
into a person who is confident enough to build up rapport with individuals from a variety 
of different backgrounds, ages, genders, and socio-economic statuses. I believe this was 
key during the recruitment of respondents and when undertaking the interviews. 
 
From all of these experiences I fully understood the different approaches needed when 
recruiting and interviewing different respondents. For example, a connection needed to 
be made culturally and socially with young adults which enabled them to consider me as 
one of them. On the other hand, when recruiting and interviewing Muslim elders46 I had 
to converse in a balanced fashion that not only asked the pertinent questions, but also 
maintained the respect that was expected within a South Asian community such as this.  
 
At this point, it is important to mention that negotiating a specific role within a community 
is a complex and dynamic issue. A researcher does not, and indeed cannot, simply 
assume the role of an insider or outsider (see for example the debate between Duneier 
and Wacquant in the American Journal of Sociology47). Rather, how someone engages 
within a particular social setting depends upon that person’s qualities and individual 
characteristics. Whilst insights from secondary material can provide a good foundation, 
                                                 
46
 For a definition of the term ‘elders’, see Footnote 18. 
47
 This debate started from the publication of Wacquant’s (2002) paper in the American Journal of 
Sociology which strongly criticised theories and approaches taken by Duneier’s (1999) in his 
book, ‘Sidewalk’. In fact, this criticism was aimed at wider works conducted by others such as 
Anderson (1999) and Newman (1999). Duneier (2002) responded to Wacquant’s criticisms with 
his own paper in the American Journal of Sociology.  
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in reality the world is a far more complex place. When dealing with people and groups 
who inherently hold individual traits and personalities, the ‘textbook’ ease of conducting 
research ceases to exist. Although this research did not implement an ethnographic 
strategy per se, I sought to maintain a standpoint which encompassed both insider and 
outsider statuses. I aimed to involve myself enough to gain trust and collect, to the best 
of my knowledge, reliable data, whilst at the same time not becoming too involved to 
cloud my own judgement or perceptual acuity. For example, Hall (2000) recommends 
researchers should aim to maintain a balanced status where they are considered as 
accepted within their sample, though at the same time not completely immersed. 
Similarly, Davis (1973: 342) writes that the researcher should adopt a ‘middle ground’ 
position of both ‘Martian’, whom he describes as an individual who would prefer minimal 
interactions with their sample, and the ‘Convert’, who immerses themselves within the 
sample with an aim of becoming an insider in order to produce ‘a valid objective account 
of their subjective world’ (ibid: 337, italics in original). Therefore, I was informed by 
certain literature, specifically of Mitchell Duneier, Howard Becker and Robert Burgess, 
though fully understood that the approach adopted was subject to change depending on 
the varying conditions. It was clear that a successful researcher in the field needs to be 
flexible and adaptable to any changing circumstances in order to best maintain this 
balanced role.  
 
3.8.2 The Challenges of Conducting Empirical Research 
 
Collecting the empirical data was a very challenging task and took a lengthy amount of 
time. This was a difficult period where I had to always remain resilient and motivated. I 
was constantly working on building relationships with people over a long period of time, 
sometimes many months, before they agreed to meet me for an interview. I travelled a 
great deal and covered many miles during the data collection. Although the experience 
was very rewarding, there were many difficulties that I had to overcome. 
 
One of these was not knowing if the respondents would actually turn up to the interview; 
something that happened on many occasions. For example, after a long three hour drive 
to meet a grassroots worker, I waited for over two hours for him without any message or 
reply to my phone calls. After another hour had passed, he sent me a text message that 
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simply said he couldn’t meet me, without any explanation. Not only did examples like this 
severely affect my resources, but also threatened my access into a network of potential 
respondents, as I was not sure if they genuinely could not meet me, or had second 
thoughts about the research. When this happened I had to curb my frustration as I didn’t 
want to burn bridges with any contacts or networks. 
 
There were also times when an agreed interview was close to cancellation and I had to 
do whatever I could to ensure it took place. One particular example of this was when I 
had arranged to meet a former extremist from the Midlands who I had been put in touch 
with by a mutual contact. I spent many weeks exchanging text messages and telephone 
calls with this respondent to alleviate his concerns towards the research. He eventually 
agreed to meet me. I remember being extremely nervous before this interview as this 
respondent had the potential to provide real insights into radicalisation from a first-hand 
account. I wanted to ensure the interview went smoothly.  
 
On the morning of the interview, as I was filling up petrol and about to join the motorway, 
I received a text from our mutual contact saying the respondent wanted to cancel as he 
suspected I was either an undercover reporter for the BBC or part of the security service. 
I felt dejected, let down and like I had just lost one of the most insightful interviews I 
could have achieved. I sat in my car and called the respondent in a bid to convince him 
otherwise; though it was no surprise that he did not answer. I left him a long voicemail 
which again explained my intentions. I got a call back from him a little while later and 
spent much time alleviating the concerns he had. He ended the phone call by simply 
saying something along the lines of, ‘I will think about it and get back to you in a little 
while’. I received a text message from him about half an hour later stating that he would 
give me a chance. The joy I felt when his message came was incredible. I made the long 
journey to the meeting point, which seemed like an eternity as I was forever expecting a 
call from the respondent to cancel. This did not, thankfully, happen and I conducted one 
of the most interesting interviews of the research which yielded some very insightful 
data. 
 
I sometimes had to be forthright when attempting to secure an interview. This was the 
case when I was trying to arrange an interview with a prominent grassroots worker in 
London. I tried to get in touch with his organisation without any reply. They did not 
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answer the telephone either. I decided that the only way I was going to get in touch with 
him directly was to go to his office on the off chance he was there and free to chat for a 
few minutes. This was a risky strategy as I had to travel for over two hours to get there; 
especially at a time when money was running low for me. There was the possibility that 
he may have been elsewhere or could have refused to talk to me. I arrived at the office 
and he was there but was talking to someone else at the time, so I waited. He eventually 
came over and asked if I had an arranged appointment with him. I told him I hadn’t and 
apologised for turning up without one. I explained how I had tried on many unsuccessful 
attempts to get in touch with him. I told him that I only needed a few minutes of his time, 
which he was happy to give me. I briefly explained who I was and gave him an overview 
of what I was researching. I requested a formal interview. I stated that he could get back 
to me at a later date once he had a chance to think about it; as I wanted to ensure he did 
not feel pressured at the time to agree. After a few days, I received an email from him 
informing me that he would be happy to be interviewed. 
 
There were other instances when meeting the respondent was daunting. As discussed, 
some of the interviews conducted for the research were with former violent extremists. At 
first, this was somewhat intimidating and I found myself to be quite anxious before the 
initial meeting of this type. However, after this first interview was completed, I quickly 
realised that these respondents were, in essence, no different from other interviewees. 
 
In order to collect the data, I sometimes found myself in situations which could have 
posed a direct threat to my personal wellbeing. Although I followed all of the guidelines 
outlined within my submission to the ethics committee at Cardiff University, real life can 
often be quite unpredictable. Sometimes the respondent I had arranged to meet arrived 
so late it had become dark and I found myself in unfamiliar territory. On occasion the 
location we had prearranged was changed by them at the last moment, and this was 
somewhere remote. I had to assess the risk as I went, and always made sure someone 
was aware of where I was going. However, when you are unfamiliar with a certain locale 
and simply following a map on your smartphone, you sometimes do not know until the 
last moment that you will be walking through a threatening area.  
 
The recruitment of the officials was much easier than the informed informants as they 
were more used to being approached by people to discuss their work. However, not all 
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of these interviews were without their own challenges. One issue which occurred during 
an interview with a high-level civil servant highlights this. Around the time of the meeting, 
(in early 2010), there was much criticism being aimed at the then version of the Prevent 
Strategy. When attempting to explore some of the concerns which had been raised, this 
caused an issue. The respondent became somewhat angered by the questions posed, 
refused to answer them, and questioned not only my approach but also my intentions. I 
was accused of not taking enough of an academic rigour towards my research and that I 
had adopted a journalistic approach to my thesis. This was of course very insulting, but I 
had to remain calm. As a result, the interview was in jeopardy of collapse and the topic 
had to be changed to something which was less ‘taxing’ and ‘sensitive’. As a researcher 
this is not a simple task as the primary objective, and natural instinct, is to gain truthful, 
transparent and insightful data on the issue. If the topic is sensitive in the sense that it is 
causing emotional strain to the individual, then the interview of course must immediately 
be terminated. Though, on this occasion the questions appeared to be ‘hitting a nerve’ at 
a politically sensitive time. However, it is strongly felt that this is simply not good enough. 
In order for society to progress forward, these important questions need to be explored. 
Representatives of government need to remain transparent at all times and expect some 
form of criticism with the work they do. Only then will the pertinent issues be addressed 
which will lead to the refining of key policies and strategies.  
 
There are many positives which came from the research. Throughout the journey I met 
some wonderful people. One such person was a grassroots worker and religious leader 
who lived in the Midlands. We agreed to meet at his friend’s flat in London as he was 
giving a lecture nearby in the evening. The flat was quite small and was filled with about 
ten men, so seemed quite congested. There were a few people inside the immediate 
hallway and one of them greeted me and led me into a small living room area where my 
respondent was having dinner. The men in the flat were extremely friendly and offered 
me food and drink. The man I was interviewing also showed a great deal of warmth and 
kindness and made me instantly feel part of the group. Even when the interview ran over 
the allotted time he insisted we finish it, regardless of the consequences he faced for 
being late for his lecture.  
 
The main thing about this man was that he was extremely captivating when he spoke. 
He was charming and funny and this drew me closer towards him. Although this man is 
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completely against extremism in any form whatsoever, I couldn’t help feeling that if he 
were to propagate extreme messages it would be hard for people to not listen purely 
based on the strength of his personality and character – something discussed in more 
depth in the thesis.  
 
Thus, on some occasions it was difficult to maintain the middle ground of insider and 
outsider (as discussed in the previous section). This was evident during the meeting with 
the grassroots worker outlined above, where as well as discussing radicalisation we 
talked about football, movies, and other cultural topics. This was not a standalone issue. 
For example, when conducting the interviews with the young community members from 
the West of England, I spent the entire day with them which just felt like I was hanging 
out with my friends. I was, though, always conscious of the requirements of a researcher 
and tried to maintain a middle point as best I could. 
 
As has been outlined through various examples in this section, collecting the empirical 
data was a very difficult task. At the start of the data collection48, after a few months, I 
had only secured a very small number of interviews – most of which were conducted 
with government employees and academics – and this was a concern for the research. 
There was a contingency set between my supervisors and me that if no breakthroughs 
were to occur within informed informant networks, I would use the one interview I had 
with a former extremist as a case-study; though it was clear that this was not the ideal 
scenario. However, after much time spent relationship building through countless phone 
calls, text messages, and emails, I started, albeit slowly at first, to gain initial access into 
these networks. This happened to occur at the time I was due to travel abroad for a 
friend’s wedding. However, not being around for three weeks could have put this access 
into jeopardy, especially as there was already a concern I could have been an 
intelligence officer or undercover reporter. I decided that the best course of action would 
be to cancel the flights.  
 
Admittedly, the initial interviews were not as smooth as I had wished, and it was a steep 
learning curve. The task became somewhat easier as time went on. The more interviews 
I conducted the more confident and informed I became. In addition, the more time and 
effort I invested with the respondents, the relationships between us strengthened. They 
                                                 
48
 This refers to the main period of data collection, rather than the preliminary interviews. 
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started to trust me more and began to open up their networks. They importantly acted as 
gatekeepers. Without the support of many of the respondents, collecting the empirical 
data would not have been successful. 
 
Finally, from a personal viewpoint, the topic of terrorism is very emotive and this naturally 
affected me. As well as discussing these topics during the day with the respondents, or 
reading about them if I was not conducting interviews, I would turn on the news in the 
evening and would hear about terrorist attacks around the world, or other related items. I 
had to ensure that I spent some time away from this so not to become too emotionally 
attached; something that was essential in keeping a balanced perspective when both 
collecting the data and analysing it. Researching the topic of terrorism was emotionally 
straining at times. I regularly engaged in other activities, such as sport, to ensure that I 
maintained my emotional wellbeing. 
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Chapter Four: Susceptibility 
 
4.1 Prologue: Five Muslim Friends 
 
The following three empirical chapters will explore the three principal phases outlined in 
Goffman’s (1961) theory of moral career. To provide a reference to how each of these 
phases plays out in relation to radicalisation, they will be depicted through the accounts 
of respondents interviewed as part of the study, and will be set out at the start of each 
chapter. Whilst the final two accounts focus upon two specific individuals, this particular 
one tells the story of five young Muslim males from the West of England who were 
interviewed as part of a focus group.  
 
There is nothing extreme about these individuals, or anything that sets them apart from 
many other young people in the UK. They are simply a group of young males who have 
been friends for many years and are trying to make their own way in the world. They 
always try to be good citizens and adhere to their social duties and the law of the land. 
They are attempting to establish a place for themselves within British society. This is not, 
however, as straightforward as it may be for various other non-Muslim youth in the UK, 
as establishing an identity that balances their religious beliefs, parent’s traditions and 
culture (as maintained from their homeland), and that of a secular and liberal country is 
proving to be difficult.  
 
Whilst certain people their age may be out drinking, fornicating and possibly partaking in 
recreational drug use on a Friday night, these five friends are usually found at their local 
mosque. For them, there is a distinct chasm between the Muslim youth who lead their 
lives according to the principles and requirements of the Quran, and those who do not. 
There is nothing to make them feel part of this society, and importantly also feel like this 
society is not welcoming of them and their traditions49. There is a distinct feeling in the 
group that integrating into British culture is never going to be enough for Muslims to be 
                                                 
49
 As well as conducting the interview, the researcher spent the day with these five Muslim 
friends. This involved shadowing them whilst they completed various errands for the mosque in 
their local area. Much of the conversation on integration and belonging was outlined during this 
time. These were informal discussions held whilst ‘on the move’ and were not recorded. The 
official interview focussed upon the strains they had felt at the ‘local’ and ‘global’ levels. 
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accepted, and the only way this will happen is through assimilation, as one of them 
explained, ‘I don’t think there would be any problem if we were all called Jonny Smith 
and we were all Christians’ (cms 326). 
 
Much of what they read in newspapers and see on TV is how they feel British society 
perceives them. Most of them avoid Western media outlets as they feel Muslims are 
always portrayed in a negative manner. The racism and discrimination they have been 
subject to has increased considerably since the attacks on 9/11 and 7/7. They have all 
noticed it, been victim to it, and know many other Muslims in the same situation. Many of 
them are eager to tell stories of when they have been called ‘paki’ or ‘terrorist’ by local 
residents (cms 944); which occurs on a regular basis. They are quick to recount the story 
of the time a man came into the mosque with a dog and threatened worshippers, or 
when a local trader changed the name of his business to something which was overtly 
and directly offensive to Muslims (cms 326).  
 
This does not end with the way society perceives them. They hold concerns with how the 
government and the police treat them and their fellow Muslims in their local area. They 
explain how they have been approached on numerous occasions by Special Branch 
officers and asked questions about terrorism or if they know of anyone who is extreme in 
their mosque or local area. They can’t understand how they are singled out as they have 
never had any affiliation with extremism, and, as one of them explained, ‘they talk to you 
as if you are a criminal’ (cms 385). They have come to the conclusion that it is simply 
due to them being Muslim.  
 
These five young adults are very politically aware of events occurring around the globe. 
They all see how the world around them has changed drastically in the past decade or 
so. When the invasion of Afghanistan happened, they were in their early teens and were 
most likely concerned about school, homework, or how they intended to spend their 
summer holidays. Though, as the years have gone by they have all been concerned with 
the political developments between Western and Muslim states. They talk about the ‘War 
on Terror’, the deaths of innocent Muslims around the world, and the instability this has 
caused in many Muslim countries. Although none of them have ever visited Afghanistan, 
they all seem to have a deep affinity for her citizens, as one of them explained, ‘I have 
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watched videos of them [Western troops] killing little boys and the boys come out and 
they shoot them’ (cms 385) 
 
As a result, they are confused about who they are, where they belong, and whether they 
can ever really be a part of Western society. They are also concerned about whether the 
Western world despises Muslims. They are starting to see themselves, they explain, as 
the ‘enemy within’ (cms 326). Although they realise not everyone is the same and treats 
them in this manner, they still hold strong animosity towards sections of British and 
Western society. This is making them more insular towards those they consider as their 
own:  
 
 ‘…like the instinctive reaction when you’re under attack, that’s gonna make you 
become offensive and that’s gonna make you have incredibly hostile emotions towards 
the non-Muslims. You feel like the Muslims are the people on your side and the people 
not on your side are the non-Muslims. You’ve got this hostile defence of emotional state 
and that’s the current state of the Muslim youth already.’ (cms 722) 
 
4.2 Introduction 
 
This first empirical chapter alludes to Erving Goffman’s (1961) prepatient phase of his 
moral career framework. Individual’s past events and relationships, including those with 
the state and society, take on a new meaning once they are in contact with radicalisers. 
This chapter discusses the strains and grievances which affect Muslim young people in 
the UK. These issues affect Muslim and non-Muslim communities more widely, and are 
therefore not causative factors of radicalisation. Their importance lies with how they work 
to push Muslim young people away from mainstream society, and how they increase the 
susceptibility of these youth being pulled towards internalising extreme narratives when 
they are in contact with a radicaliser and go through the process of conversion.  
 
As many careers require specific qualifications for employment, the same can be said 
about the radicalisee’s career in order for them to become radicalised. The strains and 
grievances discussed within this chapter act as these qualifications and without them the 
career would not progress. This is not a job requirement per se, but the building blocks 
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needed to convert the radicalisee. That said, it should not be assumed that everyone 
with these ‘qualifications’ will inevitably become radicalised. There is, as will be outlined 
in the following two empirical chapters, the need for further factors and influences. 
 
At the point of conversion, these strains and grievances become important for three main 
reasons. First, is to solidify the bonds between the radicaliser and radicalisee. Second, is 
to achieve ‘frame-alignment’ between the radicalisee’s personal experiences and the 
radicaliser’s extremist ideologies. The data showed that this occurs on three interlinked 
levels: ‘personal’; ‘local’; and ‘global’. This manifests in an ‘us vs. them’ scenario where 
the ‘us’ represents the radicaliser and/or extreme group, and ‘them’ depicts all of those 
who do not agree with their particular extreme ideologies. Third, the radicaliser uses the 
grievances at the global level to create moral outrage within the mind of the radicalisee 
which works towards convincing them to participate in some sort of activism. In essence, 
these strains determine the individual’s perception of who they are, what they mean in 
society and the world, and what society and the world means to them. 
 
The first section of this chapter discusses the strains at the personal level. This forms the 
first part of the ‘us vs. them’ argument where ‘them’ represents the British people. This 
concerns how young Muslims construct their identity and belonging within British society. 
There is currently a mixed feeling whether Muslim communities feel both British and 
integrated. An important consideration is that non-Muslims generally do not consider 
Muslims to be integrated into the UK (Greer, 2011). How people see their identity and 
belonging in a particular society is largely determined by how they perceive that society 
views and treats them. This will affect the way these communities construct both their 
perceptions of self and social identity.  
 
One way this can be determined is by considering how these communities are depicted 
within the media. It can be argued that the media makes a dominant contribution to how 
people think by affecting what they think about (Entman, 1989). Over the past decade, 
Muslims have featured regularly in the news. A study conducted by Cardiff University 
found that the frequency of national print media stories mentioning Muslims increased 
from 352 in the year 2000 to 3466 in 2008 (Moore et al., 2008). As well as the reporting 
of extremism and terrorism, these stories regularly feature aspects of anti-Islamic 
sentiment (Ali, 2008; ISD, 2012a, for example), and highlight the apparent social and 
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cultural differences between Muslims and the West. What is concerning is that the same 
Cardiff University report discovered that, ‘By contrast only 2% of stories contained the 
proposition that Muslims supported dominant moral values’ (Moore et al., 2008: 15). 
 
This anti-Islamic rhetoric has found its way into Western societies, where there has been 
a stark upsurge in Islamophobia50 in recent years. As there is a specific lack of statistical 
information on this type of crime it is difficult to judge the extent of this rise. However, the 
data gathered from a Freedom of Information (2012) request from the Metropolitan 
Police demonstrates a rise in reported crime since the financial period of 2006/07. They 
are listed alongside anti-Semitic crime statistics as a comparison in the table below. It is 
recognised that these statistics need to be considered in the wider context of reporting 
and recording behaviours. That is, these figures may not represent the actual amounts of 
people due to some not actually reporting these crimes51 (on occasion due to a lack of 
confidence with the police). Further, the police themselves may decide not to record it for 
whatever reason and could have their own internal management problems, for example. 
Therefore, it needs to be considered that official data will have flaws where it is difficult to 
identify how it relates to prevalence, and it may be a better reflection on public reporting 
and police recording practices52. However, this is not to say that the data shown below 
does not provide a compelling account which highlights the growing Islamophobic crime 
in the UK.  
 
Year Islamophobic Crime Anti-Semitic Crime 
2006/07 188 200 
2007/08 89 147 
2008/09 179 237 
2009/10 372 204 
2010/11 333 195 
2011/12 294 176 
 
 
Table 1: Metropolitan Police Islamophobic and Anti-Semitic Crime Figures 
 
                                                 
50
 The term ‘Islamophobia’, within this context, refers to the hatred, racism, discrimination and 
irrational fear of Muslims and Islam. 
51
 It should be noted that there are other ways in which both anti-Semitic and Islamophobic crime 
can be reported in the UK, like through third party organisations such as the Community Security 
Trust (for Jewish communities) and Tell Mama (for Muslims), for example. 
52
 For a more detailed discussion on crime data and statistics reporting and recording, see: 
Maguire (2007). 
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This can further be seen within the analysis conducted across Europe by the European 
Network Against Racism. They found, although statistical data is uneven, that ‘prejudice 
towards Muslims is often greater than that experienced by other religious or ethnic 
minority groups’ (ENAR, 2013: 2). In addition, this rise in anti-Muslim sentiment within 
the UK can be witnessed from the conception and increased popularity of those far-right 
organisations such as the English Defence League (EDL).  
 
The second section determines the strains and grievances felt at the local level. This is 
the next part of the ‘us vs. them’ argument where the radicalisee believes the state is 
trying to suppress Muslim communities. Academics like Laqueur (2004) argue that it is 
imperative to not underestimate the importance factors at the local level have within 
radicalisation and terrorism. Within the context of this research, this concerns the issues 
Muslim communities have with local policing and the implementation of CT strategies. 
The UK Government has sought to address some of these issues, however, statistics 
published prior to this found that under ‘stop and search’ powers certain ethnic minorities 
had a much higher likelihood of being stopped than their White counterparts (EHRC, 
2010). There are similar concerns raised with the disproportional implementation of other 
CT strategies such as ‘profiling’, for example (EHRC, 2013; Bennetto, 2009).  
 
The final section outlines the issues held at the global level and is the last component in 
the ‘us vs. them’ paradigm presented by the radicalisers. This alludes to a belief that the 
West is at war with Islam as a faith. These grievances are primarily based on the foreign 
policy decisions of the West which affect Muslims globally. The term ‘the West’ generally 
refers, within the context of this thesis, to the UK and US. However, it is also used by 
radicalisers to further the ‘us vs. them’ argument where the ‘them’ becomes non-Muslims 
and includes countries which are deemed to be the enemies of Islam, such as India for 
example. 
 
It can be argued that Muslims make up one of the most politically-aware faith groups in 
the UK (Sardar, 2006). This assumes that it is common for many Muslims to have some 
awareness of the political developments within various Muslims states. Also, it may be 
plausible to argue that this topic is not only discussed as concerns amongst sections of 
Muslim youth, but also as part of a growing cultural trend. Although many authors argue 
for (and against) the value of foreign policy in radicalisation, very few offer empirical 
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evidence to substantiate these claims; which this section addresses. In this account, the 
grievances, and the strains felt as a consequence, predominantly involve three topics.  
 
First, and in many respects most crucial, concerns ‘direct foreign policy’. This is about 
the involvement of Western militaries within Muslim lands. Second, concerns the ‘critical 
relationships’ between the UK and US and other states; primarily Israel. Although these 
relationships are deemed to be loosening (Morris, 2010; Bagehot, 2011), if we consider 
the perceptions held by Muslims in the UK, then these countries all appear to be strongly 
interlinked. Third, relates to the ‘lack of foreign policy’ action (perceived or otherwise) by 
the West within certain conflicts where it is believed that delayed involvement increased 
the numbers of civilian casualties; the most commonly cited being Bosnia. Though, why 
do British, and for that matter global, Muslims feel so much kinship with other Muslims 
they have never met and most likely will never meet? This concerns the Islamic principle 
of the ‘Ummah’, and forms the final part of this section.  
 
4.3 The Personal Level 
 
This first section outlines how Muslim youth construct their perceptions of self and social 
identity within British society and culture. As mentioned, this forms the first part of the ‘us 
vs. them’ argument at the point of conversion where ‘them’ represents British society in 
general. These strains are also important for radicalisers to be able to cause a divide 
between the radicalisees and their former lives and beliefs, which in turn provides them 
with a dominant sense of identity and belonging in the extreme group; and this solidifies 
bonds between the two. 
 
4.3.1 Identity and Belonging 
 
Almost twenty percent of respondents within the empirical data agreed that an increasing 
number of young Muslims are questioning their sense of identity and belonging within 
British society. A part of this stems from feeling caught between two cultures which are 
in many ways diametrically opposed. Young Muslims are finding it increasingly difficult to 
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balance the secular and liberal culture epitomising British society against the traditional, 
cultural and religious requirements in their home, as described by a former extremist: 
 
‘…you’re caught between two very different worlds. One is a very devout Muslim 
religious viewpoint, and the other is a very Godless, secular, materialistic culture…these 
public spaces are very different and you grew up with that [and question] where do you 
belong? Who are you?’ (gee 459) 
 
This has been compounded since the attacks on 9/11 and 7/7, where Muslim youth have 
felt even more at odds with British society. The assumption would be that they feel more 
‘at home’ in their parent’s motherlands. However, the data showed that they didn’t really 
show any affinity or feel accepted there either; leading to a perception of normlessness: 
 
 ‘I don’t really have an affinity to Pakistan at all, but then [with] this society I really 
don’t feel [British]…I’m still an outsider so that’s the reality of what I have to deal with. I 
will never be seen as an insider…I don’t fully feel part here, but I don’t feel I belong 
anywhere else…’ (gee 796) 
 
As alluded to in the previous quotation, sometimes this feeling of not belonging is to do 
with the perception of not being accepted by the indigenous population. Some may feel 
caught between these two different and often conflicting worlds, but feel like there is 
nothing indicating to them that they are British. As one researcher from London claimed, 
‘in this country feeling stuck between a parent culture that’s out of touch and out of time 
and a British population that they don’t find welcoming and accepting and, you know, 
that kind of identity crisis.’ (res 464) This crisis of identity was mentioned as a dominant 
characteristic found in radicalisation by around a third of the informed informants. 
 
People usually have many different types of ever shifting and changing identities. But 
there are certain ones which stay stable, do not change, and remain as a foundation for 
people to create their perception of self. More often than not, these include nationality 
and religion. When individuals believe that their religion and heritage are diametrically 
opposed to the identity based on their nationality, this will lead to much disaffection and 
confusion: 
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 ‘…a lot of them don’t understand what their identity is. It’s a real culture clash, 
religious clash on what their identity is. Are they British? Are they Pakistani? Are they 
Muslim? You know, they’ve got to deal with that and it’s a massive thing for an individual 
to deal with…’ (grw 179) 
 
If Muslim youth feel at odds with British society and have very little in common with non-
Muslims, then there will be very little attempt at integrating with wider society. They may 
not have many non-Muslim friends and, similar to the five Muslim youth discussed in the 
prologue, be prone to being very insular within their own Muslim circles. This may serve 
to cause further estrangement between Muslims and non-Muslims.  
 
Discussions around the integration of Muslims have been at the fore within the UK for a 
number of years. They have dominated certain CT conversations and have been blamed 
for blurring the boundaries between community cohesion work and CT policies (Lakhani, 
2012; House of Commons, 2010). Within the empirical data, there was a mixed response 
towards whether Muslims are or can be integrated.  
 
Certain respondents argued these identities, i.e. being British and being Muslim, are not 
completely diametrically opposed to one another – although certain elements are – and 
Muslim youth are capable of being both. There were those respondents who asserted 
that Muslims were trying to integrate, and in fact have integrated, into British culture and 
society. Further, some explained that Muslims, especially Muslim youth, are proud to be 
British and identified themselves in this manner, ‘…I think a large majority of those who 
are born in this country they prefer to be British...’ (irl 186).  
 
However, around six respondents reported how Muslims felt like they were not welcome 
to fully integrate into society by the indigenous population when they actually tried to do 
so. One prominent community leader from the Midlands explained how many within his 
local area felt like they were integrated and British, but at the same time felt like they did 
not really belong and their Britishness was constantly being questioned: 
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 ‘…what happens in the bigger debate is we are asked other ridiculous questions 
like, “are you Muslim first [or] are you British first?” These are nonsensical questions as 
one has to do with citizenship and one has to do with faith. I find it rather offensive, a 
question of that nature.’ (rmc 737) 
 
This was in direct contrast to the view of the Muslim friends discussed in the prologue. 
They explained how integrating into the host society was not a concern for them and 
their identity was attached to being Muslim, rather than English or British:  
 
 ‘I think there would be very few Muslims who would say “I’m proud to be English”. 
The thing is, nationalism is something that is completely foreign to Islam but just saying 
the fact that I live here, you’re under protection here we should be respectful citizens 
then that’s ok.’ (cms 722) 
 
This merely goes towards highlighting the complexity of the situation. Whilst they outline 
how they are caught between two conflicting worlds, they believe their duty is to attach 
their identity to Islam, rather than a nation. This may be due to the particular sect of their 
religion they follow, or as a consequence of the arguments presented in this chapter.  
 
Certain respondents explained that Muslims felt very detached from British society, as 
many liberal Western values were mostly against the core principles of Islam. They 
claimed that Muslim parents did not want their children to be ‘corrupted’ by British culture 
and therefore discouraged any form of integration with non-Muslims. The empirical data 
also suggested that certain Muslim youth themselves did not agree with some elements 
of Western culture. Whilst growing up, they have learnt that some of the activities people 
participate in such as drinking, fornication, and drug use are completely forbidden in 
Islam. They strongly feel like they are living in a decadent society. As a former extremist 
from the West of England outlined:  
 
 ‘I grew up in a society…with drinking, women with no self-respect, STD’s 
[sexually transmitted diseases], into drugs…and this is what they call freedoms…the 
society is really badly damaged.’ (exe 999) 
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With consideration for all of the arguments within this section, it is very simple to blame 
Western society alone for not accepting Muslims or letting them believe they are not able 
to integrate. Some effort has to be placed on Muslim communities themselves. This is a 
two way situation where Muslim religious leaders and prominent community members 
need to bring this message home to their local communities. At the same time, however, 
it cannot be denied that there are many deficiencies and discriminations in the way 
Muslims are treated within UK, and this will contribute to how they construct their identity 
and perceptions of self within British society.  
 
4.3.2 Muslims and the Media 
 
‘…the media can portray you as a villain and then portray you as a good doer, or 
vice-versa. They can ruin people’s reputations, they can restore them, they can do what 
they like, and that’s why the media is so powerful’ (grw 309) 
 
The vast majority of Muslim respondents within the study largely blamed Western media 
outlets for the way they were being treated within society. As remarked in the quotation 
above, many believe the media to be an extremely powerful institution which has the 
ability to change people’s attitudes and actions. Almost all of the respondents felt the 
media plays an integral role within radicalisation. This was set within the broader context 
of Muslim communities being alienated from mainstream society due to certain adverse 
reporting of Muslims, and Islam in general.  
 
This apprehension towards the media was down to a number of reasons. One particular 
gripe was a feeling that Muslims and Islam are constantly being reported in the news. As 
with the findings of the Cardiff University report outlined earlier, the issue is that Muslims 
are more often than not reported in a negative manner.  
 
Further, respondents questioned why terms such as ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islam’ were used in 
certain media reports when the story had very little, if anything, to do with the religion. 
There is a distinct difference in the way Muslims are reported as compared to those from 
other faiths. If terms like Christian, Hindu, and Jewish are rarely stated in media stories, 
why is this not the case for Muslims? In fact, similar arguments were made in reference 
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to Northern Ireland during the height of IRA conflicts (Hillyard, 1993). The respondents 
believed this tactic was employed in a bid to imply controversy, which in turn helps to sell 
newspapers:  
 
 ‘…[if] you saw the newspaper that said “Muslim man mugs an old lady”, [or] “man 
mugs and old lady”, you’re more likely to pick up the story about [the Muslim]…“what 
else is inside it when it says Muslim man? Is it just a mugging [or] has he mugged her 
because he wants to fund violent extremism?”…that automatically triggers in your mind 
all those things about Muslims…’ (grw 840) 
 
There was a feeling that Muslims were being treated differently since 9/11 and 7/7, and 
were being viewed by society as terrorists. The five friends discussed in the prologue 
held similar sentiments, as one explained:  
 
‘I think because of the media…the first thing that they think is the stereotype 
which is widely accepted…So if you are a practising Muslim they think “oh, terrorism, 
terrorist”…’ (cms 326) 
 
Further, respondents felt Islam is viewed negatively amongst the rest of society with 
people believing that it condones violence, murder and terrorism at the core of its ideals:  
 
‘…one of the things that I believe strongly is that the media has not been fulfilling 
its responsibility of being balanced, unbiased, giving the facts as they should be. They’ve 
taken a bit of truth but they’ve distorted it beyond even comprehension sometimes to the 
extent where people start buying into believing that Islam is a terrorist religion, Islam is 
about violent extremism, Islam condones it, [and] Muslims are all crazed fanatics’ (grw 
831) 
 
When this is considered alongside the fact that infamous figures like Anjem Choudary 
and groups like AM are given so much airtime, the respondents feared society believed 
that these groups are ‘representative of all Muslims in the UK’ (grw 358). However, once 
again, it is very simplistic to argue that most of wider society holds anti-Muslim and anti-
Islamic sentiments, when this is probably far from the truth. Though at the same time 
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there must also not be complacency with this matter. There is still noticeable animosity, 
as will be discussed in the next section, towards Muslims in the UK. 
 
Finally, there is one further consequence of this type of media reporting. As discussed 
within the Methodology chapter, there was reluctance by community members to be 
interviewed for this particular research. One of the gatekeepers who facilitated access to 
community members outlined this:  
 
‘…we’re very scared of the media, that’s why we’re very scared when you came 
to us. A lot of people in the mosque, when you was there, they came up to me while they 
[the community respondents] were talking to you and said, “what’s going on here, what’s 
going on?” And I said “no, don’t worry, he’s a neutral person, he’s not this and that”. So 
we simply shut off the media from our mosque…a lot of people are scared ‘cos they 
think, you know, [as] soon as you tell someone they will edit it out, what you mean, they 
will say something else, and we’ve seen that done a million times…’ (grw 156) 
 
This was particularly evident within this study, as seen in the quotation above. Many that 
did agree to participate were fearful of their words being presented in a way which would 
be what the researcher wanted, rather than ‘the truth’. They had strong concerns that if 
misquoted, this could damage society’s view of Muslims further. This concern not only 
affected access to certain interviewees within this study, but may also be felt by other 
researchers in the field.  
 
4.3.3 Islamophobia and the Far-Right 
 
Another consequence of this type of media reporting is the contribution it makes towards 
an increase in Islamophobic based crime. These are the physical and verbal assaults 
against Muslims, which one grassroots worker described as a ‘backlash’ (grw 179). By 
having a specific term, i.e. ‘Islamophobia’, to describe racism and discrimination against 
a particular faith indicates the severity of the issue. Islamophobia was mentioned by just 
over a third of respondents as a key issue facing Muslims in the UK. As well as affecting 
Muslim communities more generally, this problem also works towards compounding the 
radicaliser’s ‘us vs. them’ argument.  
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This was an issue mentioned by former extremists who had been radicalised both pre 
and post-9/11; indicating that this problem is ongoing and has been part of radicalisation 
for many years. This resonates with the argument of Muslim youth not being allowed to 
feel like they are integrated or can integrate into British society. A grassroots worker from 
London who was once a prominent member of a violent extreme group recalled the 
effect it had on himself and his friends at the time:  
 
 ‘…you used to have the skinheads, and we used to get a lot of racism…We 
remember it had a profound impact, a very negative impact. I think we were emotionally 
scarred for many years thinking we will never be accepted into this society...’ (gee 459) 
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, society as a whole cannot be responsible for the 
actions of a minority. There have been many positive strides towards curbing racism and 
discrimination and moving toward a more integrated society in the UK in recent decades. 
This importantly must not be forgotten. However, as demonstrated in the statistics on 
Islamophobia provided at the fore of this chapter, there has been a general increase in 
hate crimes directed towards Muslims since 7/7 and most probably since 9/11 if the data 
were to cover this period. One example of this was outlined by a community member:  
 
‘One time I was on the bus coming back from [location name deleted] and there 
was a drunken guy on there and I went to get my bag and he said “whoa, whoa, whoa 
what are you doing!” And he actually took it to the level where he thought I was going to 
[blow up the bus]. I thought he was joking…but then I took my coat off and he said 
“whoa” and he was trying to make a point and he said “look, I am the only one saying it 
but everyone else on this bus is thinking it”’ (cms 944) 
 
This was not a standalone example. Many of the respondents were keen to regale their 
own tales of racism; however there was one conversation that epitomises this concern. 
This was partly discussed in the prologue to this chapter where the story of five young 
male Muslims was outlined. They described a number of different experiences of racism 
which affected them personally and their local mosque. This ranged from verbal abuse, 
by being told ‘racist jokes’ against Muslims by an individual ‘dressed like some sort of NF 
[National Front]’ (cms 987), to physical threats where one respondent recalled, ‘the 
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amount of times I’ve walked past English men and they’ve said to me “you f’ing [fucking] 
Muslim, I’ll bloody stab you up!...we’ll cut your head off, bloody Muslim” (cms 326). 
 
This highlights several interesting points. First, as another young Muslim explained, ‘the 
youth are backed into a corner, everybody hates Muslims, so these youths, it’s kind of 
like they feel like they’re angry’ (cms 338). Second, is the change in perception of self 
and social identity when considering the opinions of others towards them. This is similar 
to Charles Horton Cooley’s (1902) theory of the ‘looking-glass self’, where we construct 
our sense of self-identity on the basis of others’ reactions, or what we perceive others’ 
reactions to be.  
 
Once again, this can contribute to Muslim youth becoming more insular and believing the 
problem of Islamophobia to be much wider than it actually is. This is not to underplay the 
issue, but to emphasise that these youth may believe that society as a whole is racist. 
This was raised as a concern during an interview with a grassroots worker from the 
North East of England:  
 
‘One of the issues that we have got with the Muslim youth is they do get hurled a 
lot of racist abuse and what they tend to do is then tar everyone with that same brush. 
So every White person you see is now a racist, every White person you now see is a 
target…They see them as being the enemy...’ (grw 179) 
 
When probed about the term ‘every White person you now see is a target’, he explained 
how the Muslim youth he worked with were becoming increasingly hostile towards White 
communities in their local area. In some cases this was manifesting in certain Muslim 
youth being verbally and physically racist themselves:  
 
 ‘…unfortunately we’ve had various youth in the past who have picked fights just 
because the individual was White…maybe I’m assuming too much, but I’m putting two 
and two together by [saying] that’s why they go to do various things extreme. [Like them 
saying] “Kill all the Jews. Kill all the Americans”, all that kind of stuff…Personally I think 
they come to that because they see everyone as the same…’ (grw 179) 
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It could not be determined if this was a standalone issue within this particular area, or if it 
was more representative across the country. However, the interviewee makes an 
interesting assumption about radicalisation. Although it has been stated numerous times 
that there are additional factors that contribute towards radicalisation, his argument may 
have some substance. That is, radicalisees seeing ‘everyone as the same’ links back to 
the ‘us vs. them’ argument. 
 
This concern also stems from the resurgence of the far-right in the UK, specifically in the 
form of the EDL, and in Europe more widely. Some respondents felt this rise in support 
for the far-right was in direct relation to the growing anti-Islamic rhetoric within a number 
of European countries. Although the growth of the far-right will also be due to wider 
factors, the respondents’ concerns cannot be ignored. This is clear when considering 
groups such as the EDL, whose officially stated focus is to ‘curb Islamic extremism’. 
However, there are strong suggestions that EDL rhetoric has evolved more towards an 
anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic view, with numerous instances of racist attacks committed 
by members of the group (Taylor, 2010). 
 
There was much concern over the tension and anger exhibited by certain young Muslims 
when they were aware of demonstrations being held by the EDL in their local areas. 
Local community leaders expressed their fears over the potential for physical conflict 
between the two groups. Through various resources from ‘word of mouth’, to utilising 
social media and technology like BlackBerry Messenger (BBM)53, Muslim youth were 
able to mobilise themselves in large numbers and on very short notice. As a result, 
grassroots workers, youth workers, and religious leaders had to act fast and implement 
diversionary tactics, such as organising barbeques and sports days54: 
 
‘They held a demonstration in the month of Ramadan two or three weeks ago, 
and the Asians of this community, because of lack of knowledge, they want to repel the 
attempts of this radical White extremist group by going out and confronting them. So we 
knew that the EDL were going to march. So now we have to do something about it.’ (grw 
971) 
                                                 
53
 BlackBerry Messenger was considered to play a key role in mobilising youth during the UK riots 
in 2011 (Ball and Brown, 2011). 
54
 Similar findings have also been reported in wider studies, see: Innes et al. (2011). 
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There are many reported incidents of clashes between the EDL and Muslim youth. This 
has led to the creation of counter-organisations such as the Muslim Defence League 
(MDL), which has over 40,000 ‘likes’55 on Facebook alone. When speaking off the record 
to certain respondents, it was claimed that some members of the MDL actually glorified 
terrorism and had links to wider extremist networks. These counter-demonstrations and 
physical clashes with the EDL provide ample fertile recruiting ground for these extreme 
groups. The respondents felt that this rise in the far-right was having a direct influence 
on young Muslims in the UK becoming radicalised.  
 
4.3.4 Consequences 
 
Extreme groups aim to capitalise on people’s grievances of racism and discrimination. 
They also focus upon their lack of identity and belonging and attempt to replace this with 
a dominant identity in the form of Islam and provide a strong sense of belonging within 
their particular extreme group. However, as will be discussed in the following empirical 
chapters, this does not necessarily amount to these young Muslims becoming religious, 
or more religious. It is about them asserting a dominant masculine identity in the context 
of being Muslim56.  
 
A pertinent example of this new sense of identity and belonging was outlined by a former 
extremist from London. He explained that whilst at secondary school, which was pre-
9/11, there were three different special midweek assemblies57. One assembly was for 
Christians, one for Muslims, and a secular one. Pupils were given the choice of which 
                                                 
55
 Each member of Facebook has the option of clicking a ‘like’ button for a fan page. These pages 
can be constructed by anyone using Facebook, such as individuals, special interest groups or 
companies, for example. When an individual ‘likes’ a certain fan page, they receive regular 
updates from that fan page on their own timeline. 
56
 As well as becoming more insular, Choudhury (2007: 5) argues that ‘Muslim identity’ can be an 
important factor with determining and defining a strong sense of masculinity amongst young 
Muslim men in a way to resist stereotypes of ‘weakness and passivity’ attached to Asian men 
(Archer, 2003). Hopkins (2006: 349) argues that ‘Whilst the majority of young Muslim men might 
aim to conform to hegemonic stereotypes of Muslim masculinity, a range of complex intertwining 
markers of social difference – gender, social class, sexuality, disability – disrupt this pattern’. In 
fact, Hopkins further explains the young men within his study often ‘adopt[ed] a range of 
contradictory masculine subject positions’ (ibid: 350). 
57
 A school assembly is a period of time, usually in the morning, where all of the students gather 
together in order for the teachers, usually the headmaster or headmistress, to disseminate certain 
pieces of information, or in some instances to conduct religious prayer.  
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one they wanted to attend. For the Muslim assembly guest speakers were regularly 
invited and unfortunately some of these were part of extreme groups in the UK. As these 
individuals would be sent from local colleges and universities, their credibility would not 
be questioned. Also, as these talks took place pre-9/11, this type of extremism was not 
generally a widely held concern in the UK at this point. The speakers would discuss 
topics they felt would capture the imagination of the Muslim students:  
 
‘…they would talk about issues of belief, issues of identity, things that would 
capture the attention of young people…where if you question their identity [and] you 
pose some essential questions…you will be able to spark off a discussion and flicker a 
debate in their mind…“you’re an Asian, you’re not part of mainstream society, but what 
makes you different is your belief as a Muslim”, so that sparks off that discussion…’ (gee 
709) 
 
This particular discussion motivated this respondent to approach the speaker after the 
assembly; which led him to eventually join the group. He claimed a number of other 
students also made similar contact and joined. These individuals may come to believe 
that this new group will provide them with the identity and belonging they so desire, as 
outlined within Maslow’s (1954) ‘hierarchy of needs’, or are led to believe they desire. In 
addition, if people in the extreme group have experienced similar episodes of racism and 
discrimination to the potential radicalisee, then this also goes towards solidifying bonds. 
 
These individuals may have felt belonging in their previous friendship circles, but if they 
become part of an extreme group they will be involved in a global cause. This is about 
something much larger than their normal and possibly predictable and mundane lives. 
This in turn brings a level of excitement and adventure, as will be discussed in following 
chapters.  
 
4.4 The Local Level 
 
This chapter has so far discussed the strains and grievances felt by radicalisees at the 
personal level and forms the first part of the ‘us vs. them’ argument. The implementation 
of various policing and CT legislation and strategy within the UK gives radicalisers the 
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impetus to take this to the next level. This makes the radicalisee further susceptible to 
the radicaliser’s message by giving the belief that the state is trying to suppress Muslim 
communities.  
 
There are certain issues Muslim communities have within their local areas. One of these 
relates to the actions, or lack of involvement, of the police. Although wider research has 
indicated that Muslim communities’ attitudes towards the police are more positive than 
expected (Lakhani, 2012; Innes et al. 2011), this should not, however, lead to the 
assumption that these strains and grievances are not real. One issue that was raised 
within the data was the way the police are perceived to be dealing with racist incidents. It 
was felt that the police were not taking the appropriate actions, or doing everything they 
could in their power, against offenders. This can lead certain communities, as outlined by 
a community member from the West of England, to believe it is not worth their time to 
report these incidents: 
 
‘I think the community, when they call up the police they don’t usually get the 
reaction that they want from them. So it is kind of a lost hope in them at times…when the 
situation occurs, a serious situation, [they] think of calling the police, but they hesitate 
because they think to themselves, “oh maybe they won’t do anything so it’s not worth our 
time calling the police.”’ (cms 326) 
 
Although there was considerable respect and praise for the police58 within the empirical 
data, there were concerns raised about some of their practices. A former extremist from 
the Midlands provided an interesting example. This occurred a number of years ago and 
had a direct impact on his, and his associates’, radicalisation. At the time, his local area 
faced a number of criminal issues such as robbery, prostitution, and drug dealing. When 
the police were approached by community members – who were mostly Muslim – they 
were assured that there was an awareness of the issue and something would be done 
about it. However, as time went on it appeared as if the police were doing very little to 
solve the problems. The respondent believed that this was to ‘destroy the community 
from within’ (exe 283). As a result, his friends formed their own ‘resistance’ to rid their 
                                                 
58
 This respect and praise is dependent, though, on the type of police officer or department 
(Lakhani, 2012). 
 115 
local area of these problems59. The interviewee claimed that his group were successful 
in ‘clean[ing] the streets’, and were thus approached by local residents to help solve their 
personal issues (ibid). This gave his group a heightened sense of power which he felt 
started to spiral out of control:  
 
‘…it got to a point where it was getting too much, so we thought, “there [is] a few 
of us yeah, we can do something about it, so we don’t need anyone...” They [the local 
Muslim community] used to call us “the vigilantes”, because we used to do things for 
other people…If the police did their job in the Muslim communities then there would be 
no extremism…this is what radicalisation did. We became more militant and we thought 
“yeah, yeah look what we’ve done, we can do other things as well now”’ (exe 283) 
 
The group had fifty members at their peak. Once the numbers started to dwindle, they 
approached a local extreme group, certain members had affiliations with, in a bid to get 
the extremists to join their cause and strengthen their ‘muscle’. However, the extremists’ 
primary concern was with issues around foreign policy and the plight of Muslims abroad, 
so the two groups parted company. There were two consequences attached to this 
particular type of behaviour. First, the respondent conceded that members of his group 
became affiliated and eventually formally joined the local extreme group. Second, as his 
original group were conducting a form of positive social control in their local area, 
community members may have turned a blind eye to the group’s increasing extremist 
orientations or affiliations60.  
 
As well as grievances around policing at the local level, the empirical data also showed a 
strong sense of disdain towards the implementation of certain CT strategies, like ‘stop 
and search’. This was happening within local geographic areas and also at other high 
security venues, such as the airport. This became apparent during the interview of the 
five young Muslim friends from the West of England. As much as they understood, and 
for the most part agreed, that these strategies needed to be in place to reduce the risk 
from terrorism and protect our national security (which people sometimes forget also 
affects Muslims), they did not agree with how they were being implemented:  
                                                 
59
 There are similarities between this and the account of Mohammed Sidique Khan’s group, the 
‘Mullah Boys’ (Malik, 2007; Leiken, 2011). 
60
 Similarities can be drawn with the IRA and INLA during the height of the conflict in Northern 
Ireland (see Sluka, 1989, for example). 
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‘I have been stopped at the airport about two or three times…They asked me 
about extremism and what is going on here and have you been involved in any kind of 
extreme stuff…I don’t think it was random because they picked me out every time and 
ask. And I think to myself what is going on, what have I done to deserve it?’ (cms 385) 
 
Although these laws are starting to be addressed, or ‘scaled back’ (Home Office, 2011), 
they have still had a lasting effect and were described in the empirical data as ‘very, very 
problematic’ (rmc 321). Many believed ‘stop and search’ is not a useful CT tool and was 
primarily set up by the government to gather information and intelligence on Muslim 
communities in an Orwellian type environment:  
 
 ‘…the fact that they can terrify the population into believing that these things are 
necessary is again a ploy by the government…This whole notion that we need security is 
a complete smokescreen’ (cms 338) 
 
There were also grievances with the contentious topic of ‘profiling’. There will naturally 
be contrasting opinions on this particular issue. On the one hand, there needs to be a 
consideration that according to certain statistics such as CT arrests, people that are from 
certain ethnic backgrounds and age brackets are more likely to be involved in AQI 
extremism in the UK. It can be argued that the relevant authorities do not have the time 
and resources to check every single person entering the UK’s borders, so this is a way 
of mitigating that risk. On the other hand, it can also be argued that this is a dangerous 
tactic as it gives those who wish to target the UK an increased chance of avoiding 
detection by employing those who do not fit a certain profile61. This is exemplified by the 
case of convicted terrorists such as Nicky Reilly62 and Richard Reid, both of whom were 
very close to killing scores of innocent civilians.  
 
There is no clear evidence to show that authorities within airports are even implementing 
this type of strategy. Though, once again, the perception of them doing so can be just as 
detrimental. This is about individuals feeling singled out and victimised, which in turn has 
                                                 
61
 For a more detailed analysis, see: Hasan (2011). 
62
 Nicky Reilly is widely deemed to have been a ‘lone wolf’. However, as mentioned in the 
Introductory chapter, this is far from conclusive as some believe that Reilly was actually 
radicalised by a group who even sent him a text message containing words of ‘encouragement’ 
before the incident (Gardham et al., 2008). 
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the strong potential to make them feel further alienated and detached from society. Their 
perceptions of self will be affected by these incidents and they will question their sense 
of identity and belonging. When this is capitalised on by extremists, as will be discussed 
in the latter part of the thesis, it becomes especially dangerous.  
 
4.5 The Global Level 
 
This final section of the chapter focuses upon the grievances felt at the global level and 
concerns the various foreign policy decisions of the West63. Although this affects Muslim 
and non-Muslim communities more widely, it is discussed in the context of radicalisation. 
A resounding three quarters of informed informants mentioned ‘foreign policy’ at least 
once as a factor they believed contributed towards radicalisation. This forms the final 
part of the ‘us vs. them’ paradigm, where radicalisees come to believe that the West is at 
war with Islam as a faith.  
 
These factors are also important in creating a sense of moral outrage in the mind of the 
radicalisee which lead, as will be discussed within the ‘Conversion’ chapter, towards a 
feeling of moral and divine duty towards some sort of activism. The aim of the radicaliser 
is to capitalise on the emotions of the individual. These include distress, fear, hurt, and 
most importantly anger. However, this is not to say the radicalisers do not genuinely feel 
the same strains themselves. Although the emotional factor of radicalisation is discussed 
in later chapters, it is important to mention it as a backdrop, or a context within which to 
place the grievances of foreign policy.  
 
 
 
                                                 
63
 There is a wider argument here where past actions may cause lingering resentment. Githens-
Mazer (2008: 550), during his study of the radicalisation of North Africans in the UK, argues that 
‘symbols of Islamic repression’ and ‘perceptions’ of western oppression is not the sole factor, but 
nonetheless a ‘cause in the larger process of “radicalisation”’. This is mainly attributed to how 
‘myths, memories and symbols of the colonial and recent past inform contemporary resonant 
repertoires of myths, memories and symbols, which in turn serve as bases for radicalisation 
among some Islamists from North Africa’ (ibid: 565).  
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4.5.1 Direct Foreign Policy 
 
The issue with direct foreign policy concerns the occupation of Muslim states, such as 
Iraq, by Western militaries. It is the consequences of these occupations that cause the 
primary grievance, with the most common argument pertaining to the killing of innocent 
Muslims by coalition forces64. The examples cited by radicalisers usually involve the term 
‘woman and children’ to further heighten the sense of grievance.  
 
Alongside concerns about British involvement, there were specific resentments toward 
the actions of the US, as outlined by around a quarter of the informed informants. The 
UK and US are strongly interlinked in the minds of many, especially after the invasions of 
Iraq and Afghanistan. This is an allegiance which has spanned many decades and has 
been highlighted by prominent figures, like former US President George W. Bush. This 
‘special relationship’, a term coined by former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, 
was only recently urged a rethink by certain British Members of Parliament (Tran, 2010). 
Thus, seven of the informed informants, including two former extremists explained how, 
in the UK, extremist recruiters’ jobs become easier when certain actions are taken by the 
US:  
 
                                                 
64
 Many of the respondents who discussed the innocent deaths of Muslims in these countries 
alluded to the cause coming from allied forces. However, this is not to say they did not 
understand that the Taliban could also be responsible, if Afghanistan is taken as an example. 
This may simply be due to the specific topic not arising during the conversation. However, with 
some, it may also be due to ignorance or denial. During the recent Home Affairs Select 
Committee hearings, Alyas Karmani, part of the STREET project in South London, argued that 
Muslim on Muslim killings within these countries were ‘conveniently overlooked’ (House of 
Commons, 2011).  
 
Fergusson (2010) points out that according to the UN, 1250 civilians were killed in the first half of 
2010 in Afghanistan, which amounts to a year-on-year increase of 30 percent. Interestingly, three 
quarters of the deaths in 2010 were caused by the Taliban, mainly through the use of improvised 
explosive devices. Fergusson, through his ethnographic research, argues that although the 
Taliban may be responsible for these bombings, they were not necessarily blamed for them; the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was. ‘Nato, in other words, is increasingly seen as part 
of the problem rather than the solution.’  
 
Another element to note is that many respondents considered the most recent war in Iraq, for 
example, to be illegal. Thus, it was felt by these respondents that those civilians that died as a 
result were casualties of a war that should not have been started in the first place.  
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 ‘…if I am a recruiter…my job becomes very easy when an American Drone has 
bombed a village in Afghanistan and killed 70, 80 innocent people at a wedding party…’ 
(rmc 321) 
 
Further indications about the importance of direct foreign policy emanate from the fact 
that all the former extremists within the study argued it to play an integral role within their 
own radicalisation. Examples of this can also be seen from those serving time in prison 
for terrorism related offences. Due to the complexities and difficulties with gaining access 
to prisons for conducting this type of research, speaking to those who do have regular 
contact with these individuals becomes imperative. A former extremist, who now works 
as a grassroots worker, from the North West of England held this position. When 
discussing one particular prisoner he was helping to ‘resocialise’ back into society, the 
respondent explained how this individual was deeply affected by Western foreign policy 
throughout his radicalisation. Alongside other factors and influences, as discussed within 
this thesis, this contributed to the individual travelling abroad to attend a ‘jihadi’ training 
camp:  
 
‘[name deleted] here that I worked with, he did two years for anti-terror offences, 
eighteen months in Belmarsh [Prison]…foreign policy was a big issue for him’ (gee 796)  
 
4.5.2 Critical Relationships 
 
The UK and US’s relationship with other countries, specifically Israel in this account, are 
regularly questioned by extremists. In fact, there are many wider communities, groups 
and commentators who raise similar concerns. The main grievance lies with the UK and 
US’s lack of criticism towards Israeli foreign policy decisions, as they do when other 
countries conduct similar acts. This primarily concerns the Israel-Palestine conflict. Many 
of the Muslim respondents argued there to be contradictions and differences in approach 
to the situation. Whilst certain acts are deemed permissible, or as ‘self-defence’, by non-
Muslim states, similar actions from Muslim countries are seen as illegal:  
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‘…When they [Israel] are committing these war crimes nobody seems to bother 
about it, nobody seems to be bothered taking any resolution in the United Nations…But 
when it comes to a Muslim country…why is it that we have to use this multi-power?’ (grw 
218) 
 
As with the foreign policy of Western states, the consequence of Israel’s foreign policy, 
i.e. the killing of civilians, is potent within radicalisation. The same grassroots worker 
quoted above from the North East of England provided the example of another young 
Muslim he worked with who had served time in prison for CT offences. The respondent 
explained how certain crucial moments and images had been permanently etched into 
this individual’s mind: 
 
 ‘…what was interesting was that [name deleted] would say to me that the killing 
of Mohammed al-Durrah65, that image of that boy at the age of twelve being killed in 
Palestine, it was a defining image for him.’ (gee 796) 
 
This by no means insinuates that Palestinian violations are not as culpable as Israel’s. 
However, this situation is extremely complex as can be seen in the more recent stance 
taken by the UK and US towards Israel and her actions. Whilst the US joined Israel to 
vote against Palestine’s upgrade to a non-member observer state at the UN General 
Assembly in 2012, the UK abstained from voting (BBC News, 2012). In addition, the 
Obama Administration’s reiteration of Israel’s right to ‘self-defence’ during the most 
recent escalation of the conflict was criticised by many as being unbalanced (see Zunes, 
2012). On the other hand, both the UK and the US made clear their condemnation of 
Israel’s Jewish settlement plan extension (McDevitt, 2012). 
 
Although this complexity with relationships runs deep, the perceptions of those who are 
susceptible to extremist ideologies are of greatest importance. Radicalisers may provide 
the simplest answers to these intricate issues. If the radicalisee lacks the historical 
knowledge to counter these claims, they may just accept the version provided to them. 
This was highlighted by a grassroots worker giving evidence at the Home Affairs Select 
                                                 
65
 It must be noted that the case of Mohammed al-Durrah is vehemently debated in regards to 
whether or not he was (a) killed by Israeli forces and (b) whether he was actually killed at all. 
Israel claimed the incident to be ‘a fake’, which caused ‘an angry reaction’ from al-Durrah’s father 
(Dawber, 2013). 
 121 
Committee hearings on understanding the ‘Roots of violent radicalisation’ in 2012. He 
explained how most youth he dealt with in his capacity did not have knowledge on the 
Israel-Palestine situation ‘beyond 10 years’ (House of Commons, 2012). If radicalisees 
are told that the Palestinians are being suppressed by the Israelis, who are in turn being 
supported by the West, then they may take this at face value.  
 
4.5.3 Lack of Foreign Policy 
 
The final grievance at the global level was with the West’s failure to intervene, or have 
delayed involvement, during certain conflicts involving the massacre of Muslims. The 
main cited example within the empirical data was Srebrenica66, Bosnia during the 1990s. 
It was felt that many innocent Muslim casualties could have been prevented if action had 
been taken sooner. Prior to the incidents on 9/11, Bosnia, as well as other conflicts such 
as the Chechen Wars, have been utilised by radicalisers as strong radicalising tools. A 
grassroots worker from London even argued that the situation ‘had one of the most 
enterprising effects on radicalising Muslims in this country’ (grw 927), not just within the 
UK, but also across Europe. This remains a prominent talking point within extremist 
circles to the present day, with a fifth of the informed informants arguing that the Bosnian 
War is still a strong radicalising factor. Bosnia represents the unifying point between pre- 
and post-9/11 extremists, as explained by a former extremist from London:  
 
‘…[by] word of mouth it was passed down…they say “look what happened in 
Bosnia”. No one [has] forgotten it’ (exe 283) 
 
The conflict in Srebrenica caused a global outcry from Muslims with the strong sentiment 
that fellow Muslims were being massacred with little thought or resentment. Importantly, 
no one seemed to be doing anything to prevent it. Some believed it was their personal 
duty to protect their Muslim kin and travelled to the region in a bid to do so67, all unified, 
                                                 
66
 Although Bosnia was the most commonly cited example within the empirical data, this does not 
insinuate that there are not other similar grievances held towards the UK. 
67
 As briefly mentioned in the Introductory chapter, there are concerns, similar to Bosnia, with 
Syria. There is a fear of the growing numbers of both British and European fighters involved 
(Zelin, 2013; Pantucci, 2013). As with Bosnia, there is the possibility that there will be grievances 
aimed towards the UK and the West for not intervening, or early enough, to prevent the massacre 
of civilians. 
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against a common enemy. Many British Muslims who had fought in Afghanistan during 
the Soviet invasion were still returning home after remaining to help with reconstructing 
the country. Bosnia provided them with another cause, another fight. This was also 
critical as Afghanistan was descending into a civil war where Muslims were killing one 
another (Change Institute, 2008: 72; Kohlmann, 2004). Bosnia provided a fight with clear 
battle lines, i.e. Muslims against non-Muslims. These veterans who served under the 
Taliban had little difficulty finding new recruits to travel to Bosnia to conduct ‘jihad’. This 
was outlined by a grassroots worker from London who had recently converted, or 
‘reverted’68, to Islam during this period:  
 
‘…[there] was something which was like a common enemy to fight against. The 
United Nations were not doing much; you didn’t see many people doing much to help the 
Muslims over there. So it was like a clear case of these people being oppressed with 
people thinking they should go and help them…a lot of people participated and were 
going over there [and] started volunteering…’ (grw 759) 
 
As with the other global grievances, Bosnia affected wider Muslim communities and 
related to issues that ran deeper than the direct consequences of war itself. This was not 
a conflict in a different continent but occurred in Europe, right ‘on our doorstep’, as one 
former extremist explained (exe 283). This confirmed the intent of the massacre, which 
to them related to their faith: 
 
 ‘…they’ve seen for the first time in Europe that blonde, blue eyed individuals 
were then being persecuted on European mainland. The only difference was the religion 
was different to that of the vast majority Christian West, and I think it brought it into sharp 
focus…’ (rmc 737) 
 
This raised some important questions around the acceptance and integration of Muslims 
in the West. They considered, if the blonde haired, blue eyed Muslims of Bosnia were 
persecuted, then what hope was there for them? They questioned what the future held 
for them as Muslims living in Europe:  
                                                 
68
 The term ‘reverted’ alludes to a belief that all people are born Muslims, thus by a non-Muslim 
embracing Islam it is a reversion back to the original state. Alternatively, some believe that their 
ancestors were Muslim, though were forced to convert to Christianity through various church, 
state or wider political initiatives. Thus, they are reverting back to their ancestors’ original religion.  
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‘…watching videos at the age of fifteen, sixteen, of some of the massacres that 
had taken place…Muslims who were, for all intensive purposes, well integrated into 
Yugoslavia, even culturally integrated into Yugoslavia…that presented this whole kind of 
question of how well integrated can we be?’ (gee 709) 
 
This was a real concern with many Muslims in the UK during this period, with some even 
fearing for their own safety. This was brought into sharp focus during the interview of a 
former extremist from the Midlands. He explained how the incidents in Bosnia implanted 
a level of fear within his social circle which was capitalised upon by a local extreme 
group. The extremists’ argument was simple yet tremendously effective. That being, if 
this happened to Muslims who physically resembled indigenous Europeans more than 
other Muslims, it could happen anywhere, including Britain. The respondent explained 
how this strongly motivated his friendship circle to start training to improve their strength 
and fighting abilities in preparation for the possibility of similar attacks on Muslims 
occurring in the UK: 
 
‘That’s when extremism started spreading, because of that, because everyone 
started worrying, “what’s going to happen to us?”…what if it happened to this country, 
France, Belgium, Germany? And everybody starts panicking…because of the Bosnian 
war people became more militant, became more extreme I suppose…started training, 
started running, started doing martial arts, we all started doing stuff like that and became 
more militant…’ (exe 283) 
 
4.5.4 War against Islam 
 
We are told that certain Western foreign policies, such as the invasion of Afghanistan, 
are in a bid to protect Western interests against terrorism; something that is clear from 
the speech given by former United States President George W. Bush following the initial 
strikes against targets in Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks on 9/11 (The Washington 
Post, 2001). However, there are those who believe that the attack on 9/11, along with 
others such as 7/7, was not actually conducted by those who were blamed for them, i.e. 
AQ or AQI groups. Around a quarter of the informed informants stated how either they or 
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their local communities felt these terrorist attacks were ‘inside jobs’, i.e. orchestrated by 
the US and British Governments respectively69.  
 
There are those who are not convinced that the wars against Iraq and Afghanistan have 
anything to do with protecting national security or a measure to reduce terrorism. For 
example, the war in Iraq has been deemed, both by respondents and more widely with 
anti-war campaigners, as a desire for financial gain by the UK and US; as Iraq has large 
oil reserves70. There was another perceived motivation highlighted within the empirical 
data. That being, these attacks were orchestrated by the relevant governments to justify 
the ‘War on Terror’, which would enable a strengthening of ‘Western imperialism’71. This 
leads to the belief that this is not a war against Iraq or even Afghanistan directly. Due to 
the perception that Western imperialism is threatened by the continued ‘awakening’ of 
the Muslim world, it is actually a war against Islam:  
 
 ‘What was our national interest for going into war in Afghanistan? We [the UK] 
didn’t get attacked in 9/11, and I know damn well we wouldn’t have got attacked in 7/7 
had we not gone into Iraq, which further, kind of, reinforces in the perception of Muslims 
that this is a crusade against the Muslim world.’ (cms 338) 
 
This enables the radicaliser’s ‘us vs. them’ theory to move onto the global aspect. This 
was raised as a concern by a number of respondents, with one former violent extremist 
from London arguing that the ‘War on Terror’ itself was a direct attack on Islam. This was 
one of the dominant reasons behind his own radicalisation which resulted in him going to 
Afghanistan in search of ‘jihad’:  
 
 ‘…that’s one of the reasons why we got drawn in…and that was predominantly 
due to the “War on Terror” and the way it was conducted. It was the language, the 
attitude…’ (gee 997) 
                                                 
69
 This sentiment is reflected within wider polls conducted with British Muslims. For example, a 
Gfk NOP (2007) survey for Channel 4 News found that 24% of people polled agreed that ‘The 
British government was involved in some way in the July 7
th
 bombings’. 
70
 This has also been discussed by a number of prominent academics, commentators and 
notable figures such as Nelson Mandela (BBC News, 2002), Noam Chomsky (McNeill, 2005), 
and Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve 
(Adams, 2007). Those who disrepute these arguments claim that we only have to look at the lack 
of US success of being awarded contracts during the ‘oil auction’ in 2009 (Walt, 2009). 
71
 For a discussion on ‘Western imperialism’, see: Change Institute (2008a). 
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It is important to pick up on the terms ‘language’ and ‘crusade’ used in the previous two 
quotations. There has been much criticism of the use of contentious language by certain 
people during these conflicts. For example, comments made by George W. Bush, where 
he stated ‘you are either with us or against us’ caused further divide and animosity. This 
simplistic view of the situation ignored all the complexities involved. This in turn solidified 
the recruitment drive of radicalisers by giving substance to the ‘us vs. them’ argument. 
The use of the term ‘crusade’ also drew much negativity as it had implications to the 
Crusades orchestrated by Pope Urban II in 109572. This provides radicalisers with the 
opportunity to press home the argument by using both current and historical examples. A 
former extremist remarked, ‘‘cos we’re Muslim they hate us, [and] they’ve always hated 
us from day one’ (exe 283).  
 
If this notion of a war against Islam is taken at face value, then events over the past few 
decades indicate otherwise. For example, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the 
latter was considered to be an ally of much of the West73. In this case, the old ally 
became the new enemy. However, it was argued in the empirical data that this change of 
opinion only occurred when it suited those countries in the West. Therefore, the ongoing 
conflict with the former Soviet Union and political implications of their occupation of 
Afghanistan was thought to be the main concern of the West, rather than the security of 
the people of Afghanistan. A number of respondents argued that the West engages in 
whatever action it sees suitable at the particular time as long as it is in their best 
interests, without any regard for moral standards. They believe the West has ‘double-
standards’, especially when it comes to killing in the name of democracy.  
 
The respondents explained how this was not just a feeling held by susceptible youth, but 
also by their local communities more widely. They felt moral standards change and are 
contingent on who is being killed. As a community worker from London explained, ‘this is 
where the disenfranchisement comes in “that when it suits you it doesn’t matter, we can 
                                                 
72
 George W. Bush, once again, was criticised for the use of this term by many, including former 
British International Development Secretary State Clare Short (McSmith, 2001). 
73
 It is widely reported that during the Afghan-Russian war, the Mujahedeen were funded, armed 
and trained by the CIA and American military (Burke, 1999; Zernike and Kaufman, 2011), with 
Osama bin Laden considered to be somewhat of a freedom fighter, supporting the oppressed 
against the ‘tyrannical’ Russian regime. In fact, Ronald Reagan, the then US President, described 
the resistance fighters as “the moral equivalents of America’s founding fathers” (Chellaney, 
2011). 
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take Soviet life but when we start taking American lives or British lives that is the 
problem”’ (grw 218). In fact, over half of the informed informants held similar sentiments:  
 
‘I mean for the most part I would say that the whole double standards argument, 
you know, where “we’re being accused of being terrorists when we do such and such 
and such, but you can pillage and bomb and kill in the name of democracy and liberation 
and so on.” That is really their qualm, that’s the bulk of their argument.’ (grw 320) 
 
The respondents were by no means justifying the use of violence or terrorism. It was 
made categorically clear that they did not agree with the AQ and AQI acts of terrorism or 
Western military action in Muslim countries. As one religious leader from the Midlands 
explained, ‘The suicide bombers are not heroes, in Islam they are not heroes at all. But if 
person X kills innocent people and Y does, then what is the difference between the two?’ 
(grw 680). This led to a small number of respondents to question what the difference is 
between the death of Western soldiers and innocent indigenous Muslims who have been 
killed due to crossfire. They argued that, due to unbalanced media reporting and general 
societal culture, Muslim blood is not considered to be as valuable as Western blood:  
 
 ‘…people just think, “Well no, it’s almost as though those people are subhuman. 
When we kill them and we rape them they’re subhuman so their blood is not worth as 
much as your blood or my blood.”’ (gee 441) 
 
Once again, within a complex situation radicalisers are able to provide simple and clear 
answers. This was outlined by a grassroots worker who discussed the sentiments held 
by a radicalisee he worked with,  ‘“well look how much innocent Muslim blood has been 
spilt, [then] is it not fair that British or American blood should be spilt?”’ (gee 897) This 
was not a standalone comment, as another grassroots worker from the Midlands told of 
the common arguments presented by radicalisees, ‘“if they start spilling blood, just as 
our blood is being spilt”, they say “the blood of others needs to be spilt”’ (grw 320).  
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4.5.5 The Ummah 
 
The question that needs to be asked at this point is why are British Muslims concerned 
with the problems of Muslims globally who they have never met and will probably never 
meet? Respondents within the study explained how Muslims in the UK feel a bond with 
other global Muslims, and vice-versa. Theoretically74, all Muslim men and women are 
brothers and sisters. This was a strong sentiment that was reiterated throughout the 
research, ‘they’re your brothers, these kids are your sons and your children, these 
women are your sisters, they are your mothers’ (exe 283).  
 
This refers to the concept of the Ummah, which in Arabic means ‘community’ or ‘nation’. 
In the Quran it is presented in the context of ‘Ummah wahida’, or ‘one nation/community’. 
The importance this belief has amongst Muslims was outlined by a community leader 
from the Midlands:  
 
‘…there is something that is taught to Muslims that you can never take out of the 
psyche of Muslims. It’s that a Muslim thinks of the world as the world wide Ummah, the 
one brotherhood.’ (rmc 737) 
 
The concept of the Ummah is introduced to Muslims from a very young age. It is a core 
foundation of many Muslims’ religious, cultural and traditional beliefs. It literally is like 
accepting and treating another Muslim as an immediate family member and having love 
for them ‘as you would have love for one of your blood brothers…’ (grw 502). 
 
This is something I personally noticed whilst collecting the empirical data. During the 
research – and regardless of their size, location, or following of sect – the camaraderie 
within all mosques I visited was immediately apparent. On many occasions when waiting 
for the respondent I was interviewing, I would remain quietly somewhere in the mosque. 
This was usually a place where I could sit without being in other people’s way. On almost 
all, if not all, occasions at least one worshipper would approach me, shake my hand, and 
in a friendly manner ask me who I was and how I was doing. Even if I was not physically 
                                                 
74
 The term ‘theoretically’ is not used here to highlight the difference between actual blood 
relations as compared to ‘imagined’ relations, but more to represent Muslim infighting between 
different sects. Subsequently, certain denominations of Muslims may not consider others as part 
of the Ummah. 
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approached, many worshippers would at least look across and smile. At first I found this 
to be alien to what I was used to. I suspected it occurred because worshippers somehow 
knew that I was not a Muslim, and thought I may have looked out of place in the mosque 
(although all are welcome in mosques). However, as this continued it became apparent 
that there was something deeper at play. I asked a number of my contacts what the 
reasons were behind this and they explained the concept of the Ummah. They also told 
of how it is considered to be a requirement for Muslims to approach other Muslims they 
don’t know, especially in religious places, and make contact. It is not assumed here that 
this is widespread in all mosques across the UK; however the frequency of occurrence in 
my own experience cannot be ignored.  
 
The concept of protecting other Muslims within this imagined kinship is a very strong 
underlying argument within extremist recruitment and radicalisation. When considering 
the mobilisation that occurred as a result of incidents such as Bosnia, for example, this 
becomes especially apparent. These individuals strongly feel like their own blood family 
members are being attacked. This was explained by a former extremist from the West of 
England, who at one point claimed to have been very close to participating in ‘jihad’. He, 
however, did not disclose whether this was to be conducted within the UK or abroad. It 
was only through very late interventions from a grassroots worker in the Midlands that 
this individual was diverted away from this ideology. He explained how he felt his own 
family were being attacked when he heard of Muslims being killed, ‘If you knew someone 
was coming to attack your family would you go and violently stop them? That’s how I 
felt…you literally feel it’s your brothers dying.’ (exe 999). 
 
The arguments in this section should by no means implicate wider Muslim communities 
as potential extremists due to a belief in the Ummah, as it is not a deviant concept 
whatsoever. In fact, this camaraderie promotes a sense of selflessness. The Ummah is 
used as a powerful tool by radicalisers to instil a strong bond with fellow Muslims globally 
who they argue are suffering as a result of certain foreign policy decisions taken by 
Western states. It is also used to emphasise a sense of moral outrage and guilt within 
the minds of radicalisees which can be utilised to move certain individuals towards some 
form of non-violent or violent activism. Once again, for radicalisation to effectively occur, 
this needs to be in combination with the other concepts discussed within this thesis.  
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4.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has discussed strains and grievances felt by Muslim youth in the UK at the 
personal, local and global levels, that render them more susceptible to becoming 
radicalised. These strains may affect the decisions individuals take at future junctures in 
their lives, though does not imply that these will be connected to extremism. As Taylor 
and Horgan (2006: 592) appositely argue, ‘In a sense these factors are the precursors of 
immediate causal influences, but tend to be so general as to have little predictive value. 
They clearly contribute to the behavioural choices of an individual, and may provide 
important direction and motivation, but they cannot be said in any meaningful way to 
“cause” or result in choices of a particular set of actions.’ 
 
As stated at the start of this chapter, this is about whom the radicalisees are and what 
they mean in society and the world, and what society and the world means to them. 
These conditions affect a wider selection of the population rather than just Muslims, but it 
is about how radicalisers harness them for their own benefit. As with the prepatient 
phase of Goffman’s (1961) moral career, radicalisers aim to make susceptible individuals 
believe that their previous lives were false. Thus, the radicaliser explains that whilst the 
susceptible individual may have felt part, however small, of society, they were in fact in a 
state of normlessness, and although they may have felt accepted by society, this has 
never been the case. This enables the radicaliser, usually through the extreme group, to 
provide radicalisees with a new sense of identity and belonging, and this strengthens the 
bonds between the two. 
 
The three levels of strains and grievances (i.e. personal, local and global) are also used 
by radicalisers to instil a dominant sense of ‘us vs. them’ in the minds of the susceptible 
individuals. Those at the personal level work towards persuading them that society is 
against them and other Muslims. At the local level, they believe Muslim communities in 
the UK are specifically being targeted and suppressed by the state. Finally, at the global 
level they believe that the West is at war with Islam. These factors contribute to changing 
their perception of their immediate environment and the society and world they live in.  
 
Further, the strains and grievances at the global level are also used to create a sense of 
moral outrage, which work towards the susceptible individual believing that it is their 
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moral and divine duty to engage in some sort of activism. Roy (2008: 10) argues that 
individuals engaged in terrorism, in the context of ‘de-territorialized violence’, ‘are often 
torn between three countries: the country where their family comes from; the country of 
residence and radicalisation; and the country of action (though the last two may 
coincide, as was the case with the London bombings in 2005)’. When considering the 
term ‘de-territorialized’ in the context of this chapter, the individual does not necessarily 
have to focus on one specific political agenda, or they do not have to be attached, 
geographically or through heritage, to a particular state. This now also includes Muslim 
states where civilians are being killed, specifically through the consequences of Western 
foreign policy.  
 
The radicalisees are able to harness the strains and grievances discussed within this 
chapter to challenge the susceptible individual’s perceptions of self and social identity. 
The aim of the radicaliser is to create frame-alignment between the experiences of the 
radicalisee and their extreme ideologies. This will be discussed in greater depth within 
the ‘Conversion’ chapter of the thesis. 
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Chapter Five: Contingencies 
 
5.1 Prologue: Adam’s Account 
 
This is the story of ‘Adam’ who was interviewed as part of the empirical research in late 
2009. His account starts when he was at school, many years back, where he explains 
that being one of the only Asian children he was subject to much racism. This led him to 
‘hate the person he was’. He desperately felt like he wanted to belong and longed for an 
identity which was different to being Muslim and Asian. When he finally found this within 
a local group he was overjoyed.  
 
I expected Adam to reveal this was within an AQI extreme group, but surprisingly he first 
found solace in his local football firm75. Although this part of his life may appear to be 
irrelevant to the tenor of this thesis, Adam’s journey into football’s violent subculture has 
remarkable parallels with his social and subcultural account of AQI extremism. This 
group offered Adam what he was searching for as they accepted him for who he was. It 
was about being close friends, socialising together, and looking out for one another; their 
ethnic origins did not matter. Adam first became interested in this group by the way they 
dressed, and even mimicked their fashion styles before he had any type of contact with 
them. He viewed them with admiration as they appeared to be brave and found them to 
be what he deemed as ‘cool’. He finally joined the firm through a mutual contact within 
his social networks, and the group not only provided him with an identity and belonging, 
but also allowed him to exercise his masculinity and explore an exciting and dangerous 
environment.  
 
Interestingly, although he played football as a child, Adam wasn’t at first a fan of football 
and did not support a specific team. He became interested after joining the firm and 
regularly started to attend matches. Similarly, he wasn’t attracted to the firm on the basis 
of their violent culture. He was drawn in by the allure of what he perceived as ‘cool’ and 
                                                 
75
 A ‘firm’ is an unofficial collection of predominantly young men who have the shared interest of 
supporting a league football team. They form a cohesive gang and partake in violence, normally 
with other likeminded groups of supporters of other teams. 
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‘trendy’, and the violence came after. Similarities can be drawn to Lofland and Stark’s 
(1965) account of cults, discussed in the introductory chapter of this thesis.  
 
Adam eventually left the firm for reasons which were not discussed in depth during the 
interview, as they were deemed at that point to hold little value. With hindsight, they may 
have helped to understand and enlighten elements of the primary tenor of this thesis –
radicalisation, and some of the decisions Adam took in later life. Nevertheless, Adam 
proceeded to explain his fascinating journey to the periphery of AQI extremism.  
 
The term ‘periphery’ is used here as Adam did not become ‘converted’ in the sense of 
internalising extreme ideologies. In many respects, Adam’s story is blurred as he held 
beliefs that would be deemed to be extreme. This may be representative of many Muslim 
males in his particular position as they may be satisfying their social and subcultural 
desires through being ‘extremist by association’, though not necessarily internalising any 
extreme ideologies. 
 
Although Adam may well have experienced some of the issues discussed within the next 
chapter, he by no means was affected by all, or even most, of them. This will provide an 
indication of where Adam differed in his process as compared to those who are ‘fully’ 
converted. His account highlights the presence of a number of key findings which had 
the potential to make him more susceptible towards conversion, as compared to the five 
young Muslim friends discussed in the prologue to the last chapter. As well as the strains 
experienced at the personal level, Adam also felt them at the local and global levels. 
This is where the similarities between Adam and the five Muslim friends generally stop. 
As stressed in the Introduction, this account of radicalisation needs to be seen as fluid 
with all factors potentially running in parallel to one another. Thus, people may feel 
different strains from the three phases outlined in these three empirical chapters. Those 
who identify with core elements and have a combined ideological and micro-structural 
affinity will progress further than those who either do not, or have distinct gaps in either 
one.  
 
Adam’s journey into his local football firm showed his desire for identity and belonging. It 
was a space for him to exercise his masculinity and be part of the ‘cool’ crowd, which 
brought him excitement in his normally mundane and predictable life. His flirtation with 
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AQI extremism holds little difference. For example, fashion for him and his friends was a 
pivotal point of cohesion. They copied the attire of the jihadi soldiers they saw in the 
various DVDs that were being circulated:  
 
 ‘…the videos showed that the Chechen rebels used to wear army clothes, long 
hair, big boots, [and] similar stuff. [We] actually started dressing like them…walking 
round, acting militant …’ 
 
As time went on, his group increasingly satisfied their social and subcultural desires 
through remaining ‘extremist by association’. Some of the influential figures in Adam’s 
group adopted this stance more rigorously than others. This influenced most of the 
group to move in the same direction. If any of the group’s members challenged this 
outlook, there would be pressure for them to conform to the majority norms:  
 
 ‘…if I said “no, this is wrong”, they’d say “no, what you talking about, what about 
this, what about this”…You get convinced eventually. I don’t know how, you just get 
sucked into it all, and you just forget about everything else and you just like have tunnel 
vision…’ 
 
Adam’s group were not influenced by or committed to any particular extremist ideology. 
He explained that the group were generally not religious either. As outlined in the 
Introductory chapter, the role of religion in radicalisation becomes important during the 
conversion part of the process and forms the basis of the particular ideology the extreme 
group adopts; i.e. a non-violent or violent stance. However, it can also play a crucial role 
prior to this point in terms of a being a contingency. Those who are religious and hold a 
deeper knowledge of Islam are able to distance themselves from extremism being a 
subcultural trend as they believe that any type of affiliation is against the principles of 
their religion. This is another stark difference between Adam’s story and the account of 
the five young Muslim friends. As much of their social life revolved around the mosque, 
they appeared to be very pious and well schooled in Islamic doctrine.  
 
Further, from the considerable time spent with the five friends and their religious leaders 
and imams, it was clear that they all held a close and mutually respected relationship. 
Much of this was due to the relatively young ages of their religious leaders, and the fact 
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that they were ‘home-grown’ so understood the social and cultural issues facing Muslim 
young people living in the UK. Adam explained how he had neglected his religion from a 
young age, as he had no connection with his imam who taught what Adam perceived to 
be an outdated version of Islam. His teaching tactics were also representative of the 
traditional methods still found in South Asia, which this imam continued when working in 
the UK:  
 
 ‘I was force fed the religion, showed down my throat. When I used to go to 
mosque I used to get the cane, that’s probably why I rebelled…we had no love for the 
religion, we didn’t love it, we just thought it to be really cruel, harsh religion, ‘cos that’s 
how we was taught.’ 
 
Although Adam and his group were ‘extremist by association’, they had various contacts 
within local extremist groups through their social networks. This included groups based 
in the UK such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) and AM, and those residing in the UK from other 
countries, such as the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria. Through certain social bonds 
with the groups they maintained a loose relationship with them. Though, the Algerians 
seemed to have more influence with Adam and his group than HT or AM did, and started 
to propagate their extremist ideologies onto them.  
 
However, before Adam began to deeply internalise these ideologies, he and other 
members of his group had an intervention. This came from a group of Libyans who 
taught them, through verses of the Quran, that the mode of thinking they were starting to 
adopt was wrong. As mentioned, none of his group was overtly religious, though this 
example shows that they still maintained some affection and affiliation with their faith:  
 
 ‘…they’d been studying the religion for quite a few years. They started telling us 
that what we believe in and what we follow is wrong…through teaching and teaching and 
teaching and telling us from this saying and from this Ayat from the Quran…’ 
 
Finally, the reasons that stopped Adam, and similar others in his position, becoming 
converted should be discussed. In his case, the intervention from grassroots groups, 
religious leaders, and others appears to be crucial. However, whether this intervention 
was the reason for Adam not becoming an extremist is not completely certain. It is 
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merely assumed so as some of his friends who left the group before this intervention 
occurred did end up joining ‘established’ extreme groups. Adam is defined as ‘extremist 
by association’ as he was initially involved within this subculture due to certain trends 
amongst his peer group. Whether there would have been frame-alignment between an 
extremist group’s ideologies and his personal experiences is, and will remain, unknown. 
The existence of social networks is also critical within radicalisation. Although Adam did 
have contact with extremist groups through social networks, others will not and this acts 
as an important barrier to them becoming converted. Further, having deficiency to some 
of the contingencies that will be discussed in the chapter is also immensely important 
with the facilitation (or lack of) towards a point of conversion.  
 
5.2 Introduction 
 
Goffman (1961) describes ‘contingencies’ as either facilitating an individual into a total 
institution or assisting them in bypassing this outcome. Radicalisation works in the same 
way. The contingencies discussed in this chapter have common underlying factors which 
concern culture and subcultural trends. The value of social bonds and interactions are 
also critical within this argument. This chapter is comprised of four sections. 
 
The first section of the chapter addresses the emergence of extremism as a subcultural 
trend. For some Muslim youth, portraying oneself as being extreme is linked to the 
perception of being popular. The term ‘popular’ here is used both in the sense of a 
favourable standing amongst one’s peer group and also in regards to ‘popular culture’. 
This is due to AQ and AQI extremism and extremists being viewed as ‘cool’ by some 
Muslim young people (Bartlett, et al., 2010; Slootman and Tillie, 2006; Pisoiu, 2012). 
Certain authors have termed this as ‘jihadi cool’ (Sageman, 2008; Temple-Raston, 
2010), and others attribute it to being part of a trend which focuses upon the importance 
of ‘street credibility’ (Innes et al., 2007; Husain, 2007). These youth may be under great 
strain within their particular social groups to conform to the culture of their peers more 
widely. 
 
This relates to the first of Kelman’s (1958) three stages of ‘internalization’; ‘compliance’. 
Compliance takes place when individuals ‘accept influence [as they hope] to achieve a 
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favourable reaction from another person or group’, rather than genuinely believing in the 
message or cause (ibid: 53). Also of importance to this is Maslow’s (1954) ‘hierarchy of 
needs’76; specifically the third stage, i.e. ‘belonging’. Conceptually, this is similar to the 
arguments discussed in the previous empirical chapter. The difference is that rather than 
attaining a sense of belonging within a society or nation, this concerns the individual 
feeling part of a subgroup within society which has its own identity. Although this topic is 
outlined in wider research, it is only mentioned in passing in relation to radicalisation and 
the importance of the concept is regularly neglected. This section aims to alleviate these 
deficiencies.  
 
The second section outlines the importance of social bonds and interactions within the 
context of both longstanding friendships and influential groups. This is related to the 
previous section on extremism being a subcultural trend. Social bonds have been 
highlighted in the Introduction and Literature Review chapters as being imperative when 
studying the similar processes found in cults and sects. Within this, ‘social interactions’ 
have a distinct importance for the process of radicalisation, though are frequently 
overlooked when studying this phenomenon. The analysis of social interactions, 
specifically the study of social influence, can highlight the changes an individual goes 
through ‘when in the presence of others’ (Crisp and Turner, 2007: 132). Hogg and 
Abrams (1995: 158) argue that given the breadth of the phenomenon of social influence, 
there is no generally accepted theory or framework; rather there are a ‘large number of 
specific short-range propositions or empirical relationships which are wedded to clearly 
circumscribed sub-areas of the discipline’. When trying to understand why some 
individuals move towards internalising extreme ideologies, within the context of group 
settings, there may be a number of concepts that can be drawn upon.  
 
There have been many social psychological experiments conducted that aim to further 
our understanding of people’s reactions within certain situations and under certain 
conditions. Arena and Arrigo (2005: 487) outline that this approach ‘does not portray 
human behaviour as necessarily flawed or abnormal but as a manifestation of social 
interaction’. The individual may feel some sort of influence and pressure to conform to 
                                                 
76
 Maslow’s theory is not without criticism, with many questioning the ranking structure or the 
need for a hierarchy (see Wahba and Bridwell, 1974 for example). However, within this section, it 
is the components that are focussed upon as a collective, rather than the hierarchical structure 
itself. 
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their peer group. With this kinship come a number of associated social psychological 
pressures which are found in almost all groups, extreme or otherwise. 
 
The third part of this chapter analyses the cultural differences between Muslim youth in 
the UK and their elders77. The previous empirical chapter outlined the individual’s 
relationship with the state and wider society in the context of their parent’s heritage. The 
arguments about identity and belonging provide an important foundation for this section, 
which aims to dig deeper to understand the tensions that exist between the two groups. 
The social interactions (more so the lack of) between Muslim youth and their elders are 
of critical importance, and lead to a ‘generational gap’ between the two. The term 
‘generational gap’ refers to differences in culture, beliefs, traditions, aspirations, society 
and self. This issue becomes a contingency if Muslim youth are not able to approach 
their elders with questions they have which concern ‘sensitive’ topics. The contingency 
(i.e. their elders) is removed if youth go looking elsewhere for answers and are in contact 
– if their social networks allow them to – with those espousing extreme ideologies. 
 
According to the data collected, this generational gap appeared to be especially visible 
with those from the Indian subcontinent. Although there may be similarities with other 
immigrant groups, the respondents specifically spoke of those from Pakistan, India and 
Bangladesh. Since the Second World War, Muslims have migrated to Britain in relatively 
large numbers; with the majority coming from South Asia78. There are those, such as 
Ballard (1994), who argue there to be conflict between Muslim youth and their parents, 
when parents have strong expectations of their children. This conflict is especially 
compounded when the social expectations (i.e. socialising and adopting British culture) 
of these elders are diametrically opposed to the social needs, desires and expectations 
of their children. This is predominantly due to the ‘British-born generation…[being] much 
more involved in transactions across the ethnic boundary than their parents ever were’ 
(ibid: 30). Further, Ali (2008: 5) argues, ‘Young Muslims in Britain are the nexus of what 
are being portrayed as antithetical systems – between their homes and communities and 
wider British society; with “competing” values, expectations and social mores.’ This is by 
no means exclusive to Muslim migrants, with other studies, for example concerning 
Hindus (Vadher and Barrett, 2009), yielding similar results.  
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 For a definition of the term ‘elders’, see Footnote 18. 
78
 For a detailed discussion on South Asian Diasporas in the UK, see: Werbner (2005). 
 138 
This also extends to their relationships with their religious leaders and places of worship, 
and forms the basis of the argument for the fourth and final section of the chapter. If the 
relationship between Muslim youth and their imams has broken down, they will be more 
reluctant to learn their religion in depth. This leads to what was termed in the empirical 
data as having a ‘lack of Islamic knowledge’. This contingency even prevents them from 
understanding how being ‘extremist by association’ is against Islamic principles, and 
increases their susceptibility to accept extreme ideologies at face value without the tools 
to be able to refute them (Precht, 2007).  
 
5.3 Extremism as a Subcultural Trend 
 
The empirical data strongly indicated that AQ and AQI extremists are considered to be 
‘cool’ by some Muslim youth in the UK. This subcultural trend was even described by 
respondents as the ‘new gangsta rap’, which so many young people around the world 
identify with. Subsequently, some Muslim youth consider extremism the trend they want 
to be associated with. If their friends have adopted similar tastes, they want to be 
affiliated with what they perceive to be the ‘in crowd’:  
 
‘…militancy at the moment is the new Black gangsta hip-hop, yeah. It’s the new 
“gangsta”, you know, for a lot of young Muslims’ (grw 358)  
 
Although the use of technology as a tool for radicalisation does not feature in this thesis, 
it is important to outline how, according to a number of respondents, it is deemed to be 
‘cool’ to possess certain digital materials. Importantly, this was not confined to those 
youth considered to be extreme, but in fact was prevalent across the board with 
increasing numbers of individuals. This insinuates that many of them are ‘extremist by 
association’ in a bid to adhere to the subcultural trends set by elements of their peer 
group, or generation more widely. One example which was frequently provided by the 
respondents concerned the ‘jihadi’ propaganda found on many young Muslims’ mobile 
smartphones. This was in the form of various videos, some of which had been ‘remixed’ 
with a ‘gangsta rap baseline’79:  
                                                 
79
 Examples of this type of material can even be found on popular mainstream video sharing 
websites such as YouTube. See: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0tolYsaqkpg, for example. 
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‘They didn’t know what was said. They just saw pictures of a couple of militants, 
this radical hate preacher just saying stuff in Arabic with a baseline in the background 
and they thought it was very cool to have that on their phone.’ (grw 831) 
 
Further, one informed informant from the Midlands outlined how certain rap artists were 
incorporating extremist ideology into their music. He stressed this was one of his biggest 
concerns in his work at the grassroots level. This, he argued, was a vital subcultural 
consideration when understanding radicalisation further: 
 
‘…the impact that hip-hop culture has on people becoming Muslims and radical, 
because in the hip-hop culture the hip-hop artists are now using Islamic terms, many of 
them are Muslims, and in their raps they are making references to coming into the club 
and high-jacking people…and they’re making these kinds of statements about Palestine, 
and Iraq and things like this.’ (grw 971) 
 
Although there have been a number of trends young people around the world have been 
influenced by, one of the most prolific is the hip-hop music genre. Time Magazine (2000) 
even defined this as ‘the most important youth culture on the planet’. Interestingly, one of 
the core tenets of various extreme groups is the ban of music, except on occasion music 
or singing which is based around a religious nature80. This highlights the contradictions 
that exist between certain extremists and their ideologies, and that the acquirement and 
distribution of this material is motivated by social merit, rather than the message itself. 
 
The influence of popular culture within radicalisation can also be seen with the affection 
shown towards certain extreme ideologues. For instance, an informed informant from 
London who claimed to have personally known [sheikh] Abdullah el-Faisal outlined how 
the preacher was able to ‘resonate with young disaffected Muslims because of how he 
spoke’ (grw 840). The respondent explained how this was due to el-Faisal having a 
charming and charismatic personality (as will be outlined in further detail in the next 
empirical chapter), and on account of his Jamaican nationality which enabled him to 
connect with youth culture. These arguments were confirmed by a second informed 
informant from the Midlands:  
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 Certain sects in Islam hold similar beliefs. This does not, however, necessarily align with them 
adopting any type of extremist ideology. 
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‘As for charisma, no doubt, Abdullah [el-]Faisal is charismatic…he’s got a 
Jamaican accent which influences many people who are into that type of culture, 
because Jamaican culture is very powerful amongst youth’ (grw 249) 
 
Consequently, the interviews suggested that increasing numbers of predominantly male 
Muslim youth are starting to adopt a ‘militant’ presentation of self. The use of the term 
‘militant’ does not assume militancy in its traditional understanding. It is a phrase used by 
youth, both Muslim and otherwise, to describe people who depict themselves as being 
fearless of anyone or anything. They are usually ‘over the top’ in their actions and are 
not risk averse. They are viewed as ‘hard-men’, similar to Katz’s (1988: 80) description 
of the ‘badass’, and have built up respect amongst their peers as a result of this: 
 
 ‘I think this “hard man” image is very attractive to young people, sometimes 
people just talk hard to look cool in front of their peers…’ (rmc 321) 
 
This subcultural trend was discussed in the prologue to this chapter with the story of 
Adam. He told of how some of his associates were impressed with the jihadi videos they 
were watching at the time. These videos showed Muslim ‘soldiers’ in army attire, 
brandishing weapons, and fighting, ‘…there was a lot of DVDs going around’ (Adam). 
The use of the term ‘a lot of DVDs’ by Adam indicates that many youth were interested in 
this type of material and were readily distributing it to others within their networks. Due to 
personal reputations, it is normally uncommon for people to distribute something they 
themselves did not find interesting or appealing. This substantiates the argument that 
extremism is viewed as cool and is a subcultural trend amongst sections of Muslim 
youth. According to Adam, this drew more youth into this subculture and as a result 
further associations were made between themselves and the soldiers on the DVDs. 
 
They were doing this by mimicking the soldier’s clothes. Whilst there are those who will 
actively want to dress in this manner, there will also be the outliers. There are similarities 
that can be drawn between this and Goffman’s (1961) notion of ‘identity kits’, where total 
institutions like the army ensure all soldiers start to lose their sense of individualism and 
gain more cohesion with the group as they are all dressed the same. Goffman’s analysis 
on ‘identity kits’ infers a process which is forced upon the individual. Whilst there is no 
one physically forcing these Muslim youth to adopt a certain style of dress, they may be 
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under pressure both socially and culturally to adopt this fashion. Also, by not adhering to 
this trend will make them feel like outsiders within their peer groups. Thus, they will 
forego elements of their old identity and begin to adopt this new one.  
 
As will be discussed in the next empirical chapter, ‘Conversion’, an element of this 
macho and masculine behaviour comes from youth watching DVDs where militarily 
‘inferior’ Muslim soldiers are taking on the ‘might of the West’ and other superpowers 
such as Russia. Being involved or affiliated with extremism, or even perceiving oneself to 
be extreme, has little to do with the religion and ideology itself and is about maintaining a 
perception of identity and masculinity. This was a disposition highlighted by the majority 
of respondents for this study: 
 
‘They’re not even observing, practising Muslims most of the time, yet they will 
latch onto the idea of Islamic violent extremism for all manner of reasons…one of the 
reasons is that Islam can be very macho and strong, and if you’re in an alpha-male 
environment then sometimes it’s as simple as that…It’s nothing to do with ideology at all 
its just to do with the fact that Islam is really strong and Muslims are tough…’ (gee 796) 
 
These arguments of perceiving extremism to be ‘cool’ and macho and wanting to be 
affiliated with the ‘in crowd’ may have intensified after 9/11, however they were present 
before this. As a sixth-form college student at the age of seventeen, pre-9/11, there was 
the emergence of something similar in my own personal experience. A small group of 
Muslims at the college started distributing material that denounced the existence of the 
Holocaust. They rallied support from other Muslim students and generally ‘flexed their 
muscles’ through overtly bullying other non-Muslims. This appealed to a certain section 
of the students and the gang expanded. In fact, a couple of non-Muslim students even 
became affiliated and converted to Islam in a bid to hang-out with their friends. As they 
were all converging and bonding as a group, they were also being fuelled by their 
difference to the majority of the other students81 (i.e. their Islamic faith). They were 
rebelling from mainstream society (represented by both the college and wider society), 
whilst asserting their strong and collective identity. This was also captured within the 
empirical data, and explained by a grassroots worker from the Midlands: 
 
                                                 
81
 There are similarities between this and ‘subcultural capital’, see: Thornton (1995). 
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 ‘…by embracing Islam they are basically telling their friends who are non-
Muslims that “I am not going to do what you are doing because you are doing it…”. So 
on one hand they are influenced, but on the other hand there is something chic and 
cutting edge to be different, and being a Muslim and being different’ (grw 971) 
 
There was nothing overtly political or revolutionary about the aforementioned sixth-form 
students. They were amateur in their knowledge and experience. Importantly, none of 
them really displayed a depth of Islamic knowledge and they appeared to take a relaxed 
stance about praying or practising their religion. Many of them had girlfriends, consumed 
alcohol, and frequented nightclubs. However, it was claimed by associates years later 
that at least one member of this group joined a violent extreme network and travelled 
abroad to participate in ‘jihad’. Even currently, his whereabouts are still unknown. 
 
The difference between those who are ‘extremist by association’ and those who appear 
to be committed to an extreme cause can be seen in the contradictions that exist with 
the former; as was alluded to above. Within the empirical data, a grassroots worker told 
how the youth he worked with claimed they were extremists, but legitimised going to 
nightclubs, drinking and watching pornography: 
 
 ‘…what we find a tad hypocritical with them is that you’ll find them denouncing 
the West or Western values…but their lives for the most part are very Western…and 
they continue to love everything that typifies general western youth…clubbing, drinking, 
porn. Because with a lot of them their issue is “until we have the establishment of the 
Islamic State, then a lot things that are impermissible are not impermissible”’ (grw 320) 
 
As another example, certain respondents claimed that some youth they worked with did 
not even adhere to their Islamic duties of attending prayer. Once again, they argued that 
this was not a requirement until there was the establishment of a global Caliphate: 
 
 ‘…but when it comes to time to pray in the mosque they’re walking away, you say 
“where are you going?” [and they say] “oh well the khilafah is not established…when the 
Islamic state is there then we’ll start praying”’ (grw 831) 
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This does not mean these individuals are not at risk of becoming radicalised. If there is 
the presence of the other factors discussed in this thesis then these individuals may well 
move towards becoming converted. In fact, it can be argued that they may appear to be 
more at risk as they have already started to adopt a type of personality that entertains 
extremism. 
 
Finally, the consideration of ‘youth’ within this argument, and in fact the chapter more 
widely, is extremely important. Extreme groups are aware of this subcultural trend and 
try to capitalise on it. As one respondent stated, ‘there was a lot of wrangling…in terms 
of control of Muslim youth in particular, trying to build followings, trying to get followers…’ 
(grw 662). As mentioned in the Introduction chapter, the average ages of those involved 
in extremism is relatively young. The British Security Service, MI5, in a leaked document 
given to the Guardian, state the majority are in their early to mid-20s when they become 
radicalised (Travis, 2008b). The empirical data indicated that the age certain youth 
become interested in this trend could even be pre-teen to early-teen. This was attributed 
to a number of reasons including an increased awareness due to media reporting, ease 
of access to extremist propaganda on the internet, and through social networks:  
 
 ‘…post-9/11, you’ve got the idea of being a jihadi is now a popular concept, as in 
everyone knows about it post-9/11, pre-9/11 it’s not a known thing…so you can start 
young, eleven, twelve, thirteen, everyone knows who bin Laden is, no one knew who bin 
Laden was before 2001.’ (exe 283) 
 
This section has discussed ‘extremism’ as a subcultural trend inhabited by certain 
Muslim youth. This has also included the pressures and influences that are felt by the 
individual in order to ‘fit into’ their immediate social expectations. At this juncture it is 
important to understand, with this section acting as a backdrop, what pressures and 
influences individuals can be exposed to in their immediate friendship groups. 
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5.4 Friendships and Group Pressures 
 
There are various pressures that are exerted onto individuals by different types of groups 
– both extreme and otherwise – and can take two forms. The first is self-imposed where 
the individual attempts to satisfy both their conscious and subconscious needs, including 
issues around belonging and esteem (Maslow, 1954). The second pressure is applied, 
either intentionally or otherwise, by certain members to ‘encourage’ or ‘persuade’ others 
to conform to the group’s norms. Although the arguments here relate to groups that are 
‘extremist by association’, the pressures outlined will also be applicable to established 
extreme groups. 
 
The discipline of social psychology is abundant with theories that strongly resonate with 
the findings presented within this thesis. This is especially pertinent when considering a 
peer group’s members who have been in contact, or have been friends, for a relatively 
lengthy period of time. One particular method of influence displayed by groups is ‘peer 
pressure’. This concern was raised by an informed informant from London, who argued 
that ‘…if the person is being brought up around a group who are already on that 
methodology of extremism then there is that peer pressure there…it’s common’ (grw 
927). In fact, another informed informant, who works with violent street gangs as well as 
extreme groups, argued that peer pressure is present ‘nine times out of ten...’ (grw 320).  
 
This influence is exerted to align an individual’s behaviour, ideologies and attitude with 
the group’s norms, i.e. ‘conformity’. Conformity occurs when a group member has all of 
the information to make judgement on an issue and is certain of their opinion, only to 
change their mind due to various group pressures (Sherif, 1936). Further, it is present 
when an individual does not want to appear to diverge from the group’s norms and 
become isolated in their views, in some cases to avoid the risk of social rejection, or to 
simply not be the ‘odd one out’: 
 
‘…[they] are greatly influenced by their peer group…even if they’re not pleased 
within their gang or within that peer group that they’re in, then they’ll stay quiet because 
they don’t want to be seen as the odd one out.’ (grw 249) 
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Conformity may also be present when individuals question their minority view against the 
differing majority. Being part of a group where most, if not all, members hold the same 
beliefs will have the potential to influence the individual. If all members are ‘reading from 
the same page’, this could act as a confirmation of what the individual is being told to 
believe. The individual may progress from simply being ‘extremist by association’ in 
order to satisfy social and subcultural needs, to actually starting to give the message 
more consideration. 
 
The theoretical underpinnings of this can be seen in wider research conducted within the 
discipline of social psychology, such as that of Solomon Asch (1952, 1955). Asch found 
that people can generally be influenced to conform to the positive expectations of others; 
termed as ‘normative social influence’. Deutsch and Gerard (1955) conducted similar 
experiments to Asch and employed additional hypotheses which analysed the capacity 
of not only normative influence, but also of ‘informational social influence’; ‘an influence 
to accept information obtained from another as evidence about reality’. They found that 
individuals are likely to reduce their own levels of judgement and conform to other’s 
thoughts when they are lacking information or a belief in one’s own judgement. Further, 
they argue that ‘from birth on, we learn that the perceptions and judgements of others 
are frequently reliable sources of evidence and reality’ (ibid: 635). Similarly, Cialdini 
(2001: 111) argues that ‘in general, when we are unsure of ourselves, when the situation 
is unclear or ambiguous, when uncertainty reigns, we are most likely to look to and 
accept the actions of others as correct.’ 
 
The role of influential personalities within groups is also critical. Most groups, if not all, 
have individuals who hold more power and influence than others. If these individuals are 
moving towards adopting an extreme outlook, this has the potential of influencing those 
who currently are not: 
 
 ‘…pretend there are five people who have been friends for five years, six years. If 
one of them were to become radical…if he does have a lot influence and he becomes 
radical then definitely that will wash off on to other people, no doubt with it’ (grw 502) 
 
This will particularly be the case with younger members who are still finding direction in 
their lives and are pre-family, pre-career, and whose social lives predominantly gravitate 
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around their friendship circle. If an influential person within that group was to get hold of 
some extremist propaganda material, this would influence other members of the group:  
 
‘One person brings in a jihad DVD of what’s happening in Afghanistan, or Iraq or 
something, and then the rest of them will all partake in it and share it and they’ll start 
having discussions…as long as the individual is influential enough amongst their 
peers…then the rest of them do fall in line and buy into that, so that’s the scary thing…’ 
(grw 358) 
 
If certain members of friendship circles do join extreme groups, then others may be keen 
to maintain friendships. Similar to the arguments made on cults and sects within the 
Introduction chapter, these youth have not identified with the extreme group’s ideologies 
but attend events and study groups simply to ‘hang out’ with their friends. A grassroots 
worker, and former extremist, from London outlined his experience with now banned 
group AM: 
 
‘…they go to all different towns around the UK giving da’wah82, giving study 
circles, and for the sake of simply wanting to be with their former friends’ (gee 897) 
 
Interestingly, this was also the personal experience of a former AQI extremist from the 
West of England, who before his conversion to Islam was part of a British far-right group. 
When asked how he became involved and attended far-right meetings, he replied, ‘I just 
kind of went along because my mates were into it’ (exe 999). 
 
As a final note, when considering all of the arguments presented within this chapter thus 
far, there needs to be the mention of an extremely important point. A relatively large 
amount of traditional research on radicalisation assumes that the radicalisee is innocent 
during this process and is subject to different influences which in turn ‘brainwash’ them 
into conforming to these extreme ideologies. Although there is little sympathy for those 
who are radicalised, there is generally a societal assumption that these radicalisees are 
being ‘tricked’ into submission. It is true that they are subject to these influences, though 
                                                 
82
 The term ‘da’wah’ refers to the preaching of Islam, or the invitation to practise Islam. It also 
refers to an invitation to discuss and debate, with the intention to further understand, Islamic 
beliefs. 
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it is not correct to assume they are ‘brainwashed’ or unaware of what is going on in all 
cases. Certain radicalisees will know what they are getting into and will actually want to 
be affiliated with extremism, due to subcultural trends. There are those who are ‘seekers’ 
of extremism and actually go looking for groups and networks. There are as well those 
who ‘drift’ into extremism, though are fully aware of what they are involved with. This was 
the case with one respondent who works as a grassroots worker in London, and had 
once travelled to Afghanistan to participate in ‘jihad’: 
 
‘I was introduced to a number of people who were linked to al-Qaeda, many 
people who were linked to the Taliban, who first came on the scene as aid workers, but 
then we quickly realised that they weren’t actually aid workers…they were closely linked 
to [the] Taliban, and I quite frankly had no problem with that. It wasn’t a shock to me, it 
wasn’t a surprise to me…and it was like something that I could do, I could get involved 
with…’ (gee 997) 
 
The arguments presented in the previous two sections of this chapter have discussed 
the roles of subculture and social interactions. There also needs to be consideration of 
the role a lack of social interaction and difference in culture has on radicalisation. This 
will be the focus of the next section of the chapter.  
 
5.5 Generational Gap 
 
There were strong concerns expressed within the data about the divide between Muslim 
youth and their elders. The respondents explained how elders’ culture, values and 
mindset have remained firmly in their motherland. Thus, they are ‘physically in the 
Western world, but their minds are very much in the Pakistani, Bangladeshi or Indian 
village’ (gee 441). As a consequence, Muslim youth are finding it increasingly difficult to 
relate to their parents and vice-versa:  
 
‘…they’ve still got a dichotomy between the elder Muslims and the Muslim youth. 
The life that the elder Muslims lead and the youth lead are still [different], the chasm is 
really big. So, younger Muslims find it really difficult to relate to their parents…’ (grw 840) 
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The use of the term ‘dichotomy’ in the above quotation is interesting as it represents a 
polar view of role expectations and the perception of self in British society. The empirical 
data found that young Muslims find it difficult approaching their parents on a range of 
personal issues including puberty, alcohol, drugs, and sexual intercourse, for example. 
Further, there are tensions on how these issues relate to Islamic teachings. This was 
explained by a grassroots worker from the Midlands: 
 
‘…[with] the older men in the community, how in the world is the boy going to tell 
[them], “hey, I want to know about oral sex, I want to know is it permissible?”’ (grw 971) 
 
This issue is not specific to Muslim youth, or just within Islam. Speaking from a personal 
perspective, having a South Indian and Hindu heritage, I understand the difficulties with 
approaching parents on a range of sensitive topics. Many friends and colleagues from 
similar backgrounds have commented on the same problems.  
 
As discussed in the previous empirical chapter, ‘Susceptibility’, some Muslim youth feel 
like they are caught between two different and often competing worlds. With contentious 
issues within Islam such as drinking and pre-marital sexual relations, these Muslim youth 
are confused between what they are being told by their parents, or what they perceive 
their parents will think of the issues, and what they experience in their immediate social 
environments outside of their homes. They feel trapped by their parents’ culture and lack 
the foundations to navigate through the culture of the society they are living in:  
 
‘…they are very vulnerable. In a way they are living in society which is completely 
different from what they have been told they have to be…“it’s forbidden for you to drink 
alcohol”, but when you go out you see everyone drinking alcohol. So you yourself think 
“am I normal?”…There are lots of things that are completely different from your own 
house and when you go out…they are completely confused’ (gee 234) 
 
There are two important terms used by the respondent quoted above which need further 
discussion. First is the term ‘vulnerable’, which is critical to the broader argument of this 
chapter, and in many respects the thesis. This vulnerability, coherent with Goffman’s 
(1961) argument, is the direct result from the contingencies discussed within this section. 
This enables a window for extremist recruiters to exploit and use to develop and 
 149 
construct a new perception of self – as will be outlined in the next empirical chapter. 
Second, the term ‘am I normal?’ also holds much importance. If these youth question 
their core traits, this can be detrimental when in the company of a radicaliser who makes 
them feel that not only are they normal, but in fact others who do not subscribe to 
extreme ideals may be abnormal. This in turn will also help to solidify the ‘us vs. them’ 
argument when the radicalisee’s self is being reconstructed.  
 
This generational gap has some important consequences which act as a contingency (or 
lack of) towards radicalisation. The most critical for this study is that youth may be limited 
in whom they can approach to answer their pressing questions. A grassroots worker, for 
instance, explained how he was regularly approached by Muslim youth for answers to a 
range of problems; even though he is relatively young himself. He argued that youth feel 
like they cannot turn to their parents for advice and outlined a particular recent example:  
 
‘…this Saturday someone came to me with a marriage issue, [a] 23 year old, I’m 
not old myself…he wants to marry some English girl…but the reason why he came to 
me is because that’s the conversation he cannot have with his father…’ (gee 897) 
 
This was not an isolated comment, as another grassroots worker explained, ‘I have that 
kind of relationship with many of these young people, where they see me as someone 
they can talk to about real issues’ (grw 971). These grassroots workers are normally 
much younger than the youths’ parents and have been brought up in the UK themselves. 
As a result, they can identify with many issues the youth are struggling with. Further, the 
grassroots workers are treating these youth as young adults and are also providing them 
with religious explanations to their issues.  
 
However, these youth looking elsewhere for advice can also have dire consequences. 
Through their social networks, or by chance meetings, these youth may encounter those 
who espouse extreme ideologies. The data showed that many of these extremists are 
willing to discuss a range of sensitive topics youth are not comfortable approaching their 
families about. As the grassroots worker quoted above argued, ‘Asian culture doesn’t 
allow him to address the issue of that young man, whereas some of these other people 
who are radical…they understand it.’ (ibid) 
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Many parents will be out of touch with the social concerns of youth, but some of these 
extremists have, similar to the grassroots workers, experienced these very same issues, 
as they have on many occasions been born and brought up around the same culture:  
 
‘He can’t talk [to his parents] about some of the things that he is involved in. 
Whereas…these tough people, they come from the dirt these people come from, they 
went through what they went through.’ (grw 971) 
 
These extremists attempt to replace the role of the individual’s father, as explained by a 
grassroots worker from the North East of England:  
 
‘Some of these kids that we work with or some of the adults as well even, many 
of them don’t have father figures or they don’t have good communication with their own 
fathers. Hence when a radical extremist comes along and starts trying to feed them this 
sort of information, they look at them as a father figure…’ (grw 831) 
 
There is nothing wrong with an individual providing advice about social issues to Muslim 
youth as long as the advice is legal and socially positive. However, the problem lies with 
extremists drawing the youth in with open and frank discussions about their social and 
cultural identity issues, and then propagating their extremist agenda as trust builds up 
between the two. As a grassroots worker from London quipped, this is ‘the tactic that 
they have, [as] they already have an affinity with the youth’ (grw 840). 
 
5.6 Imams and Mosques 
 
It was mentioned in the Methodology chapter how imams are considered to be more 
than just spiritual leaders and can be approached to discuss a multitude of topics. The 
empirical data strongly indicated that imams struggle to meet the needs of Muslim youth 
whether this is spiritually, politically, or as with their parents, culturally and socially83. The 
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 For wider discussions on these issues, see: Choudhury (2007); Dyke (2009); Geaves (2008); 
Rahman et al. (2010); Mirza et al. (2007); Horgan (2008); Malik (2007); Barnes (2006); Werbner 
(2004); Kraft et al. (2007); Gest and Norfolk (2008); Oakeshott (2007); Asim (2011); Charity 
Commission (2009). 
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lack of this contingency can have detrimental costs, as will be discussed at relevant 
places. This primarily concerns three main points.  
 
The first is due to their poor, or in some cases non-existent, ability to speak English. This 
is a major issue in numerous mosques around the UK. These youth are excluded from 
understanding sermons and lectures at their mosques, which in turn may de-motivate 
them from attending. As a result, these youth find it difficult to establish any connection 
to the mosque as, ‘…the imam doesn’t even speak English, he’s ineffective…’ (grw 971)  
 
Consequently, Muslim youth are more at more risk of becoming radicalised. This is due 
to extremist groups capitalising on this problem by using English in their recruitment and 
propaganda drives. This was reported to be one of the dominant reasons Mohammed 
Sidique Khan found alternative sources in the form of an extreme group for answers to 
the questions he had (Malik, 2007). This concept was confirmed by a researcher from 
London:  
 
‘…the people who clocked onto that were the Islamists who said “ok, we’ll we 
better translate all of our works”. People like HT had all their works in English long before 
anyone else because they knew that [was] what they needed if they wanted to win 
people over. They had to give them information in their own language. It’s really simple.’ 
(res 985) 
 
This should not be mistaken for religion being a driver of radicalisation. Muslim youth, 
especially since 9/11, have numerous pertinent questions they want answers for. If these 
imams cannot provide them with answers, or cannot effectively communicate with them 
due to language barriers, then the individual may look elsewhere. 
 
This forms the basis of the second problem where certain imams appear to be averse to 
discussing a number of topics which are considered to be contentious. Due to media 
coverage and increased societal awareness of AQ and AQI groups, Muslim youth want 
to understand what stance Islam takes on topics such as extremism, jihad and terrorism. 
This should not be taken to mean that these youths are necessarily looking to adopt, or 
are even attracted by, these types of activity. There is a desire to understand how these 
topics fit into wider international contexts that concern Muslims, such as the ‘War on 
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Terror’, for example. On the other hand, if they are attracted by extreme ideologies, it 
would provide an opportunity to intervene at an early point; though only if they felt 
comfortable approaching their moderate imams about the issue. 
 
The empirical data found that imams and mosques, generally, are not au fait with these 
types of discussions and ignore the issues rather than providing a space for debate and 
understanding. Some even argued that certain mosques take hard-line action with the 
threat of expulsion for generating conversation on them. A grassroots worker from 
London, who was once part of an extreme network, explained how they: 
 
‘…don’t talk about these issues…they’ll brush it under the carpet, hoping these 
issues will go away…if you start to speak about these things in mosques, more often 
than not, you will be kicked out’ (gee 897) 
 
This was brought into sharp focus by another grassroots worker from London who told of 
how he had recently been approached by a Muslim youth who had asked, ‘“If a British 
soldier kills an Iraqi, when he comes back to this country can you kill him?”’ (gee 441). It 
was only down to existing relationships between the grassroots worker and local youth – 
based on a social and cultural understanding of youth issues – that this individual was 
comfortable approaching him. The outcome could have been sinister if the youth had 
approached someone espousing extreme ideologies. 
 
There are also occasions where imams are willing to discuss these issues but are 
restricted by the mosque’s management or committee84. These are the groups that hold 
the most amount of power in mosques (Dyke, 2009). Imams can find themselves in the 
difficult position of engaging within topics the management are opposed to discussing, 
even though they may be aware of people gravitating towards extreme ideologies in their 
congregations. Disobeying the management can have detrimental consequences on the 
imam, which in turn could affect their livelihood: 
 
 
 
                                                 
84
 For more information on how mosque management and committees are generally structured, 
see: Dyke (2009: 27). 
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‘…the imams are in a very difficult situation when it comes to dealing with this. 
They know what is right because they’re more qualified than anybody else. They know 
what needs to be done, they know what needs to be said and then even have a very 
good idea of who in their congregation is up to something. But their problem is that if 
they speak out, you know, there’s a chance that they can lose their job, there’s a chance 
that they could get kicked out by the committee’ (grw 894) 
 
There are various reasons behind this reluctance, which will differ mosque to mosque, 
though the respondent quoted above raised an interesting point. Although most mosque 
managements are against extremism, there have been occasions, in his experience, 
where a small number of individuals in the committee are not. He explained, ‘usually 
committees are quite passive and they’ll have one or two dominant personalities on that 
committee who may be, you know, supporting these kinds of people…’ (ibid). Within the 
empirical data this was the only respondent to raise this issue, though a small number of 
others did highlight similar concerns during informal chats with the author. The extent of 
the problem did not, however, become clear.  
 
The data suggested there to be other underlying reasons for this reluctance by imams to 
discuss these issues. When considering counter-extremism and counter-terrorism, the 
natural assumption is to believe that it is a concern to almost all people. However, this is 
not necessarily the case in every situation with religious leaders. This is not about them 
being ‘pro-extremism’, but more about them being less concerned as their priorities are 
elsewhere. Certain respondents in the study indicated that the majority of imams in the 
UK are underpaid85, and so their priority will be with survival and wellbeing rather than 
countering extremism. Similarities can be drawn with Catholic communities in Northern 
Ireland during the height of the IRA and INLA conflict, where they were more concerned 
about day to day survival rather than the political campaign around them (Sluka, 1989). 
This may also affect their positive motivation towards the role86. This is especially critical 
if, as outlined, elements of the mosque’s management are against discussions of this 
nature. The imams will naturally not want to cause problems with those who are paying 
their wages and in many cases ensuring the survival of their families.  
                                                 
85
 For a wider discussion on these issues, see: Choudhury (2007); Pigott (2007); Naqshbandi 
(2006). 
86
 For a discussion on ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ motivation, see: Mullins (1999); Huczynski and 
Buchanan (2001); Robbins (2003). 
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It can be argued that offering low economic incentives will primarily attract people from 
countries whose GDP is significantly lower than the UK, such as Pakistan, rather than 
home-grown imams:  
 
‘…imagine you’re not paying someone a decent wage and you’re constraining 
them to a mosque, making them do something day in day out and you are giving them 
no fair reparation. These people are more downtrodden than the people that are coming 
to them for advice…you can't attract anyone from this country so you have to bring 
someone from a village in Pakistan...’ (gee 897) 
 
This is important as it links back to the argument made in the previous section which 
discussed how Muslim parents are socially and culturally out of touch with Muslim youth. 
As mentioned, these issues are also applicable to the relationships with imams. If imams 
are predominantly coming from abroad, rather than being ‘home-grown’, they will be less 
likely to understand the problems facing young people in the UK.  
 
This leads onto the third issue which concerns imams’ lack of ability, or want, to provide 
Muslim youth with what they desire. This primarily concerns them not being able to give 
interesting and relevant talks, lectures and sermons. It can be argued that many imams 
are not modern enough for British culture and society (Pigott, 2007). Much of this is due 
to Muslim young people seeing their elders’ version of Islam as simply spiritual, and thus 
outdated (Husain, 2007). Islam is considered, by a growing number of Muslim youth, to 
be an all-encompassing way of life which involves political, economic, social and judicial 
elements, amongst others: 
 
‘The imam is simply there just to lead the prayer for you, but when it comes to the 
issue of politics, theology, education, health, you know, all these sorts of matters, the 
mosque is not that place for those sorts of issues.’ (gee 897) 
 
The most pressing concern for Muslim young people from this list is how politics and 
Islam coexist. On many occasions this relates to the issues discussed in the previous 
chapter regarding the global level. This lack of political understanding and involvement 
from imams was outlined by a respondent working at a senior level within a well-known 
Muslim organisation in the UK. He explained how imams coming from aboard, especially 
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the Asian subcontinent, were not trained to understand areas of Islam which are outside 
of the spiritual realm: 
 
‘…they [imams] are mainly taught about the spiritual values of Islam and how to 
observe it and how to practice it…the reality [is] that they were not trained to serve as 
imams in a country like Britain…So they are not interested in political dimensions of 
Islam, or social, cultural or even educational, and economic dimensions of Islam. They 
just have a very limited focussed vision of Islam and they concentrate on that’ (rmc 616) 
 
During the interview with an imam in England87, it became clear that he also subscribed 
to these spiritual based ideals. He discussed how he strictly enforced a requirement in 
the mosque which forbade worshippers to discuss any political matters:  
 
 ‘“It is only [a] spiritual place, you pray, you study, you read, you mix with each 
other, socialise, enjoy, but no sectarian views, no political views…[discuss it] outside the 
mosque, not in the mosque.”’ (irl 620) 
 
The reason for this was due to the varied countries of origin, cultures and backgrounds 
of the worshippers at the mosque. He explained how some of them came from regions 
that had once had, or currently have, political tensions, or were in direct conflict with 
others’ homelands. This tension and animosity was being displayed within the mosque 
and he noticed a distinct segregation between these groups. Therefore, as a method of 
overcoming this, ensuring there was no trouble, and in a bid to bridge the gap between 
the groups, he insisted the mosque was viewed as a spiritual sanctuary. 
 
However, one particular situation experienced by this respondent highlights the concern 
raised by the other interviewees. At an early stage in his terrorist career, a well-known 
extremist regularly frequented this respondent’s mosque. The interviewee explained how 
he did not agree with some of the material the worshipper was reading and instead 
recommended other works. However, the worshipper stressed how he wanted to read 
literature which he deemed to be current and included all the dimensions of Islam, rather 
than just the spiritual:  
 
                                                 
87
 The specific region has been restricted to ensure his identity remains confidential. 
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 ‘“I don’t need those classical readings. I need the current affairs and the current 
issues”’ (ibid) 
 
This particular respondent can of course in no way be blamed or held responsible for the 
future actions and radicalisation of this extremist88. However, this religious leader could 
have acted as a contingency. There is the possibility that the extremist’s life course may 
have potentially been altered if this individual had taken an active role in discussing this 
literature in an open and frank manner, without simply recommending classical readings 
which have no connection and interest to him. This is especially critical as this particular 
extremist has been linked to a number of terrorist attacks within the UK and globally.  
 
This was not a standalone example and a similar argument was presented by a former 
extremist from London who claimed to have personally known Germaine Lindsay, one of 
the 7/7 bombers. He argued that the lack of political understanding his local imams held 
was one of the main reasons Lindsay preferred not to attend ‘mainstream’ mosques:  
 
‘…the imams of the mosques, these are the people that are most removed from 
political understanding and from what’s happening on the streets. Germaine Lindsay for 
example, he didn’t go to the local mosque…he had no interest or no attraction, because 
[these] guys have been talking about the same thing for 60 years’ (gee 441) 
 
The data suggested that Muslim youth are frequently shunning this spiritual message, 
which they find boring, and may come across more relevant and exciting lectures and 
sermons. These youth are already questioning their identity and belonging within the UK 
and Islam may have been the obvious answer to this. When they do not find this within 
their existing networks (i.e. their parents and imams) they may feel even more isolated 
within British society. However, being given a different perspective on their religion which 
offers them a dominant identity and belonging will of course be appealing: 
 
 
 
                                                 
88
 It must be noted that this respondent assured the researcher that he had immediately 
contacted the relevant authorities after learning of the ‘worshipper’s’ extremist outlook. 
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 ‘Another reason I think these kids become radical has a lot to do with a type of 
boring cultural, dull Islam of the elders, especially the Asian community…there’s nothing 
to make the young people feel connected, so as a result of that…when these young 
people hear someone who’s radical and aggressive in the way that they speak…they 
tend to listen to those people as opposed to these uninformed, uneducated imams’ (grw 
971) 
 
5.6.1 Lack of Islamic Knowledge 
 
As well as the other contingencies discussed in this section that can facilitate individuals 
moving towards an extremist ideology or help them bypass this fate, there is another that 
holds critical importance. If Muslim youth are becoming distant from their mosques and 
imams, then this could affect their learning of the faith. This could lead to what many 
respondents within the data termed as a ‘lack of Islamic knowledge’, or having ‘incorrect 
Islamic knowledge’.  
 
However, it is important to consider that someone having ‘correct Islamic knowledge’ is 
subjective and open to discussion. It is difficult for a layperson to enter debate about 
Islamic ideology and jurisprudence; though there may be certain distinctions drawn. If 
these ideologies relate to our definitions of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism, and 
therefore affect national security, then there may be leeway to make judgement. For 
example, if an individual’s particular ideology, based upon religious context, allowed the 
commitment or support of terrorist acts, or any illegal activity, then this could be deemed 
as an incorrect understanding of that religion. However, some may draw distinction to 
further arguments regarding the definition of terrorism and extremism, and the processes 
behind deciding what is legal and illegal.  
 
A lack of Islamic knowledge, or the religion itself, is not necessarily of great importance 
during initial radicalisation. There is more of an emphasis on strains, grievances, sub-
cultural trends and social bonds. It can play a role, however, as with the case of the five 
Muslim friends, as a contingency towards even entertaining the idea of becoming 
‘extremist by association’ due to subcultural trends; as this is deemed to be against 
Islamic principles. It becomes especially important when becoming prepared to support 
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(both tacitly and otherwise) or commit an act of violence or terrorism. When this occurs 
within an extreme group is of course never set, and this topic should not be 
underestimated or neglected. As it is one direct consequence of the generational gap 
and exists partly due to the cultural differences between Muslim youth and their elders, it 
is best to discuss this issue at this point as a precursor for the next empirical chapter of 
the thesis. Further, there are many Muslim youth in the UK who also have this lack of 
Islamic knowledge though do not become involved in any form of extremism. Therefore, 
it would be naïve to assume that this contingency alone constitutes an individual’s 
radicalisation.  
 
As the UK becomes an increasingly secular state, it is difficult to fully understand the 
impact and influence a religion such as Islam has on its followers. As discussed, much of 
the Muslim communities’ religious, social and cultural outlay is in some way related to 
the mosque. Learning about the doctrines, pillars and foundations of one’s religion is an 
important requirement within Islam. Mosque and madrassa based teaching of the Quran 
and Sunnah89 is one of the most common ways for young Muslims to accomplish this.  
 
A large number of informed informants, over two-thirds, argued that Muslim youth having 
this lack of Islamic knowledge was an extremely important component of radicalisation. 
As one grassroots worker from the North East of England stated, ‘…the biggest problem 
we’ve got is that people don’t understand a lot of the main principles of Islam…(grw 
179). It was agreed by almost all of the informed informants that many of the youth they 
worked with had little understanding of the foundations of Islam or wider knowledge of 
the teachings from the Quran and the Sunnah:  
 
‘You’ll be surprised actually most young Muslims don’t know anything about 
Islam…[a] children’s encyclopaedia is the level of the Islamic understanding of most of 
the individuals that I have come across.’ (gee 796) 
 
The respondents argued that if someone has a deeper understanding of Islam which is 
direct from the source, i.e. the Quran and Sunnah, then they are much less susceptible 
to this extremist version of Islamic doctrine. An imam from the Midlands expressed these 
very sentiments: 
                                                 
89
 The Sunnah is, generally, the words, actions and example of the Prophet Muhammad. 
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‘if you have deep knowledge of Islam for example they cannot make you satisfied 
because they don’t have any solid reasons, but when they are going to sit with youth or 
those who [do not have] deep knowledge they can influence them …’ (irl 186) 
 
Many respondents believed that these extremist recruiters and ideologues themselves 
do not have a deep understanding of Islam, though as compared to the radicalisee this 
appears to be heightened. As one respondent quipped, ‘in the land of the blind the one 
eyed man is king’ (gee 796). This was also outlined by the imam quoted above who 
explained how he had debated in the past with members of AM, successfully as he 
described, as ‘they don’t have any proper knowledge to convince some person who has 
deep knowledge of Islam’ (irl 186). Although it can be agreed that extremists have a 
misconstrued understanding of certain elements of Islam, it should not be assumed that 
their knowledge on other aspects is minimal.  
 
This notion of having an in-depth knowledge of Islamic teachings and principles as a tool 
against becoming radicalised was agreed upon not just by the informed informants who 
commented on this topic, but also by those who have had direct first-hand experiences 
themselves. For example, one former extremist from the West of England explained how 
he had become radicalised through a number of different methods which gradually 
resulted in him ‘thinking killing civilians is alright’ (exe 999). Further, he claimed that 
being cut off from legitimate sources of knowledge only fuelled his radicalisation. It was 
only after an intervention from a grassroots worker that he was given, as he described it, 
‘a positive source of knowledge [which] was authentic and had credibility to me’ (ibid). 
 
A further indication of the importance of this contingency was provided by a community 
member in London. Although this individual was affected by the strains and grievances 
discussed within this thesis, and was exposed to extremists through social networks and 
maintained relatively deep social bonds with them, his deeper knowledge of Islam acted 
as a contingency towards becoming radicalised. At university he attended a study circle 
which he found to hold distinct extreme views. His depth of Islamic knowledge, he felt, 
ensured he did not internalise the extreme ideologies they were espousing. However, it 
is important to note that as a result of these social bonds he continued to attend these 
groups for some time; something akin to Lofland and Stark’s (1965) account of cults. He 
explained how these individuals were: 
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‘…people who have grievances but not a great deal of knowledge about Islam. 
So I sit there and it was like these guys don’t have a great deal of knowledge. In fact I 
felt like I knew more than them... (cms 338) 
 
5.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has focussed upon the contingencies of radicalisation which have a strong 
cultural undertone. It has been discussed that some Muslim youth identify themselves 
with a subcultural trend, and thus may initially be ‘extremist by association’ rather than 
being interested in extremist ideologies or a particular cause. Within this, there are other 
cultural, social and religious contingencies which were demonstrated to hold importance. 
Goffman’s (1961) notion of contingencies argues that it is the decision and choices of 
other people which help determine the career direction of the mental patient. Similarly, 
the career advancement of the radicalisee works in the same way. Much of this concerns 
how it affects an individual’s perception of self and social identity. In order to maintain 
this ‘satisfying self-defining’ relationship, they may alter and develop their self depending 
on what they perceive others viewpoints or expectations to be.  
 
At this point, although not discussed within this chapter, there needs to be a mention of 
the importance of social networks. The data strongly indicated that individuals appear to 
become committed to the group first, whether this is the extreme group or a group of 
friends that have adopted an extreme outlook, and their ideology solidifies thereafter. 
This is in direct contrast to the commonly held belief that individuals acquire extreme 
ideologies and then go in search for a likeminded group. That is not to say the latter 
does not occur, and therefore should not be dismissed. However, the data suggested 
the former is more of a frequent occurrence, and has also been seen in wider studies of 
terrorism (Crenshaw, 2011), cults and sects (Stark and Bainbridge, 1980; Lofland and 
Stark, 1965; Bainbridge, 1978), and social movements (Stewart et al., 2007). How much 
so was unfortunately not answered by the empirical data. 
 
Thus, it can be said that there are now three different distinctions of groups. The first is 
those who are ‘extremist by association’ and are ‘pretenders’ to the cause. Then there 
are those who are the ‘seekers’ and actively search an extreme group or network and 
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research what they require. Finally, there are the ‘drifters’ who are lulled and pulled into 
extremism. Though, it must be mentioned that there should not be an assumption that 
there is no individual agency involved. It is also important to consider that these drifters 
could have progressed from being pretenders. 
 
Many will be content with adopting a subcultural trend which is perceived to increase 
their social standing with amongst their peers. This may even be the case if they become 
connected to an extreme group through social networks. This group of individuals may 
maintain contact with an extreme group, usually non-violent, for a number of years 
though never really internalise the group’s ideologies. A small number of others, 
however, will strongly be affected by the strains and grievances discussed within the last 
empirical chapter and will, as a result, turn out to be committed potential employees. The 
social and subcultural element of AQI extremism is what initially draws them in. In order 
to join certain extreme groups and networks, especially those that are violent, it is about 
who you know and how committed you are. As with the age old saying, ‘separating the 
men from the boys’, the committed are distinct from those who are merely ‘extremist by 
association’. Thus, for the committed, this is where their career starts. 
 
It is at this point that those who are attempting to fit into a subcultural trend or identify 
with their immediate social group are separated from those who are genuinely affected 
by the strains and contingencies discussed within these first two chapters. This is 
discussed in the next empirical chapter of this thesis. Through social networks, it must 
be assumed that at this point the individual is in contact with a radicaliser and/or an 
extreme group. 
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Chapter Six: Conversion 
 
6.1 Prologue: Omar’s Story 
 
‘Omar’ is a male Muslim in his forties and lives in London. He is very active in his local 
community and works in a number of capacities to improve the wellbeing of Muslims. In 
his youth, Omar considered himself to have a happy and stable upbringing. He studied 
hard at school and was rewarded with a place at one of the most prestigious universities 
in the world. However, he was also once part of a violent extreme group which led him to 
the Af-Pak region to receive military training and fight alongside the Mujahedeen on the 
frontline in Afghanistan. Although Omar’s journey did not lead him to plan or execute an 
act of terrorism on Western soil, his radicalisation mirrors the process of those who have.  
 
Omar’s career into violent extremism began long before he went to university. He felt the 
same strains and grievances experienced by both Adam and the five friends discussed 
in the previous prologues. Omar had personally experienced prejudice from others in 
society and believed that the British government were discriminatory against Muslims. 
Consequently, he and his friends ‘were emotionally scarred for many years thinking we 
will never be accepted into this society’. Omar believes this problem still exists for young 
Muslims today where they are ‘withdrawn into their own circles’. He found similarities 
with this and his own experience, ‘I know what that’s all about because I went through 
that phase’. In his own words, he had ‘a crisis of identity’. Omar had also taken a deep 
interest in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan during the eighties and the war in Bosnia in 
the nineties. Therefore, he had experienced strains and grievances on the personal, 
local and global levels. However, as mentioned, these strains are not causative and 
alone did not amount to his radicalisation. 
 
Whilst this was all occurring, Omar, through his social networks, joined a group of young 
Muslims who were not necessarily violent in their ideologies, but held strong politicised 
views of Islam which were mostly opposed to the spiritual beliefs of their parents. Omar’s 
conversion into violent extremism occurred during his degree course. He was part of the 
Islamic society where certain members held some very extreme and violent views. They 
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were not all part of the same group and represented a number of different networks all in 
competition for new recruits:  
 
‘…in the campuses of university you had [different] groups who were actually 
vying for competition, they really competed, but they were all fundamentalist groups.’ 
 
Predominantly through the influences from his social networks, Omar joined one of these 
extreme groups. In order to convert him towards internalising their particular ideologies, 
the radicalisers had to first mortify his former self and did this through encouraging new 
members to ‘disown [their] parents’ and cut ties with people who did not agree with the 
group’s ideologies. This ensured they were mostly prone to the extremists’ messages 
and reduced the likelihood of there being what Lofland and Stark (1965) describe as a 
‘countervailing force’.  
 
From this, they were able to resocialise, or reconstruct, Omar’s perception of self and 
social identity. This was accomplished using two very distinct methods. First, the group 
alleviated some of the strains he had experienced in his youth by giving him a dominant 
sense of identity and belonging. This also strengthened the bond between Omar and the 
extreme group. Second, the radicalisers compounded the ‘us vs. them’ argument. It was 
not difficult for Omar to internalise this ideology as he had personally experienced it on 
three levels, i.e. personal, local and global. This was a common approach used by all of 
the extreme groups Omar had contact with, both violent and non-violent, where ‘all of 
their literature was about [how] the West is at war with Islam’. Further, he was especially 
aggrieved and displayed a deep level of moral outrage towards the death of innocent 
Muslims around the world as the result of Western military occupation.  
 
An important point here to consider is that all extreme groups Omar was in contact with 
had also internalised this belief, but the vast majority of them did not become involved 
with violent extremism. This was due to the particular ideologies the various groups had 
adopted which differed in their strategies to overcome their issues and achieve their end 
goals; even though many of the issues and goals were shared across the groups. Omar 
was part of an organically grown group which believed that the only way they could save 
Muslims around the world, and Islam as a faith from the hegemony of the West, was to 
engage in violent ‘jihad’.  
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Omar’s group felt extremely guilty for leading relatively comfortable lives in the West and 
not adhering to the ‘cry for help’ from their Muslim kin, and the religion itself. The West’s 
‘war against Islam’ meant it was religiously and morally justified to participate in violence 
for Omar and his group. This was compounded through their contact with an influential 
individual who they ‘revered as a religious teacher [and] spiritual figure’. This was critical 
in Omar’s radicalisation as he explained how they were:  
 
 ‘…very prone to those voices to the extremist’s voice who said “[We] need to deal 
with this, this is aggression by the West or by the non-Muslim West against Muslims” 
and therefore it’s a classic case of jihad…’ 
 
As well as having a purpose and mission in life, the episode was exciting, adventurous 
and Omar was able to explore his masculinity. He was part of a global movement and it 
transcended his normal and predictable life:  
 
‘I was effectively a book worm…and I got some military action…I can remember 
the sense of adventure and you’re gonna take part in global war…so young Muslim men 
like many other men have that sense of adventure.’ 
 
In fact, the whole episode, including pre-military training, was attractive to Omar. He saw 
himself as similar to those he had heard about on the news and seen on TV; people who 
had reached a cult status amongst certain sections of Muslim young people. His group 
was a splinter cell and were regularly evading police and intelligence services in the UK 
and abroad. He found it to be cool, which in turn made him cool:  
 
‘…[it’s] very exciting the fact that nobody else knows...and that kind of ego thing 
where “look I’m doing something really cool”, and also the fact that [you] know 
sometimes that the police or authorities are on the trail and trying to evade all that…’ 
 
It is important to briefly highlight the differences between Omar and Adam, as it helps to 
understand why some people go further than others. Whilst Omar had become part of an 
extreme group and gone through a proper process of conversion, Adam had merely 
skirted along the boundaries of these types of extreme ideologies. Adam was content in 
being ‘extremist by association’ and exercising his subcultural desires and masculinity 
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through his local group. Omar wanted something more in the sense of going on what he 
perceived to be a real adventure. In addition, although Adam started to internalise the 
‘us vs. them’ argument, the intervention that occurred in his life prevented this reaching a 
deeper state. As a result, he had not felt the moral outrage which had strongly motivated 
Omar to travel abroad, nor internalised the moral and religious justifications behind the 
use of violence. 
 
Further, Omar strongly believed that dying in battle as a ‘martyr’ brought with it personal 
benefits, i.e. securing a place in heaven for himself and his loved ones, and the promise 
of eternal rewards in the afterlife; and this was extremely important for him: 
 
‘…you have supposed people in authority, figures telling you that “this is the path, 
you know, this is the path to salvation and you’ll go to heaven”. Because ultimately if 
you’re a believer it is the afterlife which is more important…’ 
 
Thus, rather than being scared of death he fully embraced it:  
 
‘…it is every young devout Muslims dream to take part in jihad…yeah, we nearly 
got killed actually from shelling, the shell landed really close to us, but we went there for 
that purpose. We were quite happy if we’d be taken down, we’d have died as martyrs…’ 
 
The main reason why Omar did not move towards committing an act of terrorism in the 
West was to do with the specific ideologies he had internalised. Further, his first-hand 
experience of war, death and destruction also made him seriously rethink his ideologies 
on violence. Omar’s interpretation of jihad90 has now changed significantly from involving 
a violent struggle to something more peaceful and spiritual, and is, ‘…really like a moral 
struggle, jihad can include any moral struggle against injustice or wrongdoing…’. There 
will, however, be those that do continue with their violent ‘jihad’, which could culminate in 
a terrorist attack on Western soil. This is the focus of the following empirical chapter.  
 
 
                                                 
90
 For a discussion on the term ‘jihad’, see: Pisoiu (2012). 
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6.2 Introduction 
 
Radicalisation at this point occurs in an analogous way to Goffman’s (1961) inpatient 
phase where individuals begin some ‘radical shifts’ in their moral career. This involves 
changes in both their personal beliefs and those of ‘significant’ others and society. This 
chapter outlines the process of ‘conversion’, where the effects of the strains, grievances 
and contingencies experienced until this point are harnessed by the radicalisers to move 
the radicalisee towards some sort of activism. A small proportion of these individuals will 
become involved in some type of violent or terrorist activity.  
 
This chapter is set out in five sections. The first section discusses how radicalisees come 
to internalise extreme ideologies. This is achieved through the radicaliser mortifying and 
reconstructing the radicalisee’s perceptions of ‘self’ and ‘social identity’ (Goffman, 1961). 
In order to mortify the self, the radicaliser aims to place a barrier between the radicalisee 
and any countervailing influence in their life. They also construct an environment which 
demands conformity and non-dissent. This begins a shift in the radicalisee’s personality 
and works to remove their individual identity. The radicaliser is then able to reconstruct 
the radicalisee’s perception of self and social identity. This is achieved, at first, through 
satisfying their social and cultural needs. The radicaliser is then able to focus on altering 
the radicalisee’s mentality through achieving ‘frame-alignment’ between their extreme 
ideologies and the experiences of the radicalisee. Those grievances at the global level 
become particularly critical as they are used to create a sense of moral outrage, which 
can lead to some type of activism. The conversion process up until this point is generic 
for most, if not all, extreme groups in the UK. 
 
The second section outlines the extremist’s career. It begins by discussing the distinction 
between the different types of non-violent and violent extreme groups in the UK and how 
the radicalisee may navigate through them. Although the organisation they join may well 
have similar goals to others, the strategies adopted to achieve them will differ between 
groups and will be dependent on their particular ideologies. This does not assume that 
the radicalisee will settle with one group as mobilisation can occur between them. Some 
affiliates of non-violent groups will become frustrated with these types of ideologies and 
gravitate towards their own organically formed clusters, and move towards accepting the 
use of violence as a strategy to achieve their goals.  
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The third section focuses upon this breakaway cluster and discusses the personal and 
psychological preparations needed for its members to fully internalise the use of violence 
personally91. The cluster, with their own specific ideologue, explores the moral and divine 
duties they perceive to be bestowed upon them, and the justifications behind the use of 
violence. These messages will only be pertinent if the ideologue holds what the cluster 
believes to be ‘religious authority’92.They also explore the perceived personal benefits 
available to those sacrificing their freedoms or life by using violence. It is at this point that 
religion becomes imperative within radicalisation. 
 
The fourth section starts by outlining the different courses of action available to members 
of the cluster. They may decide, social networks permitting, to travel abroad and receive 
military schooling in an AQ, or similar, training camp with the intention to join a ‘Muslim 
army’ in combat. Alternatively, a smaller number of clusters will decide that attacking the 
West is a better strategy either initially or after attending a training camp abroad. With a 
consideration of the components discussed in the previous section, there is also great 
importance here with subculture and social identity, where elements such as excitement 
and masculinity play a key role. 
 
The final section examines the phenomenon of terrorism in the West. Those that return 
from military camps abroad with the intention of attacking the West, or those that decide 
this from the outset, will form their own smaller ‘cells’ with others who have a similar type 
of intent, or are deemed to have the potential to do so. In order to progress to committing 
this act of terrorism against Western civilians, there needs to be additional religious and 
moral legitimacy to that already discussed in this chapter.  
 
Members of these cells, as with most companies, have distinct organisational roles. This 
includes those on the periphery providing tangible support. As these cells are organically 
formed, there may naturally be deficiencies in their knowledge and skill set. The cell will, 
through social networks, look to ‘headhunt’ new employees to fill these ‘job vacancies’. If 
                                                 
91
 The use of the term ‘personal’ or ‘personally’ in the context of this thesis is not intended to 
imply that this is an individual decision to conduct an act of violence or terrorism. More so, it 
represents the distinction between condoning the use of violence, i.e. support, and personally 
partaking in the use of violence. 
92
 For a more detailed discussion, see:  Wiktorowicz (2004, 2005). 
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this does not yield any results, they may then headhunt recruits from other cells, groups 
or networks.  
 
6.3 Mortification and Reconstruction of the Self 
 
The aim of the radicaliser is to ensure the radicalisee internalises their particular extreme 
ideologies. The term ‘internalisation’ can be defined as making ‘a feeling, attitude, or a 
belief part of the way you think’93. Kelman (1958: 54) argues that internalisation occurs 
when the individual believes that the outcome will be ‘intrinsically rewarding…[and] is 
congruent with his value system. He may consider it useful for the solution of a problem 
or find it congenial to his needs’, and therefore continues with this mindset and relevant 
actions ‘regardless of surveillance or salience’. This is achieved through the process of 
resocialisation which holds distinct similarities to, as mentioned, Goffman’s (1961) moral 
career, where radicalisee’s perceptions of self and social identity are mortified and then 
reconstructed.  
 
6.3.1 Mortification of the Self 
 
In order to maintain a self-defining relationship with the extreme group, the radicalisee is 
required to make certain sacrifices. They are encouraged to cut previous social ties with 
those that do not share the same ideologies of the group. The enactment of this process 
of withdrawal and replacement with a new set of social relationships forms the principal 
part of the mortification process. Goffman (1961: 24) describes this as a form of ‘social 
death’, where ‘the privileges of having visitors or of visiting away from the establishment 
is completely withheld at first, ensuring a deep initial break with past roles and an 
appreciation of role disposition’. Therefore, the barrier between the potential recruit and 
the ‘outside world’ ensures that they discard their previous role and adopt one which is 
attached to the extreme group.  
 
The social distance that is created between the radicalisee and their former life enables 
the radicaliser to propagate their ideologies with the reduced risk of any countervailing 
                                                 
93
 As defined by the Oxford Dictionary. 
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influences. As one former extremist from London explained, ‘if you’re in your own circles 
only, you’re very prone to those voices, to the extremist voices…the only place for right 
and wrong is what this person tells you; then you’re at [their] mercy’ (gee 459). This 
ensures a much greater propensity to accept what is being preached to them with a 
restriction to other sources of information; as was outlined in the previous chapter where 
‘normative influence’ and ‘informational social influence’ have a distinct power in the way 
people construct their perception of reality (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955). 
 
Another method of mortification embedded within the radicalisation process is described 
by Goffman (1961) as ‘looping’. This ensures that the individual ‘finds that his protective 
response to an assault upon self is collapsed into the situation; he cannot defend himself 
in the usual way by establishing distance between the mortifying situation and himself’ 
(ibid: 41). This refers to the ‘dictatorial’ nature of extreme groups where dissent and non-
conformity are viewed as extremely deviant acts.  
 
The data suggested that those who question the norms and ideologies of the group are 
at risk of receiving social sanctions from other members. The main consequence would 
see them being excluded from the group. If the individual becomes an outsider, then 
according to the group they are no better than those they are in conflict with. They will be 
viewed as a ‘kuffar’ as ‘…criticism of the group is criticism of Islam, and being against 
the group is being on the side of the West’ (gee 709). This would also see them losing 
their existing social ties and friendship networks within the group. Threatening exclusion 
from the group is a very potent method for stopping dispute. 
 
This pressure is exerted by the extreme group as it allows them to avoid awkward topics 
which question its core ideals. They may not hold the capacity to refute or counter these 
claims effectively. This can lead to other members of the group becoming unsettled and 
instigate an uprising. Further, this may be disconcerting to those members who have 
internalised the group’s ideologies, especially as they may have invested vast amounts 
of time, effort and sometimes capital into the organisation. A former extremist explained 
these points:  
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‘You do not discuss it with other members. You’d be suspended if you discuss it 
with other members…[as] it will create a rebellion…Because the integrity of the group is 
based upon the adoption of the ideas. This is old school Marxism. But if you believe in 
the ideas, you’re part of the group, [and] if you disagree with the ideas then you disagree 
with the group’. (gee 709) 
 
This respondent proceeded to explain how his former extreme group tried to promote an 
environment of intellectual debate. However, there were parameters and restrictions to 
this. Members may be entitled to question certain aspects, even to disagree, though they 
should not actively promote their disagreement. If they seriously oppose the core ideals 
of the group, then they should leave.  
 
This contributes towards affecting the radicalisee’s perception of self and social identity. 
This will suppress their natural instinct to be critical and inquisitive, and begin to accept, 
with less resistance, what they are being told is right. It should not be assumed that the 
radicalisee is forced into this, at least not in a manner perceived to be negative. The 
environment created by the extreme group appears to the radicalisee to be extremely 
positive where they can thrive in being in such a cohesive group. 
 
6.3.2 ‘Culturing’ and Reconstructing the Self 
 
‘It’s run like an organisation. The process is called “culturing” and they’re taught 
to do two things; you change the [radicalisee’s] mentality and disposition. They define 
the mentality as the way a person senses reality…and the disposition is how do they 
satisfy their needs…If you change those two things you change the psychology of the 
person, because the person thinks and feels and behaves differently. That’s the process 
of indoctrination we used to use in Hizb ut-Tahrir and it is elaborately discussed and 
debated out to what’s the best way.’ (gee 709) 
 
The respondent quoted above explained how a deliberate and thought out process was 
designed by his group, HT, to reconstruct the self of radicalisees. Central to this is the 
term ‘culturing’ which was derived by HT’s core leadership:  
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‘…it’s a refined science. ‘Cos basically what they’ve done is taken some points of 
view from behavioural psychology and cognitive psychology and embraced them and 
said this is the way to do it…’ (ibid) 
 
In fact, this strategy has been published as a 225 page paper and discusses the human 
personality, which consists of the ‘Aqliyyah’ (mentality) and ‘Nafsiyyah’ (disposition) (an-
Nabhani, [n.d.]). It advises that every member of HT ‘should endeavour to achieve in the 
process of teaching and culturing individuals’; i.e. a command to continue recruiting for 
the group (ibid: 7). Although this technique was only outlined in its complete entirety by 
this respondent, its elements were distinctly present in the accounts provided by a 
multitude of the informed informants. 
 
This generic process is used across the board by many extreme groups in the UK, 
including larger organisations with distinct hierarchical structures like HT to those smaller 
organic clusters of groups, both non-violent and violent. Adopting the idea of ‘culturing’ 
to explain conversion is beneficial to this account, where radicalisers aim to both satisfy 
the radicalisee’s ‘disposition’ (needs) and alter their ‘mentality’ (their perceptions of self, 
social identity and worldview).  
 
Disposition: Satisfying Needs 
 
At the heart of reconstructing the radicalisee’s perception of self and social identity is the 
use of the strains and grievances discussed in the previous empirical chapters. The role 
of the radicaliser in relation to this has been outlined in the relevant chapters, though it is 
important to provide a brief reminder. Although some of these strains do not necessarily 
have to be a burning concern with the individual prior to their conversion, there will at 
least be some awareness. The radicalisers need to emphasise these strains (i.e. identity, 
belonging and generational gap) and then provide a replacement for them. 
 
Further, extreme groups also provide a substitute for all that is forcibly lost in their lives; 
that being the previous social ties they have cut. The new group not only becomes one 
of their only social outputs and immediate social environment, but are also considered to 
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be their ‘new family’ or ‘substitute family’94. They will endeavour to provide the emotional, 
social and economic needs of the radicalisee. The group are extremely aware of the 
individual’s requirements, and ‘they develop such a support network around you [that] if 
they see any weaknesses…they will mould themselves around you’ (gee 997). This 
strengthens the bond between the radicaliser and the radicalisee. 
 
Finally, and as a brief side issue, another way for certain, though not all, extreme groups 
to begin to solidify commitment is by providing the potential to satisfy the radicalisee’s 
career advancement and achievement needs. Some extreme groups in the UK are run in 
a similar way to traditional organisations. They may have a centralised structure with the 
potential for promotion for the recruit. This can act as a substitution for the traditional 
understanding of ‘career’. A former member of HT outlined this: 
 
 ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir is a centralised structure, it has recruitment policies, it has an 
official ideology… they know how to recruit people and they know then how to educate 
them and move them up and they have a career system if you want as well…’ (res 985) 
 
Mentality: A Collective Grievance 
 
In order to move the radicalisee towards internalising the extreme group’s ideologies, the 
radicaliser has two principal aims. They must first create a ‘collective grievance’ by once 
again visiting the strains and grievances outlined in the ‘Susceptibility’ chapter. This is a 
key element of the conversion process. In order to accentuate this collective grievance 
the radicaliser emphasises the ‘us vs. them’ paradigm, where ‘them’ refers to those at all 
levels in the radicalisee’s life; i.e. personal, local and global. Thus, it can be said that the 
radicaliser aims to achieve frame-alignment between their ideologies and the personal 
experiences of the radicalisee. 
 
At the personal level there is reference to radicalisee’s lack of integration and belonging 
within society (perceived or otherwise), and the racism and discrimination they have felt 
from wider society. Next, local level strains are stressed with the radicalisee believing 
that certain CT legislation is specifically designed and implemented by the government in 
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 For a wider discussion on groups becoming ‘substitute families’, see: Hudson (1999: 37). 
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a bid to suppress Muslim communities. Finally, arguments at the global level allude to a 
perception that the West is ‘at war with Islam’:  
 
‘…they say to him “no, the reason why you can’t get a job is because you’re a 
Muslim, you know, you’re the wrong colour, you’re the wrong religion. If you were White 
and you were a Christian or atheist, you would have no problem getting a job”…and look 
at our Muslim brothers and sisters, you know, who are up against it…so they’re against 
Muslims”’ (grw 894) 
 
The second strategic aim involves instilling a sense of moral outrage in the mind of the 
radicalisee, where the strains outlined at the global level become especially critical. The 
radicaliser will attempt to alter the radicalisee’s perception of self through changing their 
worldview. This moral outrage causes resentment towards the UK, and the West more 
widely, due mainly to the consequences of their foreign policy actions. This emphasises 
the argument that the non-Muslim world is at war with Muslims and Islam.  
 
At the heart of this conversion tool is a ‘play on emotions’; which includes distress, fear, 
hurt, and most importantly anger. This inflammation of emotions is one of the strongest 
weapons in the radicaliser’s armoury, not only during the recruitment process95 and the 
internalisation of extremist ideologies, but also to enable a deeper state of radicalisation. 
This is not generally linked to religious principles, but something that invokes their moral 
and human concerns. Though, saying that, there is a caveat where the radicaliser will 
emphasise the concept of Ummah, as discussed in the first empirical chapter. Speaking 
from personal experience, a former extremist explained:  
 
‘…these guys will come and play on their emotions, just like they play on the 
guitar. So they’ll say “look our brothers, our sisters they’re being killed, they’re being 
humiliated, they’re being raped and so on”. They’ll say all these emotional things…they 
won’t give any knowledge of Islam, they will just bring emotions’ (grw 309) 
 
                                                 
95
 Although this account of radicalisation focuses upon social networks as the key driving force for 
recruitment into extreme groups, that is not to say that there is no recruitment through ‘extremism 
outreach’ (Wiktorowicz, 2005). Within both types of accounts, the grievances described within the 
‘Susceptibility’ chapter are utilised to cause moral outrage within the minds of potential recruits. 
This has the strong possibility of causing a further interest in the activities and ideologies of the 
extreme group, which can lead to recruitment. 
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Reflecting on his own radicalisation, another former extremist asserted that his emotions 
were taken advantage of and, as he termed it, ‘abused’. It is important to consider that 
he and his friends were fully aware of what they were becoming involved in, i.e. relating 
to the previous argument made about drifters knowing what is going on, as opposed to 
the traditional notion in radicalisation of ‘brainwashing’96. However, he felt that the trust 
they had built up with the extremists was based on lies. This allowed the ‘abuse’ of 
emotions to continue until he found himself on the battlefields of Afghanistan:  
 
 ‘Our emotions were abused…we call it an abuse of emotions, an abuse of faith, 
an abuse of sincerity, you know, an abuse of relationships, an abuse of lie, everything. 
And this all falls under abuse, and sometimes people don’t really, you know, understand 
and can’t relate to that abuse until its actually happened, or until it’s too late.’ (gee 997) 
 
The radicalisees are shown very graphic images and videos of Muslims being killed and 
tortured. Different material is presented repeatedly to maximise moral outrage and keep 
radicalisees’ emotions ‘constantly on the boil’ (grw 797). This is particularly pertinent if 
radicalisers themselves display strong emotions and appear to be physically enraged by 
the grievances. If the radicalisee has no, or very little, historical knowledge of conflicts 
and associated grievances then the theatrical actions of the radicaliser will reinforce their 
arguments:  
 
 ‘When people don’t have knowledge they tend to judge the truth based upon how 
good it makes them feel, how loud the guy is screaming, how brave he seems to be’ 
(grw 971) 
 
As strong and emotionally evoking as these images and videos are, first-hand accounts 
from those who have experienced these incidents are equally as, if not more, compelling 
and an important conversion tool. The ability to see, first-hand, the emotions on people’s 
faces and hear it in their voices will strengthen the message through adding a personal 
touch. Further, they are able to ask in-depth questions which they cannot do with DVDs, 
for example. This was personally experienced by a former extremist from the West of 
England:  
 
                                                 
96
 See previous quote from the same respondent (gee 997) on page 146. 
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 ‘I know people from Bosnia who have seen horrific things in the Bosnian war and 
it really touches deep, like when you hear them talk about how they can’t sleep at night 
because they see visions of things…’ (exe 999) 
 
The arguments presented in this section, thus far, relate to wider academic studies, such 
as the ‘sociology of emotions’. There exists a plethora of literature which pertains to the 
emotions which affect radicalisees and radicalisers. These include a unified sense of 
identity and pride (within the group) (Scheff, 1994), an evocation of their morality (Turner 
and Stets, 2006), and anger (Schieman, 2006). Within the various accounts of SMT, the 
sociology of culture and emotions plays a pivotal role with theories such as ‘framing’. In 
addition, as discussed within Goodwin and Jasper’s (2006) analysis of SMT literature, 
academics like Gamson (1992) point to the importance of ‘injustice frames’, where 
certain emotions may arise even prior to blame being allocated. There can also be a 
deeper understanding of how extreme ideologies are internalised by looking at the work 
of prominent sociologists such as Goffman (1958, 1983), who stresses the importance of 
scripts (or reactions to), theatrics, settings, and interactions within the study of emotions 
and culture.  
 
At this point the radicalisee’s perception of self and social identity is fast changing. They 
may have started off as a confused young individual in the UK trying to find their way in 
life, but they now have a dominant identity in the form of Islam, one that has a new moral 
compass. They are now part of a collective, a cohesive group that has global aspirations 
and provides them with the belonging they desire. 
 
In order to maintain commitment of the radicalisee, the extreme group must compound 
their dominant position. Almost all, if not all, extreme groups, at least in the UK, consider 
themselves to be the ‘vanguard of Islam’. They all claim to be the ‘market leaders’ and 
only legitimate authority. With profound conviction they will inform their followers that 
they are the true voice and defenders of Islam. By instilling this conviction to their cause 
they attempt to dispel any confusion and uncertainty the individual may have, not just 
about the group, but within their own lives and direction. From the opinion of the 
radicalisee, they want to be employed by the best organisation in the market to further 
their career. A former extremist from the North East of England argued that the group:  
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 ‘…offers you absolute certainty, plus uniqueness. You are the only people in the 
whole world who are doing this…‘cos in there you’ll see that vanguard is a key thing 
here, [and] the idealism which comes with [it]…So, you’ve got a sense of absolute 
certainty, “we are absolutely right, everyone else is wrong and we are unique, we are the 
only ones who do that”. Now you tell me what that equals? It equals individuals who will 
see themselves as special and significant in society’ (gee 796) 
 
As stated in the quotation above, this in turn facilitates the view that the extreme group is 
right and all others are wrong. Those who do not subscribe to their ideals are considered 
to be, on most occasions, part of the problem rather than the solution. This view, 
importantly, also extends to the other extremist groups, with some asserting that these 
alternative groups pose a direct threat to Islam:  
 
‘…anybody outside the group is worth less than people within the group…so 
you’re taught that “you are right, you’re group is right, everybody else is wrong and 
anybody who challenges that is themselves satanical [sic]…They don’t realise it’s the 
other way round. [They tell their followers] “don’t listen to them, they’re wrong” (gee 459) 
 
Some of these extreme groups even claim that all Muslims who do not subscribe to their 
particular ideologies are part of the problem. This was stated by Adam when outlining 
the message propagated by the Algerian extremist group he had affiliations with:  
 
 ‘…they used to preach the ideology for us to be against the Muslims at first, and 
say “90% of the Muslims in [location name deleted] were not Muslims”, that’s what they 
were saying…”they’re all Kaffirs”…’ (Adam) 
 
It is important at this point to pick up on one important argument. It was mentioned 
above that each extremist group in the UK consider themselves to be the vanguards of 
Islam and in a sense special from the rest of society; which has parallels to Becker’s 
(1963) research on ‘outsiders’. Those that do not agree with their ideals, including other 
extreme groups with differing ideologies, and in fact even other Muslims, are classed as 
non-believers. On the other hand these groups claim to be fighting for the safety and 
security, amongst other aspects, of Muslims and Islam. This in itself highlights the 
complexity, as it almost appears as if they pick and choose to take whichever stance 
 177 
works best for them at the time. This also begins to show the contradictions that exist 
within their approach. In order to make a strong statement to the West, so to speak, they 
claim to be protecting Muslims globally, but to achieve mortification and social distance 
they assert to the radicalisee that Muslims who do not buy into their ideologies are also 
non-believers and in many instances part of the problem.  
 
Finally, as found within most research on radicalisation, it is clear that those who go 
through the process of conversion will be larger in numbers, as compared to those that 
internalise extreme ideologies. Thus, they can ‘successfully’ be converted or they may 
revert back to their former lives, for example. However, they may remain ‘extremist by 
association’, or pretenders, and still join because of subcultural reasons or to be close to 
their friends; but not internalise their extreme ideologies. 
 
There can be similarities drawn between this and Goffman’s (1961) concept of ‘primary 
and secondary adjustments’. Those who have a ‘primary adjustment’ are ‘transformed 
into a cooperator; [they become] the “normal”, “programmed”, or built-in member’ (ibid: 
172). These individuals are considered to have taken on Goffman’s ‘fourth mode of 
adaption’, i.e. “‘conversion: [where] the inmate appears to take over the official or staff 
view of himself and tries to act out the role of the perfect inmate.’ (ibid: 63) Those with 
‘secondary adjustment’ may appear allude to the norms of the group or the organisation; 
though will participate in certain ‘underlife’ activities. Goffman argues that those having 
secondary adjustment have the potential to eventually destabilise the organisation, and 
in the case of extremist groups may, as a result, be left behind.  
 
Within the context of conversion, there are numerous reasons why individuals may not 
make the transition from secondary to primary adjustment. As outlined in the previous 
empirical chapter, there may be contingencies that restrain some people from becoming 
radicalised, such as an in-depth knowledge of Islam, and contingencies that facilitate 
others, such as the generational gap with their parents and imams. Further, those who 
do not become radicalised may not have felt all of the strains at the personal, local or 
global levels, and so radicalisers are thus unable to frame-align with these arguments to 
resonate with their own ideologies.  
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In addition, those who are committed to the group, as opposed to those affiliated in order 
to satisfy certain social and subcultural needs, are normally deeply affected by the moral 
outrage element, which in turn motivates them to partake in some form of activism. That 
is not to say the latter will not also feel the social and subcultural pulls. Although it did 
not become clear in the empirical data why some are deeply affected by moral outrage 
whilst others are not, it can be said that they are influenced by the depth of their affection 
with the concept of the Ummah, and thus how much they identify with those being killed 
abroad as their own blood relatives.  
 
6.4 The Radicalisee’s Career 
 
Although it may be the most likely outcome, it should not be assumed that the first group 
the radicalisee becomes affiliated with is where they want to progress their career. The 
radicalisee’s career will be dependent on numerous factors, such as who they know and 
the choices made by their friends. Those they are in contact with, through their social 
networks, will influence which type of extremist group they initially join, or even move on 
to. 
 
There are a plethora of extremist groups, organisations and movements within the UK97, 
including many that have been proscribed by the British Government98. Some will have 
regional links to others with similar ideologies, whilst other groups have some form of 
international connectedness. The goals for the different extreme groups in the UK have 
many underlying similarities, i.e. to end the suffering of Muslims globally, to resurrect the 
ideas, traditions, culture and dominance of Islam, and to win the war against the West. 
Where these groups differ is in their strategies towards achieving these goals and much 
of this depends on the particular ideologies they adopt. 
 
Providing an analysis of the different extreme groups in the UK99, including the variations 
on their ideologies, whether small or drastic, is an exhaustive task with no benefit to this 
particular thesis. It may, though, be suitable to provide an extremely elementary analysis 
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 For a more detailed list of groups, see: Simcox et al. (2010). 
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 For a detailed list, see: Home Office (2012). 
99
 For a detailed discussion on differing ideologies, see: (Change Institute, 2008a). 
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and loosely discuss the most commonly known types of organisations in the UK100. 
Within this, there can be a brief inclusion of their particular ideologies and how they 
relate, if at all, to violence and terrorism.  
 
The types of groups within the first category are organisations like HT. Their active intent 
of establishing a global Caliphate and implementing Sharia law in the UK is considered 
to be extreme by mainstream society, though in the UK, at present, this does not amount 
to any type of illegal activity. They are very conscious of public perceptions towards them 
and reiterate their non-violent stance in many of their published materials (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 
[n.d.]: 3). HT in the UK allegedly has, however, links to many sister organisations around 
the world, whose opinions on violence and terrorism are far more complex. Some even 
argue that HT in the UK are not, as they state, completely against the use of violence. 
They are thought to be pragmatic and believe the current use of violence to be of little 
value. However, once the establishment of a global Caliphate is achieved the use of 
violence, through a united and strong global ‘Muslim army’, will be more fruitful, as a 
former HT member outlined, ‘What the HT believe is we should take power and then use 
violence’ (gee 709). He continued to explain the complex beliefs of HT: 
 
 ‘…So HT as a group don’t organise violent attacks. The individual members will 
not be involved normally in terrorism or violent attacks. What they do advocate is two 
things…they’ll advocate and support what would see as legitimate jihad, which is 
anywhere where a non-Muslim authority is in a Muslim land. So they would see it’s a 
legitimate jihad to fight against the current Iraqi regime because it’s been propped up by 
Western powers…And [second] they believe in infiltrating military regimes and getting 
them to overthrow the regimes, and if that involves violence then so be it, but technically 
they don’t organise it, so that’s their kind of clause out.’ (gee 709) 
 
There are then groups whose ideologies towards violence and terrorism are even more 
difficult to identify. These groups are constantly being proscribed by the government only 
to be organised under a new name with the same personnel101. Within the Terrorism Act 
2000, an organisation or group can be banned if it: 
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 Those recently labelled in the UK as ‘non-violent extremists’ have purposefully been omitted 
from this analysis. However, they have been discussed in brief in the Methodology chapter, and 
in more depth in the ‘Theory, Practice and Policy’ and ‘Conclusions’ chapters of the thesis. 
101
 For an example of this, see Footnote 21. 
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“…commits or participates in acts of terrorism; prepares for terrorism; promotes 
or encourages terrorism (including the unlawful glorification of terrorism); or is otherwise 
concerned in terrorism.” (Home Office, 2012: 1) 
 
One of the better known groups within this category is AM102. One similarity between AM 
and HT is their aim to establish a global Caliphate (Wiktorowicz, 2005). In terms of 
terrorism, the media are quick to highlight AM’s ties, with Gilligan (2010), for example, 
arguing that ‘at least nineteen terrorists convicted in Britain have had links with al-
Muhajiroun’. However, a deeper analysis shows that the situation is a lot more complex 
than this. Within the data, certain respondents explained that although groups like AM 
may incite violence and tacitly support it, they will not involve themselves in it physically. 
The difference between AM and HT, is AM’s propensity to be more public and outspoken 
with their condoning of violence and terrorism. Elements of this may refer to previously 
made arguments about perceptions of generational subculture, social status, ‘militancy’ 
and masculinity. This affiliation to terrorism was outlined by a former extremist:  
 
 ‘…they’re the ones that like to sort of glorify themselves when any terrorist 
activity takes place…they’ll incite violence, they’ll incite hatred…but that group itself will 
not get involved in terrorist activities’ (gee 997) 
 
Within these groups there are further differences in ideologies and approaches, in terms 
of condoning violence and terrorism, to achieve their goals. Certain groups in this loosely 
defined category will condone violence in Muslim countries so long as it falls in what they 
deem to be a theatre of war, or ‘conventional war’. This remains true even if it involves 
violence against Western coalition forces. This is due to a belief that Muslims countries 
under ‘attack’ or occupation have the right to defend themselves using whatever means 
required. Global Muslims are able to join the fight as they are part of the Ummah. These 
groups, however, condemn, or at least do not condone, terrorism in the West as they 
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 Although the term ‘AM’ is generically used to describe this type of group, it must be noted that 
AM itself was not proscribed by the government before it disbanded. It was proscribed by the 
government in 2010 and 2011 as part of a wider network. A list provided by the Home Office 
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Muhajiroun, Islam4UK, Call to Submission, Islamic Path, London School of Sharia and Muslims 
Against Crusades should be treated as alternative names for the organisation which is already 
proscribed under the names Al Ghurabaa and The Saved Sect.’ (Home Office, 2012: 6) For 
further information, see Footnote 21. 
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believe Muslims living there are under a ‘covenant of security’ which forbids them from 
attacking their hosts. When AM was originally conceived it was considered to subscribe 
to this type of ideology. Since then, this has caused factions and splits in the group. In 
fact, Omar Bakri Mohammed, who originally formed and led AM, even claimed one of the 
reasons he dissolved the group was because he did not want to be associated with the 
emerging faction within the organisation which permitted the use of terrorism in the UK 
(Raymond, 2010). However, there are many contradictions within the official statements 
given by the leaders of these groups in regards to their support of terrorism (ibid).  
 
The stance held by the aforementioned groups on violence and terrorism becomes even 
more complex when considering their wider views. Certain groups will condemn violence 
either abroad or in the UK, due to ideological differences, for their own members, though 
do not condemn other groups’ use of it. Referring back to the example of HT, one former 
member explained:  
 
 ‘…we used to believe is that the only other valid alternative is jihadism because 
they are religiously inspired, and even though we don’t agree with it, we consider God 
will reward the individual. Because for them it falls into the classic paradigm of as long as 
you are sincerely trying to interpret the text, you should be rewarded by God for the 
sincerity of your interpretations…’ (gee 709) 
 
Finally, there are those directly involved in violence and terrorism, either in the UK or by 
conducting ‘jihad’ on the frontline in Muslim countries with ‘Muslim armies’. A quarter of 
the informed informants labelled them as the ‘jihadis’. They remain quiet and stay under 
the ‘radar’ as much as possible to avoid them gaining the unwanted attention of the 
police and security services. One grassroots worker from London described them as:  
 
 ‘…real violent extremists. These people are very quiet; you wouldn’t even hear 
about them, something would just happen’ (grw 927) 
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6.4.1 Gravitation to Violence 
 
There are several ways people can become part of ‘jihadi clusters’ in the UK. More often 
than not, clusters are organically formed by groups of friends103. It is not uncommon for 
some members of the cluster, potentially all, to have once been a part of other groups in 
the UK, such as HT or AM, at one point in their extremist career (hri, 707). If this is the 
case, the former groups will provide a certain level of radicalisation for these individuals. 
There will also be those clusters that are organically formed, though the members were 
not once part of another group; however, it is interesting to focus upon those who were. 
 
As discussed, extreme groups in the UK hold contempt towards those who are critical of 
their ideologies. However, this is not to say that certain members will privately differ in 
opinion on the legitimacy of some of their ideals; such as not supporting violence and 
terrorism as a tactic. They believe that their current group is not achieving anything with 
prayer and non-violent activism alone. They also find some of the group’s goals to be 
unrealistic, such as the establishment of a Caliphate which can take many decades, or 
even longer, to implement. They believe that the situation facing Muslims and Islam is so 
urgent that immediate action needs to be taken. This is assessed in an extremely simple 
manner; the longer it takes to establish a Caliphate, the more Muslims around the world 
die, and the more of a stronghold the West has over Islam: 
 
‘[They] turn to violence because they come to the conclusion that non-violence 
political action as well as non-violence religious activities [are] ineffective at changing the 
world and bringing it to that end state that they want a Caliphate. So they’re rejecting the 
non-violent political activism of the HTs, the AMs, all those groups…they believe that 
they are ineffective and essentially look down upon them’ (hri 707) 
 
There is much contempt held for these non-violent groups, with a belief that they simply 
‘run their mouths’ with no measurable benefits or achievements: 
 
‘…they say “ah look these guys have been active for 50, 60 years now and where 
have they got? Nowhere, they’re idiots!”’ (res 985)  
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Those individuals who come to countenance violence or terrorism have no faith in any 
alternative processes and believe it is the only viable method at their disposal to alleviate 
their grievances and achieve their goals. There is little, or no, trust in the UK’s – and the 
West’s – political system. In addition, certain interpretations of extremist ideologies are 
opposed to fundamental democratic values and the notion of democracy itself. Thus, it is 
felt that although their current extreme group may subscribe to ideals that are in line with 
their perception of Islamic principles and core belief of what they believe the Caliphate 
should bring, i.e. a dictatorship, they believe that the group are contradicting themselves 
by resorting to democratic means to attain them. This causes further anger and some 
begin to feel like the only way to achieve their goals is to use the same tactics employed 
by their enemies, i.e. violence: 
 
‘…a lot of them they see it to be the only way they can really make a point. No 
one listens to somebody with a placard as far as they’re concerned. They see the only 
way people will stand up and listen to them is if they use violence, if they start spilling 
blood’ (grw 320) 
 
For those individuals part of non-violent extremist groups, which may or may not have 
been proscribed by the government, this acts as a ‘stepping stone’ towards flirting with 
differing ideologies, some of which allow and encourage the use of violence104. However, 
this should not be interpreted as these groups acting as ‘conveyor belts’ towards violent 
extremism. If moral outrage is deep and their emotions are sufficiently evoked, then 
these clusters will completely detach themselves from their original group. 
 
This was confirmed within the empirical data by a variety of respondents including former 
high-ranking police officers working in counter-terrorism, grassroots workers and those 
who were former extremists, both non-violent and violent. For example, one informed 
informant told of his experience working at the grassroots level: 
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 This can also be seen in wider accounts of radicalisation and in various media reports. For 
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2007). However, certain former prominent members of the organisation, such as Mohammed 
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explained that due to AM’s stance on the ‘covenant of security’, they left to pursue extremist 
careers which allowed for an attack on Britain to be considered as legitimate (Taseer, 2005). 
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 ‘…that may be al-Muhajiroun…but the kind of person that they create is an angry 
young person who finds that they’re only shouting and hollering, and then he doesn’t 
want to be with them, he wants to go somewhere more stronger to do something’ (gee 
997) 
 
This is not to insinuate that all of those that breakaway and form their own counterculture 
are potentially committed jihadis. Some will be moving towards this stance, whilst others 
within the cluster will break off with them due to, as discussed in the previous empirical 
chapter, certain group pressures or simply to remain close to their old friends105. 
Whatever the reasons, they have all now essentially become self-employed. As long as 
some of the members remain committed to taking some form of direct violent action for 
their cause, they will eventually take out a franchise, either officially or ideologically, with 
a larger organisation such as AQ, Jaish-e-Mohammed or Lashker-e-Taiba, for example. 
 
There are of course other ways they could become affiliated. The argument presented 
above merely represents one method into violent extremism or the potential for it. How 
prevalent this is, the empirical data unfortunately did not illuminate. However, those who 
have conducted in-depth analysis of terrorist cells in the West claim it to be a common 
occurrence (Silber, 2011, 2012). 
 
There is one further consideration which can illuminate the transition between low- and 
high-risk activism. This has been highlighted within the research conducted by McAdam 
(1986). He analysed data from the Freedom Summer movement which sought to register 
as many African American voters in Mississippi as possible. The mainly White students 
that participated in the movement were fully aware of the physical dangers to them, 
including death, from various groups and organisations, ranging from local police officers 
to members of the Klu Klux Klan (sometimes these two groups overlapped). McAdam 
analysed all the applications submitted by those wishing to participate in the movement 
including those accepted, rejected and dropouts. 
 
Interestingly – as has been briefly touched upon and will be discussed in detail later in 
respect to AQI extremism – gaining acceptance into the movement was very selective 
which gave people more impetus and desire to become involved. McAdam found that 
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ideology and a commitment to the cause was evident with those who did apply and were 
successful, and also with those that were accepted but dropped out. Although McAdam 
does not question the role these factors play, the difference between the two groups was 
that activists had greater numbers of organisational affiliations, higher levels of prior civil 
rights activity and more strong and extensive ties to other participants; as compared to 
those who were accepted but dropped out. This can be related to the arguments made 
in the previous empirical chapter regarding social identity and the value of friendships. 
The point McAdam stresses is that there needs to be the existence of both structural and 
individual motivational factors in high-risk activism. In the context of AQI extremism in 
the UK, whilst some may have an ideological commitment to the cause and feel a strong 
sense of moral outrage, they may not have the social networks and ties in place. In the 
same way, those that may have the social networks and ties may not feel this moral 
outrage or have internalised any extremist ideologies. Therefore, as McAdam explains, 
the ideological identification acts as a ‘push’, whilst the ‘microstructural’ factors act as a 
‘pull’.  
 
6.5 Personal and Psychological Preparations for Violence 
 
Prior to discussing the various types of violent activity some members of the cluster may 
come to participate in, it is important to outline the cognitive evolvement required in order 
for someone to conduct an act of violence. This is in the context of this particular study. 
The use of violence is directly linked to the emotional strain caused by those arguments 
outlined in relation to moral outrage (i.e. the suffering of Muslims globally, and the West’s 
perceived war against Islam). This is also robustly supplemented by the attainment of 
personal benefits. 
 
6.5.1 Morality and Religion 
 
The cluster will, more likely than not, have an ideologue attached to them. They will be in 
contact with them either through their social networks, or in some digital capacity such 
as the internet. The ideologue will advocate that it is the cluster’s moral and religious 
duty to protect their Muslim kin, who are the victims of Western oppression, through any 
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means available. Essentially, ‘they feel it is their Muslim and their human responsibility to 
do something’ (grw 502), and are made to feel guilty for not doing so. They are reminded 
of the fortunes they have had in their lives and the misfortunes of others. They are told, 
as one grassroots worker from the North East of England explained, ‘…that they’re just 
sitting here in their cushy lifestyle, in their three bedroom semi[-detached house] doing 
nothing…’ (grw 358).  
 
This guilt is linked to the idea of ‘us vs. them’, where they are told, ‘…”you’re either with 
these guys or you’re with us. If you’re a true Muslim you’re with us”“ (rmc 737). If there is 
not a complete internalisation of extremist ideology by the individual at this point, then it 
places them in a very difficult position. Some members will genuinely feel like the West is 
at war with Islam. Also, the deaths of countless Muslims around the world is a very real 
occurrence; sometimes due to the military actions of the West106. In addition, they may 
have previously been part of another extreme group, who they now have some sort of 
animosity towards, and they do not want to revert back to this position. They do not want 
to be ‘one of them’, those they detest and perceive to be evil; whether this is the West or 
other extreme groups. There is a strong desire to be part of the righteous.  
 
The guilt they feel is also attached to God. Many religions believe what happens after we 
die depends on the actions taken in life and this argument is used by the ideologue. This 
emotional tactic makes the individual feel both guilty and fearful of the consequences of 
not adhering to the ‘cry for help’ from their Muslim kin. This was outlined by an informed 
informant, who even went as far as describing it as ‘emotional blackmail’:  
 
‘…[they are] using language which says “what will you say to God? If you saw 
these things happening and you didn’t do anything about it, how will you stand before 
God and say this?” Its emotional blackmail you see.’ (rmc 321) 
 
When these individuals accept what they believe is the decree of God, they feel like they 
are reaching a higher plane. They have transcended from ordinary mortals to those who 
are directly undertaking God’s work: 
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 ‘…he believes it’s a good thing what he’s doing because he’s actually doing 
something that’s going to change the world for the better…So not only are they going to 
create a change in this world, but this is what God has obliged them to do…’ (gee 709) 
 
However, it must be considered that the radicalisee has more than likely been socialised 
through their life to believe that violence and killing others is morally and legally wrong. 
Though at this point they are seriously challenging, or have changed, their worldview. 
There is a polarisation of what is right and wrong and between what is good and evil; 
though their previous conceptions of wrong may still act to inhibit accepting the personal 
use of violence. Religion is not important in the early parts of the radicalisation process, 
though it may be present107. It cannot be considered as a radicalising agent or 
something that drives radicalisation. However, it is imperative in justifying the use of 
violence to the individual through a misconstrued religious context, which goes towards 
alleviating any moral or religious concerns they may have. 
 
In order to make sense of how religion can supply a justification to loosen normative 
constraints for behaviour it is possible employ the aforementioned theory of ‘techniques 
of neutralization’ (Sykes and Matza, 1957). Within the Literature Review chapter, four of 
the five methods were deemed to hold importance when understanding radicalisation: 
i.e. ‘denial of responsibility’; ‘denial of victim’; ‘condemnation of the condemners’; ‘appeal 
to higher loyalties’. When this is combined with previous arguments regarding perceived 
religious requirement, this moves the radicalisee closer towards violence. This was put 
into context by a former extremism from London:  
 
‘Those thoughts and convictions make up the worldview and then there’s a latent 
behavioural shift that happens as a result, and then from there when you bring in the 
kind of theological dimension, the religious scripture, all of those things which justify 
these set of acts…’ (gee 709) 
 
The real importance of having a religious justification can be seen through the difficulties 
experienced by grassroots workers when trying to de-radicalise these individuals, as 
compared to those who only hold emotional grievances: 
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‘From an emotional perspective you can tackle that issue…but those individuals 
who actually believe from the scripture it tells you, that’s a lot more challenging in 
tackling because you have to go back to principles, you have to go back to principles on 
how you understand the Quran and the Hadith’ (grw 179) 
 
6.5.2 Personal Gains 
 
As mentioned, many believe the actions we take in life determine what happens after we 
die, in terms of finding salvation in the afterlife. One explanation for radicalisation is the 
absolution of sins if the radicalisee partakes in ‘jihad’108. The empirical data found that 
this is not necessarily linked to criminality109, but more about the personal perception of 
not leading one’s life in accordance to religious requirements. This argument becomes 
especially relevant when considering the possible view of certain extremists, that British 
laws are man-made and therefore not relevant to them; especially as some extremists 
actually promote the engagement of criminal behaviour110. Nevertheless, a former 
extremist from London held similar sentiments. The absolution of sins was not a causal 
factor for him to travel to Afghanistan to engage in combat with the Mujahedeen, but 
contributed to the justification of putting his life in danger:  
 
‘…[you think] I’ve got lots of mistakes that I have made in my life, I’ve committed 
a lot of sins, and if I do die, you know, then I’m going to be a martyr”. So it was that kind 
of mentality at that time…’ (gee 997) 
 
It was discussed in the Literature Review chapter how radicalisation can be considered 
in two different ways. First, is the emotional and cognitive state which leads an individual 
to the point of violence. Second, is both the emotional and rational choice of committing 
an act of violence or terrorism that more authors, especially those employing SMT, are 
adopting into their theories (Pisoiu, 2012). Once again, it should be considered that this 
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is not just about rational choice, but also about the wrap around social control exerted by 
radicalisers, such as the cluster’s ideologue. Although it can be argued these positions 
are fundamentally opposed, it can also be said that the human psyche is far more 
complex than being driven by one causal factor. 
 
It would be extremely difficult for those about to commit an act of violence to not consider 
the personal costs involved. This includes the moral aspect of taking the lives of others. 
However, as mentioned, the worldview of the radicalisee is fast becoming polarised, with 
their perceptions of right and wrong, and good and evil undergoing a dominant shift. A 
further cost is being convicted of the crime, losing their freedoms, and spending time in 
prison. This is assuming that the attack does not include the use of personal suicide, or if 
it does then the risk being arrested before the incident takes place or the attack failing in 
some way111. Finally, one of the biggest costs is losing one’s own life. This will of course 
be dependent on whether the attacks, again, involve suicide, or if the attackers are killed 
by police officers at the scene.  
 
With the costs come a number of benefits for the potential violent extremist. One benefit 
concerns the individual attaining their social and subcultural desires (this is discussed 
further at a later point in the chapter). Another benefit for the individual is to do with 
altruism, i.e. helping their Muslim kin globally and working towards resurrecting Islam to 
its perceived rightful dominant stature in the world. However, some argue against the 
existence of pure altruism, and insist that there is always the presence of some type of 
underlying personal motivation112. This is also the case with violent extremism. 
 
This personal motivation, or reward, is primarily in the form of acceptance into heaven. In 
Islam this promises many things, including salvation, eternal bliss, and all the wants an 
individual may desire. This is a very strong incentive. The use of violence, more so dying 
in battle as a ‘martyr’, helps to facilitate this entry into heaven. There is the belief that the 
time-span of life is nothing compared to eternity, and the sacrifices given in life will be 
comprehensively outweighed by the rewards in heaven: 
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‘Because ultimately if you’re a believer it is the afterlife which is more important, 
or the higher things which are more important…and heaven is the ultimate goal and 
you’re told that just going and fighting somewhere and being killed its gonna get you 
straight to heaven…’ (gee 459) 
 
This section has thus far outlined the cognitive requirements needed to shift radicalisees 
towards legitimising the use of violence. The personal benefits available have also been 
discussed. It is important at this point to understand the role these play within facilitating 
someone towards violent extremism as opposed to those that may be exposed to similar 
influences and circumstances, though do not partake in violence. 
 
This becomes clearer when comparing the responses of Adam and Omar in this context. 
As outlined in the prologue to this chapter, Omar embraced ‘jihad’, and more importantly 
he welcomed death as this for him fulfilled all of his duties and bought with it rewards. On 
the other hand, Adam wasn’t as keen as Omar, and this became clear when he outlined 
how he had once been asked to attend a jihadi training camp abroad: 
 
‘I was in Pakistan [and] I heard there were camps in Afghanistan at the time and 
people were going over the border to train and my friend said to me “let’s go”. I said “no 
way am I going there”…you had to go through the mountains, walk through ice. I thought 
“I aint doing that!”…you’d probably fall off and die…’ (Adam) 
 
This demonstrates that some people do not progress through the process of conversion 
where they feel it is their moral and religious duty to participate in ‘jihad’, and simply are 
not concerned about the perceived rewards. On the other hand, some fully embrace the 
notion of ‘jihad’ and their duties to perform it within the context of violence. The effect of 
moral outrage also holds much importance. It may be useful, then, to revisit the three 
different types of career paths outlined at the end of the last chapter. Thus, some will 
remain pretenders, whilst others will progress to become drifters. One further reason to 
why some internalise violent ideologies whilst others do not, even though they may be 
exposed to the same information, is that the ideologies need to be delivered by trusted 
sources that are deemed or perceived to hold religious authority. This is the focus of the 
next section.  
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6.5.3 Trusted Sources and Personality 
 
Kelman (1958: 53) found that one of the processes of influence and its acceptance is the 
‘relative power of the influencing agent’. Through varying this antecedent, defined as ‘the 
extent to which the influencing agent is perceived as instrumental to the achievement of 
the subject’s goals’ (ibid: 54), Kelman found that an authoritative figure could induce the 
long-term commitment of an individual. In terms of this thesis, for members of the cluster 
to internalise the arguments presented in this section the message needs to be delivered 
by a trusted source. Thus, their ideologue should be considered to be, in the perceptions 
of the cluster, a ‘religious authority’. 
 
In many types of situations, authority, or its perception, has the potential to ‘encourage’ 
individuals to engage in acts, psychologically and/or physically, they may not previously 
have considered. This is particularly pertinent in Islam, as many sects within the faith do 
not have an overarching religious authority, like there is with other religions. There is a 
much flatter structure where the imam or ideologue holds much power, as explained by a 
former extremism from London:  
 
‘In Islamic tradition the scholar holds weight, the scholar is the theologian who 
has the right to interpret scripture’ (gee 709) 
 
There are numerous ways in which ideologues can create a sense of religious authority 
with their followers or potential followers. One method is to outline their religious training. 
Many extremists have relatively little knowledge regarding the ideological arguments and 
look to ‘epistemic’ ideologues for guidance113; something that relates back to the lack of 
Islamic knowledge argument. Some of these extremist ideologues have studied under 
the guidance of ‘respected scholars’ in Saudi Arabia and this holds much weight with the 
radicalisees. 
 
The ideologue must also be fluent in Arabic. This is regarded highly – as the first Quran 
was written in ‘classical Arabic’ – especially by those radicalisees that cannot speak it 
themselves, or only have a loose grasp of the language. They must then refer to, or in 
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most cases rely on, others for translations and meanings of religious texts. This makes it 
very difficult to question what they are being taught, as argued by a former MI5 ‘asset’: 
 
‘If I am [an extremist ideologue] I will try to explain it how I want…these British 
Muslims that are born here, their biggest problem is the Quran is in Arabic…so you have 
to rely on ‘me’ to explain it to you.’ (gee 234) 
 
Once again, the argument pertaining to radicalisee’s having a lack of Islamic knowledge 
becomes essential at this point. This is especially important when deciphering where and 
when, and also in which context, ‘jihad’, violence and suicide are permissible. Having a 
fluency in Arabic and subsequent ability to draw quotations from the Quran and Sunnah 
becomes imperative. As a former extremist from London explained: 
 
 ‘…they can actually quote texts and they can actually give verses of Quran and 
Hadith…and that’s what made it attractive for me’ (gee 441)  
 
It is also important for the ideologue to demonstrate they are leading by example when 
convincing others to partake in violent extremism. The ideologue could repeatedly put 
their own security and freedoms at risk by closely associating themselves with those that 
have committed or are planning to commit acts of violence or terrorism. A more pertinent 
argument is made by those who have risked their lives to participate in ‘jihad’ in the form 
of fighting abroad in various countries such as Bosnia and Chechnya, for example114. 
The people that display a large propensity to take risk and are deemed to be most 
extreme, in line with the group’s mutual orientation, are afforded more admiration. This is 
consistent with wider concepts pertaining to ‘social comparison theory’ (see for example, 
Levinger and Schneider, 1969). As a former extremist from the North West of England 
confirmed:  
 
‘…there are individuals over the years who are veterans of Afghanistan, eight, 
nine, ten years. They have a lot of impact, a lot of credibility amongst a certain group of 
people…’ (gee 796) 
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In addition, it is also beneficial for the ideologue, and in fact other influential members of 
the cluster such as the ‘ringleader’, to display certain personality traits. The empirical 
data found that these traits had the potential to further solidify the ‘identification’ between 
the radicalisee and radicaliser. One of the widely cited qualities highlighted in the data 
was charisma. As one informed informant, and former extremist, from London outlined, 
‘I’ve met [extremist ideologues], they can speak well, they’re very charismatic [and] 
people like to be around them. I felt that experience myself…’ (gee 897). Further, though 
society generally views these individuals with negativity, certain respondents commented 
on how some ideologues have ‘warm personalities’115. A former extremist commented on 
a particular extremist ideologue he had once met:  
 
 ‘…[he’s a] very charming bloke [and] you get enticed by him. I can see why the 
youngsters chased him, because he used to speak nicely to them. (exe 283) 
 
Finally, for the extreme ideologue and cluster ringleader there needs to be overt displays 
of fervour, as well as strong and interesting articulation of speech. They need to have, as 
one respondent put it, the ‘gift of the gab’ (gee 459). They are essentially like showmen, 
who have the ability to both rile and entertain their audiences. In this regard, there is little 
difference between them and Christian evangelical preachers or the front-men in rock 
bands. One former extremist from the West of England stated how passionate preachers 
on the internet, specifically YouTube, contributed to his radicalisation: 
 
‘…cos you see them angry and it makes you angry. You know how like a pep 
talk, like a coach might “psych” up his boxers. It kind of feels like that…’ (exe 999) 
 
6.6 Violent Extremism 
 
The arguments made in the previous section will resonate with certain members of the 
cluster; specifically those with a strong sense of moral outrage. The value moral outrage 
holds cannot be stressed enough, where those who become committed activists can be 
separated from those who remain affiliated for social and subcultural reasons. However, 
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this should be considered in conjunction with the arguments made in reference to 
McAdam’s (1986) aforementioned research. 
 
The committed activists that have internalised the use of violence as a legitimate tactic 
must now decide the best course of action. This does not insinuate they will necessarily 
believe conducting an act of terrorism in the UK is the best way to promote their agenda. 
As outlined by Silber (2011), they may decide that they can be of most use by travelling 
abroad to ascertain what groups like the Mujahedeen require in terms of supplies and 
resources. More likely, they will travel to a conflict zone and receive paramilitary training 
to join frontline fighters. However, once again, much of this is determined by the specific 
type of ideology they have internalised and where they deem they can add most value.  
 
General public perception of AQ and AQI terrorist organisations primarily affiliates them 
with terrorist attacks in the West. However, there are relatively large numbers of people 
who travel abroad to participate in ‘jihad’; which concerns more conventional methods of 
warfare. As with suicide terrorism, there is a belief that dying in conventional warfare will 
also bring with it the status of ‘martyr’; which affords the same benefits discussed above. 
 
There needs to be a consideration of how the landscape has changed post-9/11. Before 
this point, it was deemed easier to recruit Muslims in the West to fight in conflicts abroad. 
As mentioned in the Introductory chapter, some even claimed the UK government turned 
a blind eye to this type of activity as long as it did not become a target116. Post-9/11, the 
situation has changed where it has been far more difficult to recruit fighters from the UK, 
where this activity has been pushed underground: 
 
‘Late ‘80’s, early ‘90’s which was really when I came into the whole thing…it was 
so easy to go to a camp. There were droves of people who [went] to camps…and we 
had handlers…who we go through and we’ll go to [the] Kunar province in Afghanistan, 
do two weeks training there on arms training, small arms training and basic military 
training, you know what, everyone turned a blind eye, totally actively done…Then [in] the 
late ‘90’s things start changing…’ (gee 796) 
 
                                                 
116
 For a more detailed discussion, see: Laqueur (2004); Briggs et al. (2006); Phillips (2007). 
 195 
Although recruitment may have become more difficult and numbers may have reduced, 
this does not mean it has stopped altogether. The British domestic Security Service, MI5, 
estimated in 2009 that around 4000 British Muslims had travelled to the Af-Pak region for 
military training (Sengupta, 2009; Razaq, 2009). Some argue that the trend is shifting to 
the Maghreb, the Horn of Africa, and other states such as Syria, where there are thought 
to be growing numbers of British and European fighters involved (Zelin, 2013; Pantucci, 
2013).   
 
There has already been a discussion, in the previous section, relating to the factors and 
influences which are critical in moving the radicalisee towards violent extremism. There 
also needs to be consideration of the wider influences on them. This primarily concerns 
these radicalisees, through violent extremism, satisfying both their subcultural desires 
and masculinity needs.  
 
6.6.1 Subculture, Social Identity and Masculinity 
 
Considering Howard Becker’s (1963) seminal work on subculture, it can be determined 
that those labelled as ‘outsiders’ have a need to hold a distinct identity and be original. 
Even though much of radicalisation may well be about social networks and the other 
common cited issues covered in this thesis, at its core it is about individuals changing 
how they present themselves. It is also about how they construct their perception of their 
public and private ‘self’, as discussed by Goffman (1961). In addition, this concerns the 
impact of acquiring a set of motivations where extremists believe they are right with their 
cause and, as with Becker’s musicians, better than the rest of society. 
 
With the group’s cause also comes a sense of honour. Much of this is derived from the 
belief that as well as saving the lives of fellow Muslims, they are also rescuing Islam from 
the tyranny of the West. Within this, there also needs to be the serious inclusion of 
subcultural and masculinity considerations. Being part of an underground group taking 
on the ‘mighty West’ is extremely appealing to some, and they believe they are in a 
‘David and Goliath’ type situation (exe 283). Being fearless is considered to be highly 
admirable and this goes towards strengthening both their message and ideals. A former 
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extremist outlined how they, the extremists, see the various Muslim ‘armies’ around the 
world as brave heroes:  
 
 ‘…to fight for Allah, you feel they’re holy warriors, they don’t fear death. I mean 
that’s an admirable thing…They’re marching in with rags on their heads fighting against 
the latest military technology…If they die then they’re in paradise…So you feel real great 
respect and want to be part of that…’ (exe 999) 
 
In the previous chapter, some of the grassroots workers discussed the role of ‘militancy’, 
though in the context of generational interpretations as opposed to the more commonly 
accepted definition. As well as the connotations this has with masculinity, their affiliation 
with violent extremism also arouses the radicalisee’s sense of excitement; mentioned by 
over a third of informed informants, including three former extremists. This excitement is 
attached to certain physical activities. It is about being grouped with likeminded people in 
military type environments which offers the chance for adventure. When this is coupled 
with the prospect to handle powerful military hardware it becomes especially appealing 
to certain people. This featured strongly in Omar’s account and contributed towards his 
search for ‘jihad’ in Afghanistan:  
 
 ‘I was very similar when I was nineteen, there’s a chance for adventure…I got 
some military action and we fired guns, Kalashnikovs, M16s, hand grenades, 36mm 
canon and all this stuff, incredibly exciting. It would give you an adrenaline rush…’ 
(Omar) 
 
This excitement is also attached to being part of a group which offers these individuals 
with some sort of escapism from their previously normal and mostly predictable lives. It 
is not difficult, without sympathising or empathising, to see the appeal young individuals 
may have with becoming involved with extreme groups. It may be as simple as one day 
having a conventional life which is about university, work and family, to then being part of 
a ‘revolutionary’ network which has global aspirations.  
 
In addition, being part of a covert group which attempts to evade police and intelligence 
services is appealing for some. They attend clandestine meetings where conversations 
 197 
focus on how to destabilise the West. This was experienced by a former violent extremist 
from London:  
 
 ‘…many meetings took place, we went to many places, clandestine meetings, 
very secretive, very private…after a while it became exciting to the point where it was 
adventurous, you know, something different…it was like basically what we were looking 
for.’ (gee 997) 
 
This, and some of the other emotional dynamics mentioned within this thesis are also 
discussed by Jack Katz (1988) in his book, ‘Seductions of Crime’. Katz argues that in the 
case of ‘sneaky thrills’, criminals may not just be involved for the end product, but also to 
escape from their normally mundane lives (ibid: 74-75). Further, he stresses that the 
emotive attachments to crime must also be considered. Within this context, it can be 
understood that the radicalisee goes through some strong emotions. First, this concerns 
anger and sadness, from watching fellow Muslims being attacked through various digital 
outlets, or from the first-hand accounts of those who have personally experienced some 
type of distress. These emotions then become happiness, joy, a sense of revenge and 
jubilation when they witness videos of Muslims blowing up Western tanks, for example. 
Finally, they shift to excitement when considering themselves to part of a very select and 
covert group which is, as stated by the respondent above, ‘taking on the might of the 
West’. Similarly, Ferrell (1996) outlines the significance of ‘risk’ and ‘danger’ in shaping 
participation and membership in deviant and criminal subcultures, which ‘seduce recruits 
into continued sub-cultural participation’ (Ferrell, 1999: 404).  
 
6.7 Terrorism in the West 
 
As a consequence of some of the arguments presented in the thesis so far, some cluster 
members will travel abroad to participate in ‘jihad’. As discussed, this has become an 
increasingly difficult task, and it is now about ‘who you know’ through social networks. 
These groups are more cautious since the ‘War on Terror’ began and only accept those 
they know and trust. One respondent even referred to it as an old boys’ network’ (res 
985). Those that do make it there may find themselves fighting on the frontline with 
likeminded individuals. However, there is also the possibility they will be informed that 
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there are enough ‘soldiers’ to fight and the best way to support the ‘cause’ is to go back 
to their home countries in the West, where they have a depth of familiarity, and conduct 
their own missions117 118. 
 
This will appeal to some, but make others rethink their stance on extremism; as was 
reflected in Omar’s journey to the tribal regions of Afghanistan. He resigned prematurely 
from his career in violent extremism due mainly to a change in ideology – which started 
to legitimise the killing of innocent Western citizens – by some of the ideologues he was 
affiliated to in Afghanistan. This was conflicting to the ideology he and his friends had 
internalised where they believed it was morally and religiously acceptable to participate 
in the Afghan War as it represented conventional warfare though did not legitimise killing 
civilians. A former extremist raised similar sentiments: 
 
 ‘I didn’t agree with killing civilians really. But fighting against an army, I’ve never 
heard of any religion in the world that condemns fighting against an army…I know Islam 
says you can fight war, democracy says you can fight war, that’s why we’ve got troops in 
Afghanistan and Iraq right now.’ (exe 999) 
 
The attacks on 7/7, which were in Omar’s hometown, compounded his concern of killing 
civilians. His opinions on participating in ‘conventional warfare’ also started to become 
reassessed. This, Omar explained – and agreed upon by other former violent extremists 
in the study – was due to him personally witnessing the horrors of war and death: 
 
 ‘…because I’m a little bit older now I can say that, young people don’t see that, 
especially if they had an easy upbringing in this country…[I have] been through war and 
seen how terrible it can be…Because the kids here have no idea of history or haven’t 
seen war or death first-hand…’ (Omar) 
 
                                                 
117
 For a more detailed discussion, see: Silber (2011). 
118
 This was also deemed to be the case with Mohammed Sidique Khan. In the home video 
recordings he made for his baby daughter before his departure to the Af-Pak region, Khan talks in 
a way which infers he would not see her again. This implies that he originally went abroad to 
conduct ‘jihad’, rather than planning an attack on the West. It was reported that the original plan 
changed within days of Khan arriving in Pakistan (BBC News, 2011). The videos can be seen at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fGoL_e9jAe8 and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12621381. 
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These respondents deeply believed in the ‘covenant of security’ paradigm which acted to 
prohibit them even considering attacking civilians in the UK. This is a concept members 
of the cluster could have internalised and is something their ideologue, either in the UK 
or abroad, needs to remove. The most common argument used by the ideologue which 
‘legitimately’ overrules the ‘covenant of security’ belief is the concept of ‘Dar ul-Harb’119. 
As a very brief explanation, Dar ul-Harb refers to a ‘land of war’ or ‘state of war’, where 
countries like the UK are considered to be legitimate targets due to their involvement in 
conflicts within Muslim lands. When this is combined with a misconstrued understanding 
of the Ummah, they believe that if war is declared on one Muslim state then this is a war 
on Islam itself. Therefore, if Muslims reside in certain Western states then by default 
these places become legitimate battlefields. This is combined with the distortion of other 
Islamic belief such as self-defence; as a community member from the West of England 
explained: 
 
 ‘In Islam there exists basically a law where it is explained in the Quran, there is a 
strong calling to self-defence and some people they distort the meaning of that.’ (cms 
385) 
 
Another told of an additional doctrine misconstrued and used by jihadis: 
 
‘…the Quran comes and tells you that [recites an Arabic phrase], “you can fight 
those who fight you” and these people are fighting [recites an Arabic phrase], “fight them 
as a whole as they fight you”, collectively and you fight as a whole so you need to have 
an Islamic unity.’ (gee 709) 
 
However, they also need to overcome the moral concern of killing innocent people. Much 
of this can be reduced through some of the concepts outlined within Sykes and Matza’s 
(1957) ‘techniques of neutralization’ theory, and the rest through religious scripture. The 
radicalisees are, as explained by Sageman (2008), reassured through religious doctrine 
that the innocent victims that die as a result of their attack will be rewarded in paradise. 
A former extremist from London outlined these concerns: 
 
                                                 
119
 For a more detailed discussion on ‘Dar ul-Harb’, see: Baker (2009, 2011). 
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‘…inherently people know that killing women and children is wrong…That 
mindset has changed in the individual who’s gonna take radical actions. He removes the 
natural moral criteria he has, he’s not immoral, he’s not a bad person, he’s amoral in the 
normal sense because he doesn’t have normal morality. He only has scripture to tell him 
what is right and what is wrong… (gee 709) 
 
Conducting an act of terrorism will resonate with those who are not able to counter the 
arguments presented to them. They will travel back to the West with these intentions and 
attempt to convince the other cluster members, who did not travel with them, that this is 
the best way to further their cause. They will specifically target those they feel will be the 
most open to this type of action. Within the research conducted by Simcox et al. (2011) 
on British terrorists, it was found that although only 28% had attended training camps in 
countries outside of the UK, at least one person in six out of the eight major terrorist cells 
they analysed had done so. In addition, it needs to be considered that there is also the 
possibility that likeminded people from the same country in the West will meet on these 
trips abroad.  
 
Finally, as mentioned before, there will be instances where the individual or cluster has 
already conceived a plot to attack a Western target. They may then go abroad in search 
of direction and/or training (e.g. bomb making). They may even be looking to attain some 
type of funding; similar to Dhiren Barot who was convicted of plotting an attack in the 
financial district of New York. Interestingly, Silber (2012) likens these people to ‘venture 
capitalists’. Whichever route they take, those who are part of a cluster and agree to 
attack the West will form a ‘cell’. Those that do not internalise the religious and moral 
legitimisation given to them will cease to become affiliated.  
 
6.7.1 Jihadi Cell Formation and Active Support 
 
The formation of a ‘jihadi cell’ plotting to attack a Western target can comprise of three of 
four different types of personnel. The first is the inner core of the group who will progress 
to carry out the attack. Some of them will have been part of the original cluster. They 
may have been friends for many years, have become acquainted at university, or met 
through their former extremist group and remained together due to their convergence in 
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similar ideologies. Silber (2011) provides the analogy of a cell with a nucleus and argues 
that within this inner core is the ‘active core’. These are the one or two people who are 
fundamental to the particular plot and without them it does not necessarily take place. 
They are the ones that have travelled abroad and received instructions to attack the 
West, or who have been at the centre of conceiving these types of plots. They are the 
ringleaders of the group.  
 
Surrounding the inner core is the outer core, or the ‘inner circle and outer circle’ as one 
former extremist described it (gee 459). They give tacit and tangible support to the inner 
core, such as providing money or organising logistics. The cell’s ideologue, whose role 
has been discussed previously, also sits at this level. This structure was confirmed by a 
grassroots worker from the North East of England: 
 
‘…the structure of jihadist groups in the UK where basically you had the emir, you 
had some “daees”, which are callers…you had followers…’ (gee 796) 
 
It is important to focus on a point made by a respondent when discussing the role of the 
cell’s ideologue. It is generally thought that the ideologue provides guidance, in whatever 
form, all the way through to the implementation of the attack. However, this interviewee, 
a senior intelligence official from the US, made a very interesting argument from his vast 
experience of dealing with AQ and AQI terrorism in the West. He explained how the 
ideologue is present during the initial formation of the cluster, though as it progresses 
and moves towards becoming a cell the ideologue is discarded as their knowledge is 
shown to be minimal. This role is taken on by another member in the group, possibly the 
ringleader. This may occur at any point and therefore some of the tasks undertaken by 
the ideologue, as discussed in various points previous, may have been completed by the 
person who took over this role. Similarly, although the term ‘ideologue’ is continued to be 
used in this chapter, it may refer to the old ideologue or the new one, which is dependent 
on the particular situation of the cell:  
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‘The pattern that I have seen time and time again is that the ideologue ends up 
being a person around who the cluster might form…[then] certain members of the cluster 
begin to challenge if not surpass the ideologue in terms of their knowledge…and the 
ideologue becomes increasingly sidelined and most importantly when the group begins 
to move towards an operation, in most cases…the ideologue is left out of the operation.’ 
(hri 707) 
 
He continued: 
 
 ‘They had already adopted that ideology, so they no longer needed the validation 
from these other individuals and they may be even perceived as having some kind of 
operational liability’ (ibid) 
 
Moving on, these ‘followers’, or supporters, do not engage in violence and remain on the 
periphery for many reasons. For one, they may not be deemed to be ‘committed’ enough 
by the rest of the cell (gee 796). More often than not, these supporters in the outer core 
will be close friends and family members of the inner core and will do everything they 
can to help their friends and loved ones through the emotional ties they have developed. 
Though, this does not necessarily infer they agree with their violent ideologies, or are 
even completely aware of the plot. They may simply be helping a friend out and might 
know something is going on: 
 
 ‘…there [are] guys who have come up from places like Burnley, Blackburn and 
other places, guys who have come up from London because they were getting harassed 
by intelligence or Counter-Terrorism Units…So they leave London and come up to the 
North and people are helping them out and putting them up and that sort of stuff…’ (grw 
894) 
 
If they are aware of the plot, they may support it due to them identifying with the strains 
and grievances discussed in the early chapters of this thesis; though have not gone 
through the same process of conversion as those who will go on to enact violence. 
Those who support these terrorist activities through some form of economic or logistical 
support are given specific roles by the ringleader and failure to adhere to them will result 
in the plot not occurring. This is similar to many types of organisations, where different 
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members of the team, from the cleaners, IT technicians, up to the MD have their own 
roles to play and without them the running of the organisation may suffer in some small 
or major way. One former violent extremist from London stated how those within jihadi 
cells are, ‘signposted to do [a] job’ (gee 997), with another grassroots worker adding:  
 
 ‘…people recognise you in the group as either having the most knowledge or the 
most fervour or the most, you know, the best fighter…’ (gee 796) 
 
There are then those who were part of the original cluster, before it became a cell, who 
do not completely buy into the notion of ‘self-sacrifice’, as they may not have internalised 
the ‘us vs. them’ argument in its entirety, or are not as affected by the moral outrage 
argument as others. They may still be affiliated with the cell, in some way, in order to 
maintain previous relationships and to continue to satisfy their social and subcultural 
desires. If they haven’t fully internalised the ideologies and do not completely agree with 
the use of violence, they may also remain affiliated with the group as they do not want to 
be seen as disobedient. Disobedience is quite a difficult task once people get beyond 
certain stages and have various factors impinging on them. Milgram (1974: 26) argues 
that the person’s ‘moral concern’ shifts away from the actions, to ‘a consideration of how 
well he is living up to the expectations that the authority has of him’120.  
 
The idea of disobedience, not only to authority but also the movement and its ideologies, 
can be applicable to any member of the cluster, cell, or even the ideologue themselves. 
Although this was mentioned only by a couple of respondents it merits the need to be 
briefly discussed. One grassroots worker from London explained how he suspected 
certain extreme preachers he had personally encountered did not fully agree with the 
extreme ideologies they were espousing. He argued, ‘it might have even been the case 
that some of them didn’t even fully believe some of the things that they said’ (grw 662). 
This was confirmed by a researcher from London who explained how he had been 
informed by four personally respected independent sources that Abu Hamza al-Masri 
believed the 9/11 attacks were ‘wrong’ and against Islamic principles. It was claimed that 
Hamza felt extremely aggrieved that Islam was considered to be a religion that targeted 
                                                 
120
 For an interesting discussion of authority and obedience, see Hannah Arendt’s (1963) account 
of Adolf Eichmann. 
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innocent women and children. However, he kept his thoughts relatively private as he did 
not want to appear as a defector. The researcher explained: 
 
‘He actually said 9/11 was wrong, and he continues to say it. But he wouldn’t say 
it out publically because he doesn’t want to be splitter in that sense, he doesn’t want to 
be a traitor. He says theologically its wrong…the fact of the matter is most of these guys 
are religious people and they don’t want to think that their religion justifies killing 
innocent women and children…and most of them are troubled by this…’ (res 985) 
 
There also needs to be consideration pertaining to the ‘sequential nature of the action’. It 
is clear from this thesis that radicalisation is an incremental change in belief and action. 
There is no immediate shift from ‘normal’ to ‘extremist’. Those small increments in 
change are justified in the mind of the participant and they gradually move towards a 
more extreme stance. This involves the build up of prior actions in order to conduct the 
next which creates binding conditions. Breaking off would insinuate that everything the 
individual has done until that point to be wrong, and if they decide to continue, then 
reassurances are provided by past actions for future ones (Milgram, 1974). This was 
also represented in the empirical data:  
 
 ‘…you would hardly be in a group where [any of] them were saying “yeah we’re 
wrong. What were we doing for the last five years or six years? It was a waste of time”, 
you know, they’re gonna bring in that safety mechanism. So psychologically that’s gonna 
try and reaffirm or try and console in their mind…’ (grw 502) 
 
Similarly, some of these individuals may have dedicated much time and resources to 
their particular group and cause. This may have included sacrificing their social ties with 
friends and family, and possibly even their careers. Similar arguments can be found 
when referring back to Erving Goffman’s (1961: 25) account of ‘mental patients’, where, 
‘Although some roles can be re-established by the inmate if and when he returns to the 
world, it is plain that other losses are irrevocable…It may not be possible to make up, at 
a later stage of the life cycle, the time not now spent in educational or job advancement’. 
 
Finally, these individuals may agree with others’ use of violence, though might simply be 
scared of becoming involved in it themselves. They know that participating in ‘jihad’ on 
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the battlefields abroad may bring with it a large chance of them dying, or a certain death 
if they become involved in a suicide mission at home. As demonstrated with the case of 
Adam and Omar, Omar embraced death and considered ‘jihad’ to be a privilege, whilst 
Adam, on the other hand, was deeply concerned about the loss of his own life. Although 
Adam had not reached the same point of radicalisation as some of the cell’s associates 
have, they may not accept the ideologue’s claims of rewards in the afterlife as there is no 
tangible evidence to prove this. There is also the possibility that although they give the 
impression of being so, they are not as religious or believe in God as much as others do. 
They do not want to therefore risk their lives on something they cannot guarantee. They 
could still feel some of the strains and some sort of moral outrage and want to be of 
service, though maintain enough of a distance to the actual plot; either through personal 
choice or something enforced by the cell itself. This goes to explain why so many people 
on the periphery, including on many occasions the cell’s ideologue, will not be charged 
under any type of terrorism offence as there is not enough evidence to convict them 
(Silber, 2011). 
 
6.7.2 Organisational Headhunting 
 
Jihadi cells are fully aware of the importance of having a complete and capable skill set 
in order to effectively conduct their proposed attack. This could relate to their ability to 
conduct reconnaissance missions without detection or being able to build certain types 
of devices due to their specific education, such as a degree in engineering, for example. 
This is particularly important if they are planning to use explosives as part of their attack. 
A former high-ranking police officer interviewed during the data collection alluded to this 
very concern:  
 
 ‘Let’s say 7/7, clearly it was successful because the skills were sufficient, not just 
the bomb making skills but the whole [plot]…and 21/7 was unsuccessful and yet maybe 
the skills around 21/7, maybe they only just fell a little bit short…[so] you’ve high calibre 
figures who are interested in people’s skills…’ (hrp 740) 
 
Once a jihadi cell has been established, if there are gaps or vacancies available then it is 
possible that the cell will ‘headhunt’ potential employees. This normally occurs through a 
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search within their existing social networks. However, if this does not yield any positive 
results, they may look further afield for potential recruits.  
 
Around twenty percent of informed informants outlined how they had witnessed, through 
their own work at the grassroots level, members of groups such as HT and AM being 
‘headhunted’ by jihadi recruiters. Jihadi ‘head-hunters’ will attend meetings, events and 
conferences held by other extreme groups in order to pull certain individuals into their 
networks. They favour going to gatherings held by extremist groups, as opposed to the 
ones attended by the general Muslim population, as they understand that the members 
of extreme groups will have reached a certain depth in their radicalisation. As has been 
alluded to at numerous points in this thesis, simply because someone is Muslim does not 
make them more susceptible to extremism. Further, attending gatherings held by normal 
Muslim communities also poses the risk of them becoming identified and being reported 
to the police. Thus, it can be said, in order to find the most suitable employee, they look 
for certain qualifications and experience:  
 
 ‘What happens is sometimes some of their people in their group would go to al-
Muhajiroun meetings to look out for certain individuals, right, that maybe don’t want to be 
there [and] want to be somewhere else. [They are], sort of, bringing them into their own 
networks… the younger guys they’ll get pulled out into different networks…so he’ll be 
talent spotted by certain people and then be pulled out and taken for training…’ (gee 
997) 
 
If the jihadi recruiter has never met the individual they may have little way of identifying if 
they will subscribe to violent ideologies. From the informal conversations held between 
various informed informants and the researcher, it was claimed that jihadis will look out 
for certain types of behaviour when at these events. These potential recruits are usually 
selected from those that ask questions about violence and terrorism and are confident 
enough to publically challenge their current group’s ideologies; as the jihadis may have 
once done themselves. The jihadi recruiter will approach the individual after the event 
and strike up a conversation. If they are deemed to hold enough potential to join the cell 
they will be invited to certain ‘closed circle’ meetings with the group and their ideologue. 
At this point the jihadis will not mention anything to do with violence, but simply attempt 
to gauge the individual’s long-term potential. This is exciting for the individual, something 
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that also massages their ego as from their perception, as with normal careers, it is very 
satisfying being headhunted by another organisation.  
 
However, the jihadi head-hunters are extremely cautious about who they bring into their 
network, whether this be new recruits or old friends. Although the majority of the cell’s 
inner core could be formed organically, there is still a selective process in place. Simply 
because they are close friends with someone does not necessarily immediately facilitate 
them into the inner core of the cell. The situation is very serious at this point and they are 
fully committed to participating in some form of action. There has been a considerable 
move away from non-violent activism which they participated in with their former extreme 
group. All of the cell’s members are required to show a strong devotion to the cause, a 
commitment to the use of violence if necessary, a depth of intelligence, and a level of 
maturity. If a member of the cell is immature and are affiliated for subcultural reasons 
and to improve their social status, they may give away the plot or cause undue attention 
to the cluster by bragging about their involvement: 
 
 ‘…the one who’s not speaking, not too vocal, is quietly working away in some 
little corner in a room somewhere is far more dangerous, in my opinion, than the mouthy 
youngster, eighteen or twenty [years old], who’s walking down the street…’ (rmc 737) 
 
This alludes to a wider argument which highlights the animosity between these different 
types of groups. It also demonstrates that contrary to public perceptions of these types of 
groups working together, they are actually in rivalry with one another; as mentioned at 
various points of the chapter. This is particularly the case with the jihadi cells, as there is 
a belief that they are involved in actions which have a real potential of yielding tangible 
results. They perceive these types of groups to simply be ‘loudmouths’ and a ‘joke’121 
(gee 897), with no identifiable way to achieve their goals. They also believe that these 
other groups are simply hungry for media attention, which leads to an enhancement of 
counter-terrorism funds. Consequently, this increases the chances of the jihadi cell being 
detected: 
 
 
                                                 
121
 For further information, see Footnote 104. 
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 ‘…there are many people that I work with right, that have been involved in violent 
extremism and potential terrorist activities that say we would run a mile when we have 
Hizb ut-Tahrir or al-Muhajiroun, because they are attracting too much attention’ (gee 
997) 
 
This rivalry was brought into sharp focus by a researcher from London. After conducting 
his own ethnographic research on the 7/7 bombers, he discovered that a member of HT 
was allegedly physically assaulted by Mohammed Sidique Khan’s group:  
 
‘…I heard a HT guy went to Beeston and got beaten up by Mohammed Sidique 
Khan’s guys…’ (res 985) 
 
This further strengthens the argument regarding the difficulty for outsiders to join the cell 
or cluster, as they are extremely selective in their choice of who they feel is suitable and 
trustworthy. Even internally, those members that do not pass the stringent commitment 
requirements will be dropped. This can be linked to Goffman’s (1961) aforementioned 
theory of ‘primary and secondary’ adjustments. Thus, there will be those who are simply 
affiliated to satisfy their social and subcultural desires. On the other hand there will be 
others who have internalised the extreme ideologies, are fully committed to the cause, 
and will do whatever is necessary to achieve their goals. 
 
6.8 Concluding Remarks 
 
Prior to the conversion process of radicalisation it can be assumed that the radicalisee is 
pulled by two competing forces; this being Western society and the traditional Islam their 
parents practise. Though, during the conversion process there is also the pull exerted by 
the radicaliser and/or extreme group, as represented in the diagram below:  
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Radicaliser/Extreme Group          Traditional Islam 
 
 
Diagram 2: Competing Forces 
 
The radicaliser’s aim is to remove the influences of the other competing forces, and this 
is undertaken through instilling a form of wrap around social control. It is at this point that 
conversion can effectively start to take place. This primarily occurs through mortification 
and reconstruction of the radicalisee’s self and social identity, which is carried out by the 
radicaliser. The conversion process does not imply there to be no individual action or 
resistance, nor does it imply that this process is deterministic no matter who the person 
is. Individual agency does matter, and radicalisees are able to interact with this structure 
and attempt to negotiate with this position. Goffman’s (1961) account of moral career 
occurs in a total institution where social isolation can be maximised and enforced to a 
high degree. However, as violent extremist radicalisation (of the type being explored in 
this study) does not occur within the confines of a total institution, there are no physical 
barriers and so the social distance caused by the radicaliser will more often than not 
have some sort of limit. As a result, there is always the opportunity for outside influences 
to affect the radicalisee; whether this is an influence which brings them away from 
extremism, or in fact takes them in a different direction. Without this, there would be no 
opportunity for de-radicalisation to take place, for example. 
 
The radicalisation process described until this juncture is generic for most, if not all, 
extreme groups within the UK. The pool of recruits at this point will be of varying sizes 
dependent on the type of extreme group they are a part of. The empirical data showed, 
with the supplementation of wider literature, that certain jihadis in the West start off their 
careers in extremism in groups like HT and AM. They then begin to gravitate away from 
that group’s ideologies and increasingly towards supporting the use of violence as a 
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legitimate means for achieving their goals. Thus, they form and grow organically through 
friendships and a commonality in ideology and form their own cluster. Some members of 
this cluster – if they internalise the relevant ideologies and reduce both their moral and 
religious concerns regarding the killing of civilians – will form their own cell which will be 
committed to conducting an act of terrorism in the West.  
 
As one of the central themes in this thesis concerns the value of culture in radicalisation, 
it is fitting to end this empirical chapter on this note. Although the other topics discussed 
in the thesis are of critical value, the subcultural arguments are largely under-researched 
and need to be pushed to the fore. Thus, this is not just about the radicalisee adhering to 
their religious and moral duties towards ending the suffering of their fellow Muslims; or 
even just about the eternal rewards available to them as a result. It is also not just about 
them reacting to the emotive feelings from the moral outrage they are affected by. This is 
also about the excitement of being part of a covert group that is ‘taking on the might of 
the West’, feeling the honour of protecting Islam, and giving fuel to their own particular 
perceptions of masculinity. Being part of a group or network with global aspirations not 
only gives the radicalisee a strong sense of identity they so desire, it also provides them 
with the opportunity to leave behind their normal predictable lives. Within this extreme 
group they feel capable of achieving anything they set their hearts and minds to. In their 
own perceptions, they are the saviours of Islam, the protectors of Muslims, and ‘world-
savers’. 
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Chapter Seven: Theory, Practice and Policy 
 
This thesis has outlined a process of radicalisation derived from the empirical data. It is 
important to now bring together these arguments and discuss them in the context of how 
they apply to theory and practice. It is also critical to understand the role played by policy 
within this context.  
 
There are three career paths a potential radicalisee can engage in. These career paths 
are by no means deterministic and radicalisees are able to navigate through them like 
they would with any ‘normal’ career. This is one of the critical findings of the research. 
The first career path involves those who can be labelled as the ‘seekers’. These are the 
people who fully know and understand what they are getting into and actively search for 
extremist groups and networks.  
 
The second career concerns the ‘pretenders’. The individuals in this group are affiliated 
to extremism, though not because they necessarily identify with extreme ideologies. It is 
better to consider them as being ‘extremist by association’ to satisfy certain social and 
subcultural desires. However, this is not to assume that they do not identify, on some 
level, with certain extremist ideologies and causes. Alongside this social and subcultural 
affiliation, pretenders can be considered as ‘free-riders’ to reap the various benefits 
offered by extreme groups (Wiktorowicz, 2004, 2005). These include, as mentioned in 
previous chapters, a sense of belonging and identity, amongst others.  
 
The third career path refers to those individuals who are considered to be ‘drifters’, and 
are lulled and pulled into extremism. This group have been the primary focus of this 
research as they are the ones who are most affected by the strains discussed in the first 
empirical chapter, facilitated by the contingencies in the second, and identify with the 
arguments surrounding frame alignment proposed in the third. This is not to insinuate 
seekers will not have the same influences. The difference between the seekers and the 
drifters (and pretenders to some extent) is that the drifters are lulled and pulled into 
extremism through various influences, pressures and a form of wrap around social 
control. It is extremely important to consider that there is always the possibility that the 
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drifters could well have progressed to this point from being pretenders, or will have been 
influenced by the same social and subcultural considerations. 
 
These career paths represent different social processes of radicalisation. They need to 
be considered in relation to wider CT policy and how policy has developed and 
articulated the issue. The primary CT strategy of value within this context is the ‘Prevent 
Strategy’ (Prevent), which was conceived and implemented by the Labour government in 
2003. The inclusion of Prevent, a ‘softer’ approach within the UK’s wider CT strategy, 
can be deemed as somewhat innovative.  
 
The Prevent Strategy’s most notable change was in 2007 as a direct response to the 
growing threat of home-grown terrorism in the UK, and also as a reaction to the 7/7 
terrorist attacks in London (HM Government, 2007). Prevent was purportedly ‘based on 
a better understanding of the causes of radicalisation (the process by which people 
become terrorists or lend support to violent extremism), and [sought] to provide a 
coherent response’ through five main objectives122 which were supplemented by an 
additional two sub-objectives123 (HM Government, 2009: 12). The strategy’s principal 
aim was to implement a ‘community-led approach to tackling violent extremism’ by 
winning ‘hearts and minds’ and through the empowerment of local groups and 
communities to ‘stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism’ (HM 
Government, 2009: 11). This sentiment was felt more widely with certain commentators 
strongly believing communities to hold ‘the long-term solution to terrorism’ (Briggs, 2010: 
981). 
 
The strategy was delivered by key central government departments, local authorities, 
local community stakeholders, NGOs, and a multi-layered police response from a range 
of forces and departments (Innes and Thiel, 2008; Spalek et al., 2008; Kundnani, 2009). 
In terms of funding allocated to the strategy, around £51m was earmarked for selected 
local authorities to run their own projects (Kundnani, 2009). Many of these projects were 
                                                 
122
 (i) To challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices. (ii) 
Disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the places where they operate. (iii) 
Support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment, or have already been recruited by violent 
extremists. (iv) Increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism. (v) To address the 
grievances which ideologues are exploiting (HM Government, 2009: 12). 
123
 (i) Develop supporting intelligence, analysis, and information. (ii) Improve our strategic 
communications (HM Government, 2009: 12). 
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in partnership with, and provided funding to, ‘non-state actors’ (Briggs, 2010: 971). Non-
state actors were also funded directly through central government departments, such as 
the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism. 
 
Around two years after the release of the strategy, given the chance to understand how 
it was functioning, it received a swathe of criticism124 which primarily concerned how it 
was being implemented (Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2009; Spalek and Lambert, 2008; 
Bartlett and Birdwell, 2010; Khan, 2009). In addition, certain empirically based studies 
analysed ‘grassroots’ perceptions of the strategy (Lakhani, 2012; House of Commons, 
2010; Kundnani, 2009125). Communities’ concerns about Prevent (perceived or 
otherwise) have the strong potential to have a counter-productive effect on the strategy. 
Therefore, as well as analysing the effects of Prevent on radicalisation and vice-versa, it 
is also vital to understand how CT policy affects normal Muslim community members, as 
this will also have some impact on radicalisation. 
 
In this regard, the data found there to be a number of key issues relating to CT policy, 
though three were of particular prominence. This concerned how the strategy was being 
funded, the confusion between CT and community cohesion, and how it was accused as 
being a tool for spying on communities and collecting intelligence. This will be the focus 
of the second section of the chapter. At this early juncture, it must be noted that the 
empirical data discussed in this chapter relates to the version of Prevent released by the 
Labour government in 2007.  
 
Since the collection of this data took place, the Coalition Government released a revised 
version of the strategy in 2011. As with its predecessor, this version is not without its 
own issues and criticisms. These will be discussed in greater detail in the third and final 
section of this chapter through an in-depth analysis of the strategy and from drawing on 
wider literature. It is important to note, however, that some of the underlying arguments 
concerning Prevent 2007 will be applicable within the current context. These will also be 
considerations for future CT (and similar) policies and strategies. 
 
                                                 
124
 This refers to the more public criticism of the strategy, where in reality discussions of this 
nature were occurring before this point.  
125
 Kundnani’s (2009) research was widely deemed as initiating the more public debates around 
the issues. 
 214 
7.1 Extremist Careers 
 
The data strongly suggested there are three careers radicalisees can navigate through. 
The first career path consists of the seekers and concerns those who actively search for 
an extremist group, network or movement. This is not a feature documented within the 
empirical data or framework, but is a career pattern that has been identified based upon 
readings from the literature. One example of this, as demonstrated within the Literature 
Review chapter, concerns those individuals that become disenfranchised with something 
in their lives and seek new direction, which could eventually, depending on other factors 
such as social networks for example, be extremism (see for example Wiktorowicz, 2005; 
Silber and Bhatt). As with the other career paths, the seekers can be influenced by some 
similar issues. 
 
The second career path relates to those who are pretenders and are simply affiliated to 
extremism in order to satisfy certain social and subcultural desires. Therefore, it can also 
be said that these individuals are ‘extremist by association’. Those considered to be 
following this career path may or may not have any direct contact with other extremist 
individuals or groups. 
 
The third and final group have been labelled as the drifters and refers to those who are 
lulled and pulled into extremism through a combination of influence, social pressure, and 
subcultural and masculine desire, amongst others. It is important, once again, to mention 
the possibility that pretenders are able to progress to becoming drifters. In fact, there 
also exists the strong potential that some drifters are affected by both the social and sub-
cultural elements of extremism.  
 
The most pertinent example of subculture within the empirical data related to extremism 
being seen as a trend by certain Muslim young people in the UK. The data demonstrated 
that youths were forging links between extremism and developments in youth culture, or 
subculture (Becker, 1973). Those considered to be extremists were also perceived to be 
‘cool’. There is then the implication of some youths being pretenders or ‘extremist by 
association’, rather than being genuinely interested, at least initially, with some type of 
extremist cause or ideologies. Thus, in order to maintain this ‘satisfying self-defining’ 
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relationship they alter and develop their self and social identity depending on what they 
perceive others expectations to be. 
 
It must then be considered whether radicalisation is a unique social issue facing the UK 
and West more widely. Throughout history, every generation in society has encountered 
problems and concerns with its youth. The issue with radicalisation may then not be 
exceptional and the empirical data goes some way to demonstrate this. A number of the 
strains, grievances and contingencies discussed within the thesis are applicable to youth 
across the board, not just Muslim.  
 
There have been, throughout history, many instances of the rise and fall (and sometimes 
re-emergence) of youth cultures considered to be deviant. Pearson (1983), for instance, 
outlines many examples of deviant subcultures which have emerged at different periods, 
only to be forgotten once they cease to become popular, or when a new one emerges. 
The past is therefore seen as the golden era where the moral and social fabric of society 
was never as threatened as it is by the most current issue. 
 
In the UK, two of the most well-known youth subcultures to emerge were the ‘Mods and 
Rockers’. The two groups’ violent clashes across some of Britain’s most popular seaside 
resorts in the early to mid-1960s featured heavily in the media’s headlines and caught 
the attention of the public. This was the inspiration of Stanley Cohen’s (1972) book, ‘Folk 
Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers’. As a result of this, the 
term ‘moral panic’, although not conceived by Cohen, became widely used to describe 
various events, occurrences and developments in history. 
 
With certain Muslim youth in the UK being ‘pretend’ extremists, it can be determined by 
drawing from Cohen’s research that although society may be worried about their actions, 
they are also just as concerned about their identity, place in society and their outsider 
statuses126. The extensive media coverage on the situation, according to Cohen, gives 
the subculture, in the minds of those involved, credibility and authenticity, and it also 
makes their activities seem important. Cohen explains that those in this situation actually 
prefer negative coverage. This ties in with the arguments made in the previous chapters 
                                                 
126
 For a detailed discussion on ‘outsider’ statuses and society, see Becker (1973). 
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which concern perceived masculinity and being Muslim, and more recent understandings 
of the terms ‘militant’ and ‘militancy’.  
 
As a brief side issue, an interesting point is that although the role of ‘moral entrepreneur’, 
provided by Cohen (1972, 2002) and Becker (1973), is usually reserved for those within 
society who are opposed to the subculture, it can also be used, on occasion, for those 
within the subculture. In order to radicalise, those within extreme groups need to create a 
‘moral panic’, similar to what society has done over the decades. Generally speaking, a 
large proportion of society considers the West to be the force of good whilst the terrorists 
are seen as evil. However, radicalisees’ viewpoints on what is perceived to be good and 
evil are polarised. This relates back to the regularly cited quote, ‘one man’s terrorist is 
another man’s freedom fighter’. In regards to morality, these extremists believe they are 
striving for good, whilst most of the rest of society and the world are seen as a hindrance 
to this, or even evil. 
 
Reverting back to the conversation on certain Muslim young people being pretenders, 
Goffman (1951) alludes to similar arguments within his paper on the ‘Symbols of Class 
Status’. In this regard, Muslim youth are moving towards taking on particular stylistic 
traits without adopting the core ideals of extremism. Goffman’s paper is concerned with 
the different statuses people hold within society and how they ‘visibly divide the social 
world into categories of persons’ (ibid: 294). Goffman is especially concerned with the 
discrepancy between perceived and actual statuses, and ‘…the pressures that play upon 
behaviour as a result of the fact that a symbol of status is not always a very good test of 
status’ (ibid: 295). Similarly, those who are pretenders are by no means representative of 
those who are extreme. However, it is once again important to reiterate the possibility of 
the pretenders being able to progress to becoming drifters.  
 
The ‘drifter’, or the ‘pretender’, is in direct contact with a radicaliser or an extremist group 
through their social networks. Those deemed to be committed, or show potential, are 
now distinct from those who will simply remain ‘extremist by association’. However, it is 
important to note that this is not as clear-cut, as non-violent extremist groups in the UK 
will be plentiful with those who seem to be committed to the particular cause, though are 
only involved to satisfy certain cultural, social and subcultural needs. Thus, Kelman’s 
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(1958) ‘compliance’ and ‘identification’, rather than ‘internalization’, concepts hold much 
importance here, as do Goffman’s (1961) ‘primary and secondary adjustment’ theories. 
 
What is common across the different career paths is, similar to Becker’s (1973) work on 
‘outsiders’, being part of an extreme group allows individuals to forge an identity which 
defines themselves as being different to others. This links into the empirically made 
argument regarding each extreme group considering themselves to be the vanguard of 
Muslims and Islam (Wiktorowicz, 2005; Sageman, 2008; Werbner, 2004; Mirza et al., 
2007). This needs to be considered with them feeling better than all others and the rest 
of society, and in fact other Muslims and extremist groups. 
 
Sunstein (2002) explains that with members of a group with a shared sense of identity, 
especially one that diverges from societal norms and is considered as deviant, there will 
be an increase in ‘polarization’, i.e. from mainstream society. Through the use of various 
concepts like ‘categorisation’, ‘social identification’ and ‘social comparison’, the group 
adopts a ‘we’ stance and favours members of the in-group, and express discrimination, 
negativity and hostility towards the out-group (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). If the individual 
remains committed to just one group and relies on them for their ‘self-concept’ and ‘self-
esteem’, they will to do whatever they can to retain membership (Stahelski, 2004).  
 
In terms of the drifters, or those progressing this way from being pretenders, the process 
of mortification and reconstruction is critical with persuading them that an ‘us vs. them’ 
scenarios exists. Goffman (1961: 57) describes this ‘reorganizing influence’ as a 
‘fraternalization process, through which socially distant persons find themselves 
developing mutual support and common counter-mores in opposition to a system that 
has forced them into intimacy and into a single, equalitarian community of fate.’ 
Therefore, ‘A sense of common injustice and a sense of bitterness against the outside 
world tend to develop…’ (ibid: 58). 
 
In the ‘Concluding Remarks’ of the ‘Contingencies Chapter’, it was discussed that those 
who will remain pretenders are separated from the drifters. The analogy was used that, 
in essence, ‘the men are separated from the boys’. On reflection, this may have been 
used prematurely as there is the possibility of, as mentioned above, non-violent extreme 
groups containing those who are simply attempting to maintain a social and subcultural 
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position within their lives. This analogy may be better used to describe those radicalisees 
who are part of non-violent groups and become disenfranchised with the group and their 
strategies, and therefore gravitate away from them and adopt a more violent stance. It is, 
of course, dangerous to label these violent extremists as ‘the men’. It must be made 
clear, then, that this is not to give them some level of maturity, but more to highlight the 
difference between those willing to participate in non-risky activism, or that with minimum 
risk, with those who are prepared to risk and sacrifice their lives for their intended cause. 
Within this, differing ideologies and in how much depth they have been internalised plays 
an active and important role. However, if they have adopted a non-violent stance, this 
ideology can be questioned and dropped if they feel like it is not achieving any tangible 
results. The research showed this to be a decision point in the career of the extremist; 
though not necessarily a conscious one. 
 
These disenfranchised individuals may then gravitate towards an ideology that is violent 
in nature. This appears to predominantly affect those who are the most aggrieved by the 
moral outrage element of the conversion process. Thus, the data found that rather than 
groups like AM and HT being directly involved in acts of violence and terrorism, they are 
more likely to be stepping stones towards an ideology that espouses the personal use of 
violence for its adherents. However, once again, this should not be confused with these 
groups acting as conveyor belts to violence. Thus, some of those that do not agree with 
their current group’s ideologies will break off into their own clusters and gravitate towards 
the use of violence as a legitimate tactic to achieve their goals (Silber, 2011).  
 
In this regard, an original127 key finding from the research is that the newly formed cells 
may ‘headhunt’ new ‘employees’ when there is a specific vacancy available. This was 
particularly the case when they were plotting an attack against a target in the West, and 
deemed their knowledge and skill set to be insufficient in some area. This headhunting 
was accomplished through recommendations within their social networks and from also 
attending meetings and events held by other, usually non-violent, extremist groups in a 
bid to talent spot. Although this only occurs in a small number of cases, it is important to 
consider, as it can affect the way radicalisation is understood. 
                                                 
127
 Certain instances of ‘talent scouting’ have been briefly mentioned in context to Germany 
where individuals have been approached when attending an ‘Islamist mosque’ (Schindler, 2007: 
62); rather than being recruited from other extreme groups. 
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Thus, for an individual to be involved in the use of violence or terrorism, they need to be 
part of a group that espouses these types of ideologies. Even if they are considered to 
be what is widely termed as a ‘lone wolf’, they still need to adopt an ideology that allows 
and justifies the use of violence or terrorism. It is therefore imperative for any account of 
radicalisation to appreciate the role of ideology, including the vast differences and small 
nuances between the types adopted by various extreme groups.  
 
The empirical data also found that moral outrage and ideology alone are not enough for 
individuals to move between a non-violent and violent mindset. There was also the need 
for them to relieve their religious and moral concerns through the justifications given by 
their spiritual ideologue. In addition, they also need to feel like they are adhering to their 
moral and religious requirements.  
 
Focussing on the religious aspect, the use of Goffman’s (1961) moral career framework 
proved essential with moving the discussion away from religion driving radicalisation, to 
one that actually focuses upon it being a social process and a change in the individual’s 
identity. Therefore, an important point highlighted within the data was that although the 
radicalisee may embrace religion at any point of their extremist career, radicalisation is 
not fuelled by religious ideology and thus it cannot be considered as a causal factor. The 
value of religion can be seen with forming the foundation of a new identity and creating a 
sense of belonging (Choudhury, 2007; Taseer, 2005), when compounding the notion of 
moral outrage (through utilising the concept of Ummah), and, importantly, misconstrued 
religious identity provides the justification for committing terrorism (Githens-Mazer, 2010; 
Juergensmeyer, 2003; Wiktorowicz, 2004a, 2005; Toft, 2007; Sageman, 2008a). 
 
In terms of understanding the moral justification of violence further, the thesis found 
much merit with incorporating certain sociological concepts. For example, the use of 
Sykes and Matza’s (1957) ‘techniques of neutralization’ was important to determine how 
moral concerns about deviant behaviour can be counterbalanced. They argue there to 
be a number of ways by which deviants attempt to neutralise their moral concerns, as 
they are aware of their moral obligations to adhere to law and societal norms. Through 
these ‘techniques of neutralization’ the individual is ‘freed to engage in delinquency 
without serious damage to his self image. In this sense, the delinquent both has his cake 
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and eats it too, for he remains committed to the dominant normative system and yet so 
qualifies its imperatives that violations are “acceptable” if not “right”.’ (ibid: 667). 
 
Taking a slightly wider perspective, one important finding of the research was the value 
of subculture, social identity and masculinity with further understanding violence within 
this context. Thus, the use of violence is not simply just about attempting to save the 
lives of their fellow Muslims. There is also much excitement involved, especially if the 
individual is affiliated to a group that has been proscribed by the government, or even 
more if they are part of a jihadi cluster or cell. This inevitably provides escapism from 
their predictable lives and can be seen as ‘glamorous’ (Trevelyan, 2012; Secret, 2012). 
 
As briefly outlined in the Literature Review, certain research on violent crime and cultural 
criminology (more widely) shows the value of excitement (Ferrell, 1999; Katz, 1988). The 
emergence of concepts in cultural criminology, such as ‘edgework’, can further highlight 
the importance of adrenalin and masculinity within acts of crime and violence (Lyng, 
1990). Although earlier ideas regarding the concept were heavily criticised by feminist 
criminologists (Ferrell et al., 2008), the core of the theory may still yield some interesting 
insights. For example, it can be argued that people engage in extreme high risk taking in 
search of danger and excitement (Lyng, 1990). Importantly, researchers have found that 
those partaking in these acts are not ‘out of control’ nor do they possess a ‘death wish’ 
(Ferrell et al., 2008: 72).  
 
This subcultural affinity with extremism serves to quench the radicalisee’s thirst for a 
desire to adopt a masculine position, and also provides them with a narcissistic outlook. 
These individuals go from being Muslim, which sets them apart from the rest of society 
(Kraft et al., 2007), to part of a select and covert jihadi group which is trying to save the 
Muslim world from the tyranny of the West. Those who have trained abroad using 
military hardware come back to the West and talk about the adventure and excitement 
they have experienced. As Whittaker (2004) argues, the terrorist is orientated through 
action and stresses their keenness to find excitement. They even describe fighting with 
and for their Muslim kin as ‘romantic’ (Silber, 2011). This gives these individuals a sense 
of global importance and a purpose in life; one that has been provided to them through 
divine networks. This is something that constantly feeds their ego and makes them feel 
special. 
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However, this is not to insinuate that committing an act of violence or terrorism is easy. 
Collins (2008) found that even if an individual has strong motivations to conduct an act of 
violence the ‘micro-situational evidence, to the contrary, shows that violence is hard’ 
(ibid: 20). Further, it ‘is not an easy or automatic process, and it takes a lot to trigger it’ 
(ibid: 375); a notion agreed upon by others in the field such as Grossman (2001). The 
ability of human beings to conduct violent acts against one another depends on the 
‘social pressure and support in the background that pushes them into this situation’, with 
those with social support being the most likely to conduct acts of violence (Collins, 2008: 
77). However, there needs to be an understanding that social pressure and support 
alone will not be enough to convince the radicalisee to partake in violence. This notion 
needs to be considered in conjunction with the empirical findings pertaining to violence 
and terrorism within this research, as discussed above.   
 
When it comes to using suicide terrorism as a tactic there are various other elements to 
consider128. It needs to be asked whether suicide terrorism129 against civilians is easier 
to conduct, as compared to other forms of terrorism, such as the Mumbai attacks in 2008 
or the Westgate Mall attacks in Kenya in 2013? As outlined above, the use of violence is 
not an easy task to undertake but psychologically removing oneself from the action 
somewhat makes it easier. Therefore, is killing oneself so not to face the legal and moral 
consequences of one’s actions also a consideration, and one which is rational? In this 
regard, morally accepting the use of violence is one matter, but dealing with the 
psychological consequences after the act has been committed is very different. Does the 
use of suicide give these individuals a way to achieve their goals, attain their social and 
subcultural desires and gain their personal rewards in an instant, without having the guilt 
of conducting more commonly undertaken acts of murder?  
 
Thus, although suicide may initially appear to be the more psychologically difficult option, 
it may actually be one of the easiest. Collins (2008: 441) argues this by stating that, 
                                                 
128
 The reasoning behind why suicide is legitimised as a tactic has been outlined in various 
research, see: Pape (2006); Atran (2006); Hoffman (2006); Bloom (2007); Munir (2008); Taarnby 
(2003), for example. 
129
 Although suicide attacks account for a small minority of all terrorist attacks, they are 
‘responsible for the majority of all terrorism-related casualties’, and this phenomenon has grown 
exponentially globally (Atran, 2006: 127). Some argue that this may be due to the tactic being 
‘inexpensive and reliably lethal’ (Hoffman, 2003). There are also those who argue that suicide 
terrorism can be rationalised in an attempt to achieve the goals of the group (Wintrobe, 2003).  
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‘Suicide bombings are…psychologically the easiest to carry out as far as confrontational 
tension is concerned since there is not even a need to concern oneself with facing an 
audience while making an escape afterward’. Collins stresses how this explains why only 
a small minority of individuals are violent; as there is much difficulty in overcoming this 
confrontational tension/fear. They, of course, realise they are going to potentially take 
lives, though also know (whether subconscious or otherwise) that they will not have to 
deal with any confrontations or repercussions after the committing the act. This can be 
considered as a ‘buffer’, where Milgram (1974: 175) argues that there is ‘nothing more 
dangerous to human survival than malevolent authority combined with the dehumanising 
effects of buffers.’  
 
However, there also needs to be a consideration of these other types of attacks, such as 
in Mumbai in 2008. What is interesting about Mumbai, though, is that elements of the 
attack have parallels to the findings of this thesis. For example, Ajmal Kasab, who was 
the only surviving perpetrator of the attack before his execution, allegedly claimed during 
his first interrogation, ‘“It [jihad] is about killing and getting killed and becoming famous’” 
(Henderson, 2013). Kasab’s idea of ‘becoming famous’ relates to the social and sub-
cultural arguments made within this thesis, specially linking in to the ‘glamorous’ element 
of radicalisation (Trevelyan, 2012; Secret, 2012). Kasab’s words also indicate that he 
expected to die as part of the mission, which alludes, at least in his mind, to it being a 
suicide attack.  
 
More recently, there was the brutal murder of Drummer Lee Rigby in London. His killers 
demonstrated that the nature of the threat may be shifting from the globally connected 
type of planned attacks to ones that are organised more locally. Although the details of 
the incident are yet to be fully determined, it can be said that the nature of the Rigby 
murder had the hallmarks of a plot which was planned in a short space of time and only 
needed a widely available kitchen knife; as compared to the more sophisticated attacks 
on 7/7, for example. Thus, much of this may well have been attributed to a build up of 
feeling which led to it being more of an unplanned and emotional attack; something akin 
to certain theories presented by Katz (1988). 
 
Although the Mumbai attacks appear to have been far more planned than the murder of 
Rigby, for example, both still could represent the evolution of the threat. There are those 
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who feel there is a shift from transnational organised groups, to more self-starters and 
lone wolves, and smaller groups. These people are harnessing the internet130 as a tool 
to radicalise and using their own less sophisticated equipment; as outlined within a 
recent report published by David Anderson Q.C., an Independent Reviewer of Terrorism 
Legislation (Anderson, 2013).  
 
However, others throw caution to claims of future threats arising more locally and coming 
from self-starters. In a recent article in The Economist (2013b), it was argued that there 
has been a resurgence of AQ around the world of late. In fact, the article claimed that 
‘the terrorist network now holds sway over more territory and is recruiting more fighters 
than at any time in its 25-year history’. Thus, the argument that the ‘fight’ is much more 
local in the West may in fact be ‘mistaken’; with this resurgence of AQ suggesting that 
there could be a return of the type of threat we have been more used to (ibid). It may be 
important to consider both perspectives when attempting to understand and combat the 
threat; especially as there may be various overlaps. Both pose real risks to the UK and 
should be given due consideration.  
 
This section has outlined the three different career paths radicalisees can engage in and 
navigate through (i.e. the seekers, pretenders and drifters), where there is a potential for 
the seekers and drifters (including those who progress from being pretenders) to engage 
in acts of violence and terrorism. There has also been a brief discussion on how these 
careers relate to violence and where it is thought the threat is evolving to. These careers 
need to be considered in the wider context of CT policy and its implementation. This 
includes how it affects the nature of how and why people come to adopt an extreme 
position. Within this, it should also be considered how the shortfalls of certain CT policy 
can fail those who are susceptible to radicalisation and also the grassroots workers who 
are trying to counter the threat. 
 
 
 
                                                 
130
 It must be considered that although the prominence of the internet insinuates that these 
individuals are isolated from their immediate communities, it also provides the presence of an 
‘imagined community’ (Innes et al., 2007: 55-56). 
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7.2 Policy Considerations: The Prevent Strategy 2007 
 
Within the empirical data collected for the research, there was an overwhelming negative 
perception of the Prevent Strategy. Much of this alluded to how the strategy had been 
implemented. As well as giving their personal opinions, many of the respondents claimed 
this was also the feeling held by the ‘majority’ of the communities they represented. As a 
grassroots worker explained: 
 
‘…they [the government] are calling it preventing violent extremism, but behind it 
is something else which can be of harm to the Muslims. This is something which is 
engraved into the minds of the Muslims, the majority of Muslims in the UK…’ (grw 927) 
 
From the analysis of the empirical data, these concerns were found to gravitate around a 
number of different grievances. One issue related to how the strategy was being funded. 
Looking across the empirical data, there was a clear pattern evident where many 
respondents felt funding from Prevent had been ‘wasted’. In particular, money allocated 
to local authorities, some of which were used to create and fund partnerships with non-
State actors, was questioned. There was a general perception that many of the funded 
projects were far removed from the overarching aims of Prevent (that is, preventing 
violent extremism (PVE)), and were more concerned with general community cohesion 
type work. There was a distinct fear that projects of this nature misdirected effort and 
resources away from those who posed a threat to national security. For example, a 
former extremist from London who had allegedly met Germaine Lindsay, one of the 7/7 
bombers, on a number of occasions, argued: 
 
‘…you wouldn’t get Germaine Lindsay going to a community day…so these 
people who are wanting to be helped, they are not the activities they are into.’ (gee 897) 
 
These sentiments were supported by a young White convert from the West of England 
who was once part of both a far-right extreme group before his conversion to Islam and 
an AQI extreme group after. He argued that the strategy would not have made an impact 
on his radicalisation or extreme beliefs:  
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 ‘I even wanted to go to jihad at that point and if someone said to me “you know 
we’ve got this really good government organised Prevent thing”…that is no way gonna 
bring me away from extremism…’ (cms 722) 
 
This notion of ‘misuse’ of funding by largely irrelevant projects was due, according to the 
data, to a number of reasons. One of these was to do with the perception that there was 
a lack of knowledge and confidence within local authorities on how to allocate funding for 
projects run by non-State actors. Further, the local authorities were accused of funding 
groups with whom they already had established networks, regardless of whether these 
organisations had the capacity, knowledge or experience to achieve the aims of Prevent. 
There was a feeling that local authorities were opting to fund projects which seemed to 
be the safest, easiest and most risk-averse. This view was articulated by a researcher in 
London:  
 
‘…local government don’t feel nervous about doing that kind of stuff…[which] 
therefore allows local officials to do the stuff that’s easiest to do rather than stuff that’s 
gonna have the most impact…’ (res 492) 
 
Much of this concern stemmed from the local authorities’ lack of previous experience 
with this particular agenda. In addition, the data suggested disconnect between local and 
central government with a lack of specified guidance from central to local. As one senior 
local authority employee from London argued, ‘one of the big challenges we’ve had is 
that, [it] is the large element of just making it up as you go along…’ (lgc 700).  
 
Further, there were concerns that central government failed to assist in tailoring specific 
approaches with local authorities. The same employee continued, ‘the stuff that comes 
down centrally is a one size fits all expectation’ (ibid). This concern has been raised at 
various points throughout the thesis, where it was mentioned that a major issue with 
studying radicalisation was to do with the ‘one-size fits all’ approach so many working in 
this agenda appear to favour. A CT strategy adopting this approach will ensure there is a 
failure to appreciate some of the wider factors at play. There is much more complexity 
with understanding radicalisation than was depicted in this particular version of the 
strategy. For one, it does not appreciate the potentially different ways in which 
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individuals become affiliated or involved with extremism, i.e. as a seeker, pretender or 
drifter.  
 
Some of the blame for wasted funding, however, needs to lie with the Muslim groups and 
organisations that applied for Prevent funding with either no previous experience on the 
issue, or little or no intention to use the funds for PVE work. Just under a quarter of those 
interviewed raised concerns about various ‘bogus Muslim groups’131 who applied and 
successfully attained funding as they knew how to ‘tick the correct boxes’. These groups 
may have been active in some form within their local communities, but the interviewees 
felt that they lacked credibility on many occasions with this particular agenda and in a 
sense refocused their organisational aims in order to qualify for the funding. On the face 
of it, this is not an issue as many organisations constantly change their overarching aims 
in a bid to keep up with evolving trends. However, many respondents were concerned132 
that these groups were doing so primarily to receive Prevent funding, when they simply 
did not possess the experience they claimed to have with de-radicalisation and counter-
radicalisation work. One informed informant from the North East felt that these Muslim 
organisations have: 
 
‘…come up from under the woodwork for the money. They don’t know how to 
deal with it, they’ve never done it before in the past…’ (grw 831) 
 
Thus, certain respondents generally agreed that problems with funding cannot simply be 
blamed solely on the government as some Muslim organisations were simply leading 
them to believe that they knew how to achieve the set aims. As one grassroots worker 
from London explained, these groups ‘write a damn good bloody bid . . . but this is not 
the fault of the OSCT or the Home Office, ‘cos they’re being led to believe that they know 
what they’re talking about…’ (gee 997). There was, however, a general concern that the 
government wasn’t stringent enough with its assessments for allocating funding.  
 
This runs much deeper than simply the issue of wasting money. These groups were 
tasked with conducting important de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation work at the 
                                                 
131
 Certain groups were mentioned to the author, ‘off the record’.  
132
 It must be noted that some of this ‘concern’ was due to reasons other than PVE, such as 
religious or personal conflicts between various grassroots groups. This has been discussed in 
more depth within the Conclusions chapter. 
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grassroots level, and failure for them to achieve the aims of PVE may have had 
detrimental consequences. This concern is particularly accentuated when considering 
initiatives that work alongside Prevent, such as the ‘Channel’ programme. Channel is 
described, in the current Prevent Strategy, as a ‘multi-agency programme to identify and 
provide support to people at risk of radicalisation’ (HM Government, 2011). One of the 
modes of support, something that was particularly employed by the previous Labour 
government, was to use grassroots groups and individuals. Thus, agencies such as the 
police, for example, were identifying those they felt were at risk of becoming radicalised, 
or had become radicalised133, and referring them to these grassroots groups for support 
(which could be in the form of de-radicalisation or counter-radicalisation). 
 
There then could have been the risk that those needing help did not receive it as the 
grassroots groups were not capable of providing it. On many occasions this funding was 
allocated, as mentioned, to those who had existing relationships with local authorities. 
The risk here was that projects could have been run by organisations that were not 
necessarily in touch with those susceptible to radicalisation or those who have become 
radicalised. Further, they may not have been able to connect with current youth issues or 
culture particular to the UK. They may well not have understood, or have even been 
aware, that some youth may be pretenders and have the potential to progress to 
becoming drifters. As a result, there may be a similar story to what was described in the 
empirical chapter, ‘Contingencies’, where Muslim young people have some disconnect 
with their elders, which in turn pushes them further away from mainstream society. 
 
Another issue regarding funding raised within the data was a feeling that the government 
were ‘throwing money at the issue’; a concern held by around a fifth of the interviewees. 
Although this may not have necessarily been the case (at least in all accounts), it was a 
representative concern which was accentuated by the global economic downturn. Many 
of the informed informants, answering as British taxpayers as well as those countering 
extremism, felt the funds were being misused, and in some cases abused, which would 
not help to alleviate the issues. As a community representative noted, ‘I do not believe 
                                                 
133
 If the individual or group identified through Channel has committed some sort of crime, then 
they will of course be dealt with through the criminal justice system. However, there is the 
possibility that grassroots groups would also be used as a supporting mechanism. 
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simply throwing money at the problem solves the problem’ (rmc 737). This was also 
reflected by certain community members, as one individual commented: 
 
‘…they’re throwing money at a problem thinking the money will get rid of the 
problem…how is that going to prevent those kids from becoming terrorists the next day?’ 
(cms 987) 
 
Regardless of whether the funds were being used directly for PVE work, the money was 
still, largely, being used to develop elements of Muslim communities. However, many of 
the Muslim respondents interviewed were anxious that if the money was not being used 
for PVE work then it subsequently caused confusion with the overall aims of the strategy, 
not only in the eyes of Muslims, but also wider society. The strategy outlined that it 
aimed to support both de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation work, though 
respondents felt that certain projects did not reflect this. The interviewees found it difficult 
to see any obvious correlations between the some of the commissioned projects of 
which they were personally aware and the end goal of PVE. This was predominantly 
attributed to the perceived blurring of lines between broader community cohesion type 
projects and what they understood to be CT work; a concern which was also outlined by 
the Home Affairs Select Committee (House of Commons 2010: 52).  
 
Although one principal aim of the Prevent Strategy was to increase the resilience of local 
communities to violent extremism (HM Government, 2007), the confusion stemmed from 
the involvement of certain central government departments. For example, respondents 
were very clear that there was no place within discussions around a CT nature for the 
Department for Communities and Local Government. An informed informant working on 
a youth project in the North East of England raised similar concerns. He argued that the 
government ‘have been doing it all wrong because their main focus is on community 
cohesion…it’s not dealing with the issues.’ (grw 831). 
 
The terminology used under the Prevent banner also contributed towards the confusion. 
Terms like ‘terrorism’, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘violent extremism’ were frequently being used, 
when, in reality, many projects had very little, if any, meaningful connections with these 
issues. The respondents believed that this led to certain projects, which were of course 
geared towards Muslims, coming under scrutiny from wider society where there was an 
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assumption that those involved had some affiliation to extremism, even though this may 
have not been the case. As a grassroots community worker from London argued: 
 
‘…when the government gives money to other community organisations to open 
up the youth centre…nobody bats an eyelid…[but] if the money came from Prevent and 
the youth centre is geared for Muslims then all of a sudden it has different connotations.’ 
(gee 697) 
 
The interviewees did not, though, object to this type of terminology when it was detached 
from broader community cohesion type projects. Neither did they generally have issues 
with the ‘Prevent’ label, as long as it concentrated on immediate and targeted CT work. If 
it were not to, one possible consequence is the creation of a ‘suspect community’ which 
can occur through the use or misuse of various CT strategies and legislation. During the 
height of the Northern Ireland conflicts, this concern was raised by Hillyard (1993) who 
argued that Irish communities, especially those based on the UK mainland, were treated 
as ‘suspect’ and were frequently subject to fewer civil rights than others, not only by the 
state, but also elements of the media and sections of wider society. Similar issues have 
been discussed in relation to Muslim communities in previous chapters. The arguments 
have resurfaced in relation to the AQ and AQI threat, where Pantazis and Pemberton 
(2009), for example, claim Muslims are being labelled as the new ‘suspect community’. 
Although there are potentially distinct differences, as argued by Greer (2010), between 
the ‘suspect community’ Hillyard (1993) discusses, and the ‘new’ outlined by Pantazis 
and Pemberton (2009), there may also be some important similarities. 
 
In fact, as outlined in previous chapters, the majority view of the interviewees was that 
Muslim communities were being criminalised as a whole for the actions of a very small 
minority, with whom they had no real affiliations except that they happened to share the 
same religion. What is clear is that criminalising whole communities, or the perception of 
this, has the potential to be counter-productive in terms of CT work, and could potentially 
make individuals more ‘vulnerable to radicalisation’ through ‘frustration and alienation’ 
(House of Commons 2010: 11). In the previous chapter, ‘Susceptibility’, it was outlined 
that one element which helps to ‘push’ Muslim youth away from mainstream society and 
acts as a ‘pull’ towards extremists is at the local level, i.e. how certain CT legislation is 
seen as specifically targeting Muslims. In fact, if these youth believe they are perceived 
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as being deviant or suspect by wider society, it can also affect them at the personal 
level. Further, integrating community cohesion type projects with CT can be counter-
productive within both agendas (Spalek and Lambert 2008).  
 
This fear was considerably accentuated when considering the widespread accusations 
of Prevent being used as a tool to gather intelligence and spy on Muslim communities. 
This concern was also felt by respondents within this research. This type of clandestine 
intelligence gathering, perceived or real, has the potential to alienate communities and 
become ‘a disincentive for that public to volunteer intelligence’ (Innes and Thiel 2008). It 
also lends further strength to the notion of ‘suspect communities’. 
 
These concerns were widely reported at the time (see for example, House of Commons, 
2010; Kundnani 2009). Although this study’s empirical data reflected a number of similar 
findings, discussing these would simply be repeating previous arguments. It is deemed 
better to discuss how these allegations have been extended to Muslim communities and 
informed informants themselves. This further affected their perceptions of Prevent and 
had consequences with their relationship with the state. This is turn had a direct impact 
on inhibiting de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation at the grassroots level. 
 
The data strongly suggested that parts of Muslim communities were looking inward at 
one another with suspicion, causing an element of distrust and apprehension134. This 
was reflected by a prominent community representative from the Midlands:  
 
 ‘…the issue of spying has caused a lot of tension within Muslim communities; 
anybody could be a spy now in the mosque, yeah, so everyone is viewing the other with 
suspicion.’ (rmc 321) 
 
This had inevitably also extended to the informed informants themselves, with certain 
community members accusing them of being ‘puppets of the government’ and ‘toeing the 
government agenda’ (grw 927). As a result, around half of the grassroots respondents 
admitted that they regretted receiving Prevent funding in the first instance, had refused 
                                                 
134
 This has also been raised as a potential concern within wider research (see Khan 2009, for 
example). 
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it, or had attempted to conceal acceptance from their communities. As one informed 
informant from the North West of England quipped:  
 
‘I wouldn’t tell anybody I am funded through Prevent!’ (gee 796) 
 
It is important to consider that this grassroots worker felt that receiving Prevent funding 
not only amplified grievances felt across his local community, but also claimed that it was 
proving to be counter-productive towards his own PVE work. Several interviewees were 
very concerned, due to the negative connotations associated with the strategy, that their 
‘credibility’ would be damaged. They felt this would consequently distance themselves 
from the youth they were aiming to support. As one grassroots worker from the North 
East of England explained:  
 
 ‘…our credibility is more important than money…So, it might make our work 
counter-productive, so it might push people further into radicalisation…’ (grw 831) 
 
These views were of course not representative of all of those involved with the strategy. 
Although in a very small minority, there were certain grassroots groups who believed that 
many elements of the strategy were crucial to their work which enabled them to provide 
a stronger support structure for susceptible individuals. As an informed informant from 
London noted, ‘…it allowed us to give a support network stronger than the [extreme] 
recruiters would give…’ (gee 997). However, from the data gathered for this thesis, and 
from an analysis of wider research on this issue, it is reasonable to argue that the 
negatives of the strategy comprehensively outweighed the positives. Further, even if the 
informed informants did rely on Prevent funding to continue their work, they preferred, as 
mentioned above, to conceal this money from their local communities and the youth they 
were aiming to support.  
 
This section has discussed the issues related to the Prevent Strategy released in 2007. 
However, the strategy was reviewed by the Coalition Government and a revised version 
was published in 2011. The new strategy attempted to alleviate some of the concerns 
held with its predecessor. Though, it is not without its own criticisms. Some of these 
relate to the underlying issues discussed within this current section, and throughout the 
thesis as a whole. This will be the focus of the final section of the chapter. 
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7.3 Policy Considerations: Prevent Strategy 2011 
 
The revised version of Prevent was released by the Coalition Government in 2011; and 
stands as the current edition at the time of writing this chapter135. The new strategy has 
three principle aims: challenging the ideology that supports terrorism and those who 
promote it; protecting vulnerable people; and supporting sectors and institutions where 
there are risks of radicalisation occurring (HM Government, 2011). There is a noticeable 
shift with this version where it is more in line with David Cameron’s infamous use of the 
term ‘muscular liberalism’ (Cavanagh, 2011). The strategy also focuses upon addressing 
some of the concerns raised in relation to its predecessor; some of which were outlined 
in the previous section. After a deeper analysis of the strategy, however, it can be said 
that the current version raises more compelling questions than it answers. 
 
One of the main criticisms, as mentioned in previous chapters, is with whom the strategy 
considers to be an extremist (Soria, 2011; Spalek, 2011; Jackson, 2011; Hasan, 2011a; 
Bartlett and Miller, 2011). It can be understood that this label is attached to those who do 
not fully subscribe to certain core values of the UK, such as democracy and tolerance 
towards other faiths and homosexuality, for example. The strategy defines ‘extremism’ 
as the: 
 
‘…vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, 
the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different 
faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the 
death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas’ (HM 
Government, 2011: 107) 
 
Many of the grassroots groups that were once at the core of implementing the Labour 
government’s CT strategy now fall under this category and have been removed from any 
current and future plans136. There is a fear that their departure from the arena has left a 
                                                 
135
 It must be noted that, at the time of writing, the Coalition Government are rethinking the 
strategy. Its direction will be determined post results gained from the newly formed ‘Tackling 
Extremism and Radicalisation Taskforce’ (TERFOR), which was set up in the wake of the murder 
of Drummer Lee Rigby in London in May 2013. 
136
 A number of these groups follow the Salafi sect of Islam. For a more detailed discussion see 
the Methodology chapter of the thesis. 
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vacuum (Bartlett and Miller, 2011; Soria, 2011), and there are concerns over who will fill 
this ‘void’ (Spalek, 2011). Soria (2011) outlined that those working at the ‘hard edge’ of 
Prevent find that these groups may be best to offer solutions, and may follow previous 
methods of taking a pragmatic approach to working with them (Choudary and Fenwick, 
2011). 
 
Although the definition of ‘extremist’ provided by the Coalition Government is fraught with 
complexities and differing interpretations, their concerns should not be dismissed without 
any discussion. A number of these groups were interviewed as part of the empirical 
research and their ability to contribute positively to this agenda – at least in the context 
of countering extremism – cannot be denied. However, many of them did not subscribe 
to some of the core ideals of a free, fair and democratic society. Though it needs to be 
considered whether this is something that should be punished, or is it simply part of the 
foundation of this country, i.e. freedom of speech and choice? Do their beliefs really 
matter so long as they are not breaking the law or posing a security threat? Yet others 
may argue that some of the ideals they hold are in parallel to certain extreme groups and 
working with them may in the long term cause more issues than it solves. This research 
did not provide answers to these questions and this may be seen as a limitation with the 
thesis. However, rash decisions on this could have severe long-term implications, and it 
may well be an issue that is posed for future research. 
 
What the data was sure about is that radicalisation needs to primarily be countered from 
the grassroots level. One key reason for using grassroots groups is due to the trust they 
have built up with Muslim youth in their local areas and communities. Further, almost all, 
if not all, of these grassroots workers have been born or brought up in the UK, and, as a 
result, have experienced similar strains and issues. Not only are they socially and 
culturally in tune with the youth, some of them were former extremists and are able to 
identify, through experience, with the problems these youth are facing. Critically, they 
have the potential to ‘de-glamorise’ extremism (Bartlett et al., 2010); something that links 
in with the subcultural element argued within this thesis.  
 
The use of grassroots groups is not only prevalent within de-radicalisation and counter-
radicalisation strategies. It has been a proven approach taken in wider examples, like 
female domestic violence for example (Robinson, 2009; Krishnan et al., 2012). Here, 
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grassroots groups were a requirement due mainly to the social and political institutions 
being dominated by men137 (Jones and Cook, 2008). Though, as with radicalisation, 
these types of domestic violence grassroots groups can only offer limited assistance and 
need to be supported by the government (Robinson and Hudson, 2011). Thus, Duneier 
(2001) argues there to be a ceiling with the contribution informal social control voluntary 
organisations can make. It needs to be appreciated that value can also be added from 
certain government agencies, namely the police138. 
 
It may be that the government needs to soften their stance to find an agreeable way to 
work with these groups who fall under the non-violent extremism category. This is not to 
say that all effective grassroots individuals and groups fall in this definition. The research 
found there to be some very good grassroots workers who did subscribe to what are 
generally considered to be the core ideals of the UK, as outlined previous. Though, there 
were just as many that appeared not to and this cannot be ignored. 
 
However, working together and achieving effective cooperation is a skill which is difficult 
to undertake (Sennett, 2012). In his analysis, Sennett outlines two modes of practice: 
‘dialectic’ and ‘dialogic’. He argues that dialectic should be understood from Hegel’s 
perspective as a power struggle between those who are dominant and subordinate. It 
can be said that the Coalition Government have taken more of a dialectic stance when 
they should adopt more of a dialogic one. Further, rather than opting for an assertive 
mode with no space for conversation, i.e. a declarative mode, there needs to be a shift 
towards a subjunctive one where space is opened up for discussion through ambiguity. 
This enables people to interact, and to do so much more productively. Sennett argues 
that dialogic collaboration is far more complex and difficult to achieve, but one that may 
yield the most positive results for achieving a mutual desired end goal. This is about 
working with people unlike you, those you do not understand, or those you do not 
necessarily like. This will result in an appreciation of one another’s differences where 
there is not always necessarily going to be agreement, but there can be a way to 
accommodate them to work together and solve the problem. Thus, Sennett asserts the 
need to understand ‘the other’ in order to achieve complex cooperation.  
                                                 
137
 The author would like to thank Dr Amanda Robinson at Cardiff University for this distinction.  
138
 However, there must be caution with this as some Muslim youth, as outlined in the previous 
section, are reluctant to work with grassroots organisations that have strong affiliations with, or 
have been funded by, the government. 
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Although both versions of Prevent have their own distinct problems, there is one clear 
commonality between them. That is their inability to effectively balance a top-down and 
bottom-up approach to countering extremism within the UK. The previous version was 
criticised for giving too much power, control and flexibility to grassroots and community 
groups running government funded projects. As Sennett (2012: 20) writes, ‘A dialogic 
conversation can be ruined by too much identification with the other person’. On the 
other hand, the more recent version in 2011 can be criticised for going too far the other 
direction by moving away from the community-led approach on which it was founded, to 
something which is too in line, as mentioned, with David Cameron’s use of the term 
‘muscular liberalism’ in Munich in 2011. There needs to be a determination of how formal 
social control can articulate with informal social control. 
 
However, there needs to be a consideration of the issues raised in the previous version 
of Prevent. There were ongoing debates regarding who should be funded. This is a very 
difficult and complex task, as determining which organisations should be funded, whilst 
considering the often varying perceptions of them has proven to be difficult. The issue of 
‘bogus groups’ applying, sometimes successfully, for Prevent funding was also raised. If 
groups are being funded, then there needs to be procedures put in place to be able to 
understand how to assess and monitor their work. This is of course not straightforward 
as setting out the benchmarks and criteria for assessment will be extremely complex and 
difficult. This cannot just be about turnover, i.e. how many young people they support, as 
the youth will all be at different levels of radicalisation. Further, as they are dealing with 
human beings, some will take longer than others to de-radicalise. The reviewed Prevent 
Strategy somewhat recognises this, but there is a real lack of clarity to how assessment 
will be undertaken. The strategy outlines that it will focus on qualitative outcomes (such 
as attitudinal and behavioural change) rather than a quantitative assessment (Soria, 
2011). Though how are attitudinal and behavioural changes assessed? What are they 
assessed against? Realistically this can only be measured on an individual basis when 
you are able to compare pre and post state. Is it realistic, logistically and economically, 
to be able to do this with every person? In fact, is this measurable and viable when 
considering all those that will be assessed will have their own individual tendencies, 
opinions and factors affecting them? Finally, who will assess these people? Will they be 
experts on radicalisation and de-radicalisation techniques? How does one determine 
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who is an ‘expert’? These are extremely difficult questions, though are important and 
need to be addressed. 
 
This is assuming that these grassroots groups want to work with the government and 
receive funding. As demonstrated in the previous section, many shunned this funding or 
concealed it to avoid creating a distance between them and the youth they were aiming 
to support. The distinct advantage some of these grassroots workers have, i.e. being 
able to relate to these radicalisees on different social, cultural and political levels, could 
become threatened, as the empirical data demonstrated, due to their affiliation with the 
government. There needs to be exploration of how these types of groups are supported, 
both financially and otherwise, without necessarily showing a strong affiliation with the 
government; though still maintaining the same accountability and transparency.  
 
Although de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation did not feature in this thesis, that is 
not to say there were no discussions on the topic during the data collection. It was not 
uncommon for grassroots workers to have differing approaches to undertaking this type 
of work. Some argued that it should be conducted primarily on an ideological level, whilst 
others focussed their attentions on the social and cultural aspects. Others felt it should 
be a combination of the two approaches and appreciated the complexity of radicalisation 
and the requirement of a multi-faceted approach to implement a successful strategy. 
 
In this regard, another concern with the Prevent Strategy139 is its lack of understanding 
of how the process of radicalisation actually occurs. Although it cites some of the core 
components of radicalisation that were also found in this thesis, it appears to not 
understand, or even attempt to understand, how these components fit together. The 
strategy needs to draw on groundbreaking research in this arena and use this as a 
framework for the problem and work backwards, rather than viewing the problem through 
one particular lens (Hutter and Power, 2005). As with its predecessor, this version of 
Prevent has not grasped the different ways people can become affiliated to extremism, 
such as the career paths discussed at the fore of this chapter. 
 
                                                 
139
 Although this argument is presented in terms of the Prevent Strategy released in 2011, it is 
applicable for the 2007 version also. 
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The flaws in the recent Prevent Strategy have the potential to be counter-productive and 
damage the long-term approach to countering violent extremism in the UK. These may 
be somewhat alleviated by considering some of the findings of this thesis. There are a 
number of areas within this strategy which need to be either seriously rethought or more 
vigorously outlined and defined. There are important omissions from the strategy like the 
links between youth subculture and extremism, which is something that this account of 
radicalisation has found to hold great importance.  
 
7.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
At the fore of this chapter, three career paths were outlined which radicalisees are able 
to navigate through (i.e. the seekers pretenders, and drifters). The careers were an 
amalgamation of the different arguments and considerations from the first three empirical 
chapters. The empirical data highlighted a number of important and interesting key 
findings across the thesis. Although these were wide-ranging, there was much focus 
upon the role of culture, subculture and social identity within radicalisation. This is not to 
say the other topics raised do not merit the same importance. It is to highlight that the 
value of culture, subculture and social identity within radicalisation studies have been 
neglected in most accounts to date, or not been provided with the depth of discussion 
they deserve. 
 
These career paths were then considered in the context of relevant CT policy in the UK. 
It was argued that when the government attempt to solve the problem through legislation 
alone, they may actually be fuelling the issue. In terms of extremism in the UK, this type 
of legislation can create an outsider status, which is then viewed as ‘cool’ and part of a 
subcultural trend certain youth want to be involved with. Cohen (1972) similarly argues 
that deviant youth subculture is fuelled by drama. With the example of the ‘Mods and 
Rockers’, the media amplified the problem and kept it burning. As Cohen explains, it was 
the drama that attracted the youth there in the first place. 
 
It must be said that although there appear to be a number of critical deficiencies in the 
current Prevent Strategy, it has noticeably progressed as compared to its predecessor. It 
has tried to grasp some of the core elements of understanding radicalisation in further 
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detail and considered some wider aspects; though it does not attempt to understand how 
they fit together. Further, the strategy has begun to understand the evolution of the 
threat and has placed much emphasis on certain key sectors within radicalisation, such 
as the role played by the internet.  
 
However, it is important to consider that although changes in policy may restrict certain 
ways to extremism, it by no means closes them off altogether. Further, it shows that the 
threat may not completely diminish, but evolve to produce new alternatives. Thus, there 
may be a shift from those more motivated actors to the more vulnerable and susceptible 
individuals whose attacks may be far harder to predict. In fact, as discussed, there are 
different opinions on where the threat currently is, and where it is evolving to.  
 
This shows that the threat is constantly changing dependent on how policy is reacting to 
it. As Hacking (1995) explains in his chapter entitled the ‘looping effects of human kinds’, 
people have agency, where they are able to react, interpret and adapt to the new set of 
circumstances they find themselves in. In order to counter this threat, it can be argued 
that we need to address the symptoms as well as dealing with the ‘disease’; something 
the current version of Prevent has been accused of not doing (Awan, 2011; Soria, 2011). 
It is not an issue we can simply arrest our way out of. Molotch (2012) explains that post-
9/11, society is increasingly more likely to look to technology or legislation to resolve our 
security issues. However, the decisions to use these tactics are not always based on 
evidence showing them to be the best approaches to countering the threat of terrorism. 
It may be more aligned with the fact that we do not entirely understand how to solve the 
problems we face. We need to be seen to be doing something, and although this is not 
necessarily the right solution to solve the issue, it is the most obvious one. Therefore, as 
Molotch argues, these precautions against terrorism have the potential to be counter-
productive and increase the risk of the threat. There is still a need for technology and 
legislation; however, the argument is that these factors alone cannot solve the issue of 
extremism. Through the various examples provided in his book, the common thread is 
that security is most effective when these problems are solved by humans and informal 
social practices. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusions 
 
This thesis has focussed upon how and why some people become radicalised to a point 
where they accept violent acts of terrorism as a legitimate means to attain their particular 
objectives. The study was devised on the basis that the phenomenon is relatively under-
researched, where much of the current work is not supported by empirical data, robust 
research designs, or clear conceptual framings (Horgan, 2005; Nasser-Eddine, 2011; 
Wiktorowicz, 2005; Borum, 2011). Consequently, many accounts are informed by what 
Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010) describe as ‘conventional wisdom’.  
 
Most critically, the majority of accounts focus their attention on the causes and workings 
of radicalisation in the specific context of Islamic extremism, but fail to appreciate that 
the process is similar to a number of wider examples. Thus, many accounts do not take 
a multi-disciplinary approach to understanding the phenomenon in more depth. This 
thesis has shown, similar to various other accounts, that radicalisation may well be about 
grievances, strains, social networks, for example, but most importantly it is about a shift 
in people’s perceptions of self and social identity. The employment of a robust and 
flexible sociological framework like Goffman’s (1961) moral career allows radicalisation 
to be depicted as a change in one’s identity. Through locating several wider sociology, 
criminology and social psychology theories within this framework, this research has 
remedied some of the critical shortcomings in much current work on radicalisation. This 
has been underpinned by empirical data collected from those with experience, expertise 
and a vested interest in countering violent extremism in the UK. 
 
8.1 A Summary of the Research 
 
Prior to discussing the key empirical findings of the research, it is important to provide a 
reminder of the research questions this thesis has engaged with and a brief summary of 
the key issues and findings that were addressed in the empirical chapters:  
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1. How do people become radicalised? 
 
2. Why are some people rendered susceptible to radicalisation and why do some go on 
to commit forms of violence but others do not? 
 
3. What is the perception and reception ‘on the ground’ of counter-terrorism policies and 
strategies amongst those who are, in many ways, the focus of such attentions? 
 
4. What are the wider implications of the findings of this research for policymakers, 
practitioners and academics? 
 
The first empirical chapter of the thesis answered the first and elements of the second 
research questions outlined above. It alludes to Goffman’s (1961) prepatient phase of 
moral career where individuals’ past events and relationships, including those with the 
state and society, take on a new meaning. The chapter outlined the different strains and 
grievances affecting Muslim youth within the UK, and were represented at three levels: 
personal level (i.e. identity and belonging); local level (i.e. within both their local and 
national geographical area concerning relationships held with the state and authorities – 
including the implementation of counter-terrorism strategies); global level (concerning 
political decisions which directly affect Muslims in terms of their wellbeing and safety in 
the form of military conflicts or civil unrest, specifically as a result of foreign policy).  
 
The chapter on ‘Contingencies’ argued there to be a number of contingencies which 
either help to facilitate an individual with becoming radicalised, or enable them to bypass 
this fate. Goffman (1961) argues there to be just as many, if not more, people in society 
considered as ‘mentally ill’ who have not been admitted to ‘mental hospitals’. Therefore, 
he asserts that patients do not suffer distinctly from mental illness, but more from 
contingencies, where it is the decision and choices of other people which help determine 
their career direction. The career advancement of the radicalisee works in a similar way. 
Within this account of radicalisation these contingencies were strongly affiliated with 
culture, subculture, social identity, and social interactions and bonds.  
 
The next chapter, ‘Conversion’, outlined the process by which certain radicalisees move 
on from feeling the grievances, strains and contingencies discussed in the first two 
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empirical chapters to internalising extremist ideologies. This empirical chapter answered 
both the first and second research questions outlined above. In essence, the process of 
radicalisation is a change in someone’s beliefs, attitudes and actions. This in turn leads 
to a change in their perception of self and social identity. In order to explain how this 
occurs, the chapter drew upon Goffman’s (1961) inpatient phase of his moral career 
framework, particularly focussing on the mortification and reconstruction process.  
 
The final chapter of the thesis provided an opportunity to bring together theory, practice 
and policy. The first section of the chapter outlined the three distinct career paths which 
radicalisees were fully able to engage in. These careers are by no means deterministic, 
and radicalisees are able to navigate through them like they would with any other career. 
The career paths consisted of the seekers, pretenders and drifters. The chapter then 
empirically analysed grassroots and community perceptions of the Prevent Strategy (the 
version released in 2007). This specifically addressed the third and elements of the 
fourth research questions of the thesis. There was a particular focus on how the career 
paths, outlined in the previous section, related to the way in which policy has developed 
and articulated the issue. The final section of the chapter took this a step further and 
analysed how the most recent version of the Prevent Strategy (released in 2011) has 
changed and evolved from its predecessor.  
 
8.2 Theoretical Contributions to the Field 
 
Accounts of radicalisation vary and differ in their approach to understanding the issue140. 
A number of these endorse their own perceptions of the causal factors of radicalisation. 
Finding mutual agreement with these is one of the most critical and challenging issues 
within the current theoretical approaches in the field.  
 
The use of Goffman’s (1961) moral career framework helped to overcome this by being 
able to temporarily strip away the commonly discussed causes of radicalisation which in 
turn provided a blank canvas. This was achieved through the identification of key phases 
in terms of how self and social identities are de- and then re-constructed through distinct 
processes of conversion. From this, a picture of radicalisation can be constructed which 
                                                 
140
 For a detailed discussion, refer to the Literature Review chapter. 
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considers those factors suitable to the particular context, e.g. dependent on differing  
environments, cultures, situations, and states, amongst others, which some argue is vital 
to studying the phenomenon effectively (COT Institute, 2008). This ensures there will not 
be an attempt to provide a ‘one size fits all’ approach to understanding the issue, but 
allows for more flexibility. Thus, this research has been able to confirm certain relevant 
existing theories with radicalisation, whilst still providing the necessary space to discover 
those factors which haven’t previously been considered, or been given the necessary 
importance or depth. Within this thesis, these topics have mainly concerned issues of 
culture, subculture and social identity.  
 
The use of this framework also allowed the analysis to move away from considering the 
strains felt at the ‘macro-level’ as causal. This is particularly apparent as there are large 
numbers of people who experience exactly the same strains though do not become 
radicalised. The research found that rather than acting as causal factors, these strains 
and grievances created an ‘enabling environment’ (ECEGVR, 2008). From this, other 
important considerations, such as micro-level factors and subcultural contingencies, are 
able to be applied and considered within the framework. This enables an appreciation of 
how they articulate with other elements of radicalisation and how they mutually reinforce 
and drive one another through. Peter Neumann argues that there is currently good 
knowledge of the ‘ingredients’ of radicalisation, but a limited understanding of how to 
‘cook the recipe’ (House of Commons, 2012: 10). Goffman’s (1961) moral career 
provided a useful framework to go some way to achieve this.  
 
Many authors, some more successfully than others, have also attempted to ‘cook the 
recipe’. Although there are a number, albeit small, of important accounts of radicalisation 
in the field based on empirical findings, almost all of them have one particular shortfall. 
This relates to the sociological underpinnings of radicalisation. There are of course those 
authors who explain that at the heart of radicalisation is the process of socialisation, or 
resocialisation, which is facilitated through various avenues of learning, such as lectures 
and study groups, for example. But this by no means outlines how this process of 
socialisation actually works. Critically, Goffman’s (1961) theory provides real insights into 
the process of identity change by employing concepts of mortification and reconstruction 
of the self, which in turn helps to inform how conversion occurs.  
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Another benefit of using this particular framework is its ability to allow the incorporation 
of wider multi-disciplinary theories, as discussed earlier, to explain certain phenomenon, 
such as group solidarity or violence for example. It must be noted, however, that there 
are limitations with the account of violence presented within this thesis due to empirical 
data collected on the topic being thinner than the other sections. This particular account 
has provided a version from the viewpoint of the individual, where some people argue 
the benefits of gaining insights from group dynamics and that group dynamic motivations 
are stronger than rational self-interest (Atran, 2006; Sageman, 2008). It merely attempts 
to explain one theory of why people engage in violence and does not claim to be a 
generic process. However, it does provide an in-depth understanding of the moral, 
religious and subcultural factors at play on the individual which can go some way to 
further understanding the phenomenon. 
 
One of these theories incorporated into the wider framework was RCT. In fact, Goffman 
himself discusses concepts in his account of moral career, like ‘primary and secondary 
adjustments’, which allude to the notion of RCT. As discussed in depth in the Literature 
Review chapter, radicalisation can be divided into two parts; i.e. moving to a position of 
violence, and agreeing to and engaging in violence or terrorism (Veldhuis and Staun, 
2009). The data found that RCT is not involved in the radicalisation process which leads 
to violence but does play a part, however small, when it comes to engaging in violence. 
It can be argued that committing an act of terrorism, especially involving suicide, can be 
considered as a large sacrifice, and this is potentially where Kahneman’s (2011) ‘System 
2’ starts to become more important. Certain factors such as the desire for identity, 
attempting to fit in with subcultural trends and satisfying cultural needs seem to be based 
on rationality. 
 
Though, the fact that these individuals have developed some form of susceptibility and 
have been primed by their emotions cannot be denied. Radicalisation cannot simply be 
defined as a grievance based account, nor can theories around persuasion, ideology, or 
religion be enough to understand this phenomenon. Using concepts like SMT, tied in 
with other previously mentioned frameworks and theories, goes some way to alleviate 
this. Thus, as with certain other authors (Pisoiu, 2012), this thesis has taken the relevant 
elements of SMT and combined them with RCT to attain a more balanced perspective. 
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This was represented through various instances in the empirical data. However, the 
account of one particular former extremist epitomises this. This individual had travelled 
to Afghanistan to participate in what he perceived to be ‘jihad’. As outlined in the relevant 
empirical chapter, he argued that on the one hand he was fully aware of his decision to 
travel and fight. He even contemplated his own death and offset this against the belief 
that he had sinned in his life. On the other hand he also strongly asserted that during his 
radicalisation his emotions were, as he put it, ‘abused’.  
 
Thus, it is important to have an appreciation of the wrap around social control element 
and the value SMT can play with framing arguments, whilst not discounting the pertinent 
and relevant RCT considerations. As Crenshaw (2012: 106) correctly argues, ‘Terrorism 
is neither an automatic reaction to conditions nor a purely calculated strategy’. The 
difference with this particular research is that these theories have been encapsulated in 
a wider theoretical framework, i.e. moral career, in order to make more sense of them, 
and to be able to better apply them within the current context.  
 
One further value of using Goffman’s (1961) framework is that it allows the opportunity to 
apply theory to a wider context than just the physical boundaries of total institutions. As 
has been demonstrated within this research, moral career as a framework can be 
applied to understand issues faced within normal society, i.e. radicalisation. However, 
the change in people’s self and social identity also occurs on a daily basis and in 
numerous contexts, from whom they vote for, supporting various causes (which do not 
necessarily have to be deviant per se), and, as discussed earlier, stopping smoking and 
paying taxes. Thus, once again, wider concepts such as nudge can be incorporated into 
the bigger picture to increase clarity.  
 
Finally, and potentially most critical, although Goffman’s framework enabled the context 
to be UK specific for this particular study, it also provided the flexibility to be theoretically 
applied in a number of different situations globally. This is something that also has the 
ability to transcend the confines of terrorism and criminology. Whilst most accounts of 
radicalisation attempt to explain why people become terrorists, using Goffman’s theory 
allowed the discussion to focus upon it being a change in people’s identity. That is, in its 
most simple understanding, radicalisation is about a change in perceptions of self and 
social identity, which in turn has the potential to alter beliefs, attitudes and actions. Thus, 
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although this research is not the first to study the concept of radicalisation, it is one of the 
first to use a framework such as Goffman’s to understand the phenomenon to engage 
with those gaps in the research and identify factors which were either not previously 
considered or given much importance. This provides a higher level of abstraction than 
many of the current accounts of radicalisation available. 
 
8.3 Research Implications 
 
There are a number of considerations for the current research. As much of this has been 
covered in depth in the previous section, the conversation here focuses more on the 
methodological limitations of this particular research and what lessons can be learnt. The 
section concludes by outlining where future research in this area should be conducted.  
 
The research engaged with respondents who have not always been given a platform to 
share their knowledge and experience. Only recently have they started to be recognised 
as important data sources (House of Commons, 2012). This includes those, part of the 
‘informed informants’ data set in this research, working at the grassroots level with youth 
who are susceptible to radicalisation, are becoming radicalised, and/or those who have 
become radicalised. Based on a wealth of knowledge and experience, respondents were 
able to provide very real and crucial insights about radicalisation. As many of them were 
once part of both non-violent and violent extremist groups, their personal experiences 
were also crucial to the research.  
 
As outlined in the Methodology, the informed informants included, as well as grassroots 
workers, former extremists (though some of these were also grassroots workers), youth 
workers, and religious leaders. When designing the research there was an assumption 
made, although not a predetermined hypothesis, that there would be wide-ranging 
contrasts between these different respondents, and they were purposefully sampled in 
this way. This was mainly due to the perceived differences in their work, backgrounds 
and experiences. Although this proved to be true to some extent, it became apparent 
during the data collection that their views were generally more similar than different. This 
was in the context of understanding the causes and process of radicalisation and due to 
the fluidity and wide-ranging approaches they took towards their work. As a result, the 
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terms ‘grassroots worker’ and ‘informed informant’ were used interchangeably. Similarly, 
certain youth workers and religious leaders also had roles which crossed the boundaries 
of their job titles. This is an important point to focus upon as it alludes to one of the core 
findings of the thesis. That is, radicalisation should be understood through the complex 
combination of social, political, cultural, subcultural and religious considerations. In order 
to be able to effectively counter the threat, those at the grassroots level, in whichever 
capacity, need to identify, understand and adhere to the wider needs of the youth they 
are working with. 
 
In terms of recruitment, there were difficulties encountered with gaining the participation 
of community members141. It became apparent that much of this was due to the media’s 
negative (perceived or otherwise) portrayal of Muslims and their apprehension towards 
outside research as a result. Studies have shown that reporting of terrorism has strong 
adverse effects on viewers (Jenkins, 1981), let alone with those communities who are 
deemed to hold some connection with the perpetrators of terrorism. Although potential 
respondents were informed at the beginning of the conversation that this was a doctoral 
study being conducted by an academic, there appeared to be concerns with the validity 
of this statement. According to the informed informants, the community members would 
have suspected that this was an undercover attempt by a journalist or intelligence officer 
to gather information. This is not surprising when considering previous research which 
outlines the depth of knowledge Muslim communities generally have with relevant CT 
policy and the strong claims of it being used as a vehicle by the police and the security 
services to gather intelligence (Lakhani, 2012).  
 
On reflection, this can be cited as a finding of the research rather than simply a setback. 
It highlights the concern held within Muslim communities towards how society perceives 
and treats them. It is an issue experienced by many other researchers in the field (see 
Githens-Mazer et al., 2010: 18; Shibli, 2010, for example). There is one other positive to 
emerge from this setback even if the outcome was not intentional. If recruitment with the 
community members had been successful, the average age of community respondents 
would have risen drastically. If the focus of the research was upon older community 
members who may not have been born or brought up in the UK, then there might not 
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 There were also many challenges faced when attempting to gain access to, and collect data 
from, the informed informants. For a detailed discussion, see the Methodology chapter. 
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have been the potential to fully understand the issues affecting Muslim young people, 
such as those pertaining to identity and belonging. In addition, interviewing young 
community members helped to further illuminate certain Muslim youth’s subcultural 
relationships with extremism and their affiliations with masculine social identities. 
 
Moving forward, there are three recommendations for future empirical research. The first 
addresses one of the limitations of this particular study by aiming to determine why some 
people are perpetrators of terrorism whilst others remain supporters. This is not about 
those who tacitly support the use of terrorism, but concerns people on the periphery of 
jihadi clusters and cells who do not become involved in the use of violence themselves. 
As discussed within the empirical data, this is not a simple task as people often hold 
complex and often contradictory understandings and viewpoints. This will not only 
depend on their attitudes towards violence, but also on maintaining social and emotional 
ties with friends and loved ones. Only when qualitative empirical research is conducted 
can the balance between ideology, commitment, moral outrage, social bonds, group 
pressures, culture and social identity be determined.  
 
Second, an interesting element to emerge from the empirical data was the link between 
crime and extremism in the UK. The data has been used for a book chapter which is due 
to be published in 2015 (see Lakhani, 2015, forthcoming). This is not just about terrorist 
funding per se, but more about certain individuals in the UK embracing extremism in an 
attempt to morally justify acts of crime, ranging from drug dealing and robbery to murder. 
There is also the possibility of those already espousing extremist ideologies beginning to 
commit acts of criminality. Future research in the area would understand how strong and 
widespread these links are, and determine the parallels between this and the issue of 
subculture and social identity. 
 
The third recommendation for future research is the development of Goffman’s (1961) 
moral career framework. As discussed, the use of this framework for the research was 
not only instrumental in understanding radicalisation more deeply, but also in viewing it 
from a wider perspective; i.e. a change in someone’s self and social identity. It is strongly 
believed that the theory of moral career can be applicable in understanding far wider 
examples of extremism, and in fact deviance. Only when applied and rigorously tested in 
different scenarios can it be determined if this hypothesis holds any weight. 
 248 
8.4 Practitioners’ Implications 
 
This section outlines the implications for practitioners in terms of their partnerships with 
the state142. Within the previous empirical chapter, there was an in-depth conversation 
on how there should not be an underestimation of the value grassroots workers and non-
State actors can bring to the PVE agenda. As with the conversation around policy, there 
will be much complexity in collaborating at the practical level and it will be fraught with 
many difficulties. However, partnership is essential with moving the agenda forward. 
 
One issue presented in the previous empirical chapter related to how certain groups in 
the UK fall within the definition of ‘extremist’ in the most recent version of the Prevent 
Strategy (HM Government, 2011). In order to achieve our common goals, there needs to 
be some type of mutual relationship developed between them and the state. In fact, after 
the definition of extremism was released, the police continued to work, even if it was at a 
basic level, with some of these types of groups as they understood the value they could 
add143. 
 
What the data was absolutely clear about is that radicalisation needs to primarily be 
countered from the grassroots level. These people are best placed to implement organic 
de-radicalisation strategies and are influential within counter-radicalisation and elements 
of disengagement144. Thus, the state needs to find ways of working with these groups at 
the practical level as they can be effective. As outlined in the previous chapter, these 
grassroots groups are more often than not socially, culturally and politically in tune with 
the youth they are working with. They have established long-standing relationships 
based on trust with these young people. Further, and critically, they are the ones that 
have much access to those considered to be susceptible to becoming radicalised or 
have become radicalised.  
 
                                                 
142
 It is understood that this discussion should naturally involve policy implications. There is a 
complex interaction that takes place between policy framings and the problems that they seek to 
solve. The ways in which policy has developed and evolved may have influenced the kinds of 
challenges we face in the future in terms of radicalisation. However, this conversation has been 
omitted from this chapter as many of the pertinent arguments were covered in the final empirical 
chapter of the thesis.  
143
 This information was given to the author during informal chats with two different grassroots 
groups who have had their ‘Prevent funding’ cut. 
144
 For further information, see Footnote 9. 
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These grassroots groups may have a clear idea of the problem and how to best address 
it. Though the state needs to work out how they are going to listen to that message and 
whether the information is going to always be accurate. One of the only ways to ensure 
the right people are included is by having frequent and open dialogue with them which is 
based on trust and transparency. This should not be about engaging with the ‘usual 
suspects’ (Briggs et al., 2006), but ensuring that wider communities are represented145. 
Listening to a wider, and more diverse, selection of people ensures information can be 
assessed and challenged. Though, the risk here is that consulting with too many people 
may become confusing. There needs to be a balance of whom the state speaks to, 
based on how likely the non-State actors are to positively influence the debate. This is 
not going to be easy. However, there are certain indicators which can be used, such as 
their previous record of PVE in terms of working with the police and through the Channel 
project. On many occasions the state may have to take a leap of faith, though this does 
not mean funding groups they are not entirely sure of, but giving them an opportunity to 
contribute to the discussions.  
 
This will, however, be an extremely difficult task to undertake as different people, often 
those with some type of influence, will have conflicting viewpoints. For example, there 
are those, like Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010), who feel that certain Salafi groups in 
South London are at the forefront of PVE work. However, other organisations, such as 
the Quilliam Foundation, as intimated in a leaked document, consider them to be part of 
the problem. It was claimed that this report included a list of ‘extremist’ groups in the UK 
the government should steer clear of. However, the list included certain Muslim groups 
who are deemed to be peaceful (Dodd, 2010). Thus, this argument is deepened by 
organisations, like the Quilliam Foundation, apparently encouraging the government to 
adopt this viewpoint both behind closed doors and in the public sphere (Maher and 
Frampton, 2009). Whether these types of organisations’ views are due to real concerns, 
conflict, or personal benefit is not completely established. 
 
Thus, one non-State actor’s views of another may differ across the spectrum. Although 
this was not represented in the thesis, when conducting the interviews, many grassroots 
workers were overt in communicating their negative viewpoints of other similar groups. 
                                                 
145
 Similar arguments can be found in wider examples, such as honour based violence and 
violence against women (see Adelman et al., 2003, for example). 
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They claimed this was solely based upon the other groups’ lack of influence, experience 
and knowledge within the PVE agenda. However, after this concern was discussed with 
wider respondents, it was revealed that the issue runs deeper, and cultural and religious 
differences have some sort of influence within their viewpoints. Thus, one sect of Islam 
may have issues with another, and they were using the Prevent agenda to raise these 
concerns. This is an issue the government needs to be careful of as they do not want to 
be seen to be excluding some from the debate purely based on hearsay. In addition, not 
including certain groups for this reason can have consequential implications for PVE, 
especially if a potential violent extremist ‘slipped through the net’ and conducted an act 
of terrorism, where something could have been done about it if a grassroots group with 
access would have had the correct support, or were part of the dialogue.  
 
This notion of dialogue is extremely important. Wider examples in society demonstrate 
this very point. For instance, an official report found that the torture and tragic killing of 
four-year-old Daniel Pelka could have been prevented if the various authorities in 
contact with him and his family had shared information with one another (Lock, 2013). In 
relation to PVE, if these grassroots groups are not a part of the discussion, especially 
after previously being involved within it, they may feel like their opinions have little value 
and may be more reluctant to report those they think are a potential danger to the UK. 
They can, of course, continue to engage in the de-radicalisation work they have already 
been involved in, but it needs to be considered that once their funding was stopped 
many of these groups now rely on donations to keep their work going. Some of the 
groups interviewed for this research are running with limited resources, with closures 
occurring frequently. There is also the wider argument to consider here where it is their 
moral and civil duty to report people they suspect of being involved in violent extremism, 
or the potential of it. However, it is important to consider the arguments made previous 
about how there is a concern of wrongful arrest and people having their lives ruined. 
Whereas before, these groups may have been much more comfortable in discussing all 
individuals they thought could pose a threat in an environment based on trust, they may 
now feel limited with this as those informal relationships with local authorities could have 
ceased to exist. 
 
What is clear is that this is a multi-faceted problem which the state, police or grassroots 
groups are not going to be able to solve on their own. There needs to be an emphasis 
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on strong partnerships across these three groups. The value of working together can be 
seen from the concept of ‘co-production’. The term was thought to have been originally 
conceived by political economist Elinor Ostrom during the late 1970s when asked why 
she thought neighbourhood crime rates had increased in Chicago when the city’s police 
started to use patrol cars more than ‘feet on the ground’ (Stephens et al, 2008). Ostrom’s 
argument rested on the notion that the police need the community as much as the 
community need the police; something which is normally overlooked. In fact, the theory 
behind co-production has been used to describe a number of situations, from health, the 
economy, and, as mentioned above, crime. The underlying argument within all of these 
accounts is that society’s problems cannot be solved by the state alone. In order to really 
effectively counter them, there needs to be co-production between the government and 
her relevant agencies, communities, neighbourhood, family and civil society. The issue 
of radicalisation works in much the same way. This will by no means be an effortless or 
uncomplicated task. However, if these partnerships are achieved, then the rewards will 
be plentiful.  
 
8.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
Radicalisation is not just about structural strains or social bonds and interactions. It is not 
just about the excitement of being involved with a deviant group within an increasingly 
defined and ‘attractive’ subculture in society, and in fact globally. It is not just about their 
perceived moral and religious duties to protect Muslims, or to maintain, and increase, the 
position of Islam in the world against the tyranny of the West. It is actually about all of 
these factors when aligned in the mind of the radicalisee. When this is compounded by a 
radicaliser or extreme group it becomes especially pertinent. This goes to explain why 
there may be many people who are affected by all of the factors mentioned within the 
thesis, but why only a very small few go on to become what we define as terrorists. 
 
This thesis has shown that radicalisation is far more complex than much of the current 
research in the field alludes to. More importantly, it has been demonstrated that it is not 
a standalone process that is unconnected from the rest of society or its problems. The 
fact that religion is not a causal factor speaks volumes, as this problem is regularly cited 
as a Muslim or Islamic issue (Lakhani, 2013). When deconstructing the issues discussed 
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in this research it is clear that if terms like ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ were removed 
then this thesis may well be about a number of youth issues. This is not to downplay the 
importance of religion but to highlight the ‘normality’ of radicalisation. By ‘normality’ it is 
not to make light of the topic or suggest that it is not a deviant activity. It is used to show 
that the building blocks of the process are not alien to society, which importantly means 
that they can be effectively countered.  
 
Many of these young British men are no different from various others in society. This is 
not to sympathise or empathise with them or their agenda. It is to highlight that in order 
to find resolutions to the problem there needs to be an understanding not only from the 
traditional method used to interpret radicalisation, but also from one that considers the 
radicalisee as a human; one that has desires and needs like anybody else in society. It 
is therefore fitting to conclude the thesis on the idea that radicalisation may well be about 
all of the issues discussed within this research, though at its core it is about a change in 
an individual’s perception of self and social identity. 
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